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ABSTRACT 
ACCESSING ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES AND PURSUING VALUE 
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL PROMOTIONAL ALLIANCES 
 
FEBRUARY 2010 
 
JOE B. COBBS, B.S., MIAMI UNIVERSITY 
 
M.A., THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
Ph.D. CANDIDATE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS-AMHERST 
 
Directed by: Professor James M. Gladden, Ph.D. 
 
 
Accessing and exploiting organizational resources plays an integral role in not 
only a firm’s propensity to achieve a competitive advantage, but also its mere survival in 
a competitive environment (Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  One of the most common means of 
resource acquisition for both large administrative firms and smaller entrepreneurial 
enterprises is interorganizational alliances (Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002).  Utilizing 
the resource-based view of the firm within a strategic alliance framework, this 
dissertation examines a particular type of interorganizational exchange relationship 
permeating the marketing discipline.  The promotional alliance is defined within this 
research as a strategic alliance based on resource exchange between a promoting 
enterprise and a firm seeking to fulfill promotion-based objectives through an ongoing 
collaboration with the enterprise. 
Each of the two sides of the promotional alliance relationship served as a focus 
for one of the two studies presented within this work.  In the first study, a longitudinal 
 vii 
survival model was employed to investigate the dependency of a promotional enterprise 
on external resource acquisition via alliances with promotion-seeking firms.  Also at 
issue were the heterogeneity of resources accessed and the dynamics of the institutional 
forces regulating such alliances.  Alliances with sponsoring firms offering financial and 
performance-based resources, as opposed to operational resources, were found to have a 
significant influence on the survival of sponsored enterprises.  However, these 
dependencies were subject to changes in institutional support and the potential for 
diminishing returns. 
The second study approached promotional alliances from the perspective of the 
firms seeking promotion.  Relying on the theory of efficient capital markets (Fama, 
1970), an event study analysis was undertaken to determine the impact of internationally 
prominent promotional alliance announcements on the equity value of the sponsoring 
firms, which theoretically reflects investors’ expectations of future cash flows.  Contrary 
to prior research, the initiation of these alliances demonstrated a negative impact on 
shareholder value.  Several alliance, firm, and promoting partner characteristics were 
hypothesized to influence alliance outcomes to varying degrees within the cross-sectional 
sample of promotion-seeking firms.   Surprisingly, only the magnitude of the sponsoring 
firm’s alliance investment and the nationality congruence within the alliance were 
influential in predicting investors’ reaction to such alliances.      
Each study was embedded within the institutional context of Formula One (F1) 
motor racing and focused on the promotional alliances involving corporate partners 
(sponsoring firms) and their affiliated racing teams.  In this context, the racing teams 
acted as the promoting enterprises charged with providing the marketing platform to meet 
 viii 
their sponsoring firms’ objectives.  With annual races on four or more continents; a 
global television audience rivaled only by the Olympics’ opening ceremony, FIFA World 
Cup finals, and the NFL’s Super Bowl; direct competition between promoting teams; and 
sponsoring firms hailing from fifteen different nations and over twenty diverse industry 
sectors; F1 provided an ideal setting for the evaluation of interorganizational alliances’ 
impact on the survival of promoting enterprises and a promotion-seeking firm’s value 
implications.    
To compliment and strengthen the applied contribution of both studies, the 
analyzed results were subjected to a discussion with industry experts representing both 
sides of the promotional alliance relationship (Lane & Jacobson, 1995).  Not only did this 
closing analysis reinforce the relevance of the research offered here, but it also presented 
a practitioner-focused examination of the industry challenges inherent in the theoretical 
tenets underlying such research.   
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Interorganizational alliances based on a promotional resource exchange forge the 
central theme of the research featured in this dissertation.  In an effort to survive and 
thrive in a competitive environment, organizations often attempt to access and exploit 
various resources through strategic alliances with other enterprises (Ireland, Hitt, & 
Vaidyanath, 2002).  When examining marketing resources, such alliances often take the 
form of a promotional relationship where one enterprise provides access to a particular 
audience and the promotional services to reach that audience in exchange for desired 
resources offered by a partnering organization that wishes to engage the specified 
audience.  This characterization of a promotional alliance is frequently manifested 
through a commercial sponsorship arrangement that involves on one side a promoting 
enterprise such as a community festival, concert, sports contest, media broadcast, art 
show or other event that reliably attracts a desirable audience.  Collaborating in this 
arrangement with the promoting enterprise is a commercial organization on the other side 
that seeks the promotional affiliation and services available through sponsoring such an 
enterprise.  
Each of the two sides of the alliance relationship serve as a focus for one of the 
two studies presented within this work.  The first study examines the exchange from the 
perspective of the promoting enterprise; while the second study looks at the relationship 
from the viewpoint of the sponsoring firm.  Prior to tackling the details of these studies, 
this dissertation outlines an overarching framework in Chapter One that unites the two 
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studies by specifying a theoretical foundation for interorganizational promotional 
alliances.  The constructed theoretical argument contributes to the literature by advancing 
the conception of interorganizational relationships based on promotion toward a strategic 
bilateral perspective that has taken root in industry practice but has been lacking in 
scholarly research.  To achieve this aim, the research foundations of strategic alliances 
are integrated here with commercial sponsorship theory.  With the exception of two 
recent works (Farrelly & Quester, 2005a, 2005b), these two streams of research have 
developed almost entirely independently of one another despite considerable overlap in 
their purpose, structure, management, and evaluation.  Each of these elements is 
discussed in turn later in this first chapter.   
Chapter Two introduces the institutional context of the empirical studies 
undertaken in Chapters Three and Four.  Each study draws on promotional alliances 
involving corporate partners (sponsoring firms) and their affiliated teams in Formula One 
(F1) motor racing.  In this investigative context, the racing teams act as the promoting 
enterprises charged with providing the marketing platform to meet their sponsoring 
firm’s objectives while also seeking to access and leverage the resources offered by these 
affiliating firms.  Chapter Two establishes the context as an attractive setting for both 
Chapter Three’s evaluation of the impact of alliance resources on the survival of 
promoting enterprises, and Chapter Four’s examination of promotion-seeking firms’ 
pursuit of value through such alliances.   The basis of this contextual assertion is the 
pervasive corporate involvement and diverse resource exchange in F1 as characterized in 
Chapter Two along with the massive appeal F1 boasts with a global audience.  The 
international nature of this context also presents an important contribution given the 
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escalating globalization of business and communication, and the dearth of cross-market 
research aimed at evaluating standardized international promotional platforms.  
  
1.2 Research Questions 
 Market relationships have become increasingly complex as technological 
advances have enabled ubiquitous global interaction among and between organizations 
and consumers.  Over a quarter century ago, Levitt (1983) described the globalization of 
markets and since that time, the continually increasing onslaught of available consumer 
information uninhibited by geographic boundaries has forced businesses to further evolve 
their competitive strategies.  One popular tactic employed by firms to meet the challenges 
of the modern marketplace is to engage other organizations in partnerships aimed at 
combining resources toward the creation of a competitive advantage (Das & Teng, 2000; 
Turnbull, Ford, & Cunningham, 1996).  The growth in organizational research focused on 
strategic alliances and business networks has reflected this trend toward 
interorganizational relationships (Anderson, Hakansson, & Johanson, 1994; Barringer & 
Harrison, 2000).  However, the investigation of organizational partnerships with a distinct 
promotional agenda has not kept pace with the study of technological and product-based 
alliances.  The purpose of this research agenda is to advance the understanding of 
promotional alliances on an international scale by first explicating the survival 
implications of an enterprise’s promotion-based alliance network and second, revealing 
whether these interorganizational relationships add value to the promotion-seeking firm, 
and if so, under what conditions. 
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 The cross-disciplinary theoretical foundations that inform this investigation are 
drawn primarily from research on strategic alliances, interorganizational networks, 
promotional sponsorship, and organizational ecology.  These themes are integrated by the 
two overarching research questions: 
 How does an entrepreneurial organization’s access to resources through 
promotional alliances influence its survival over time in a highly competitive 
environment? 
 Do international promotional alliances add value to the firm, and if so, what 
characteristics of the interorganizational relationship influence value realization? 
 
 The empirical contribution of this research emanates from two studies that 
correspond to the questions posed.  The first study, presented in Chapter Three, 
investigates the dynamic contribution of promotion-based alliances to the survival of 
competing teams in Formula 1 motor racing from 19671 to 2008.  The macro contribution 
of this study arises from the novel perspective it offers in regards to how accessing 
resources through interorganizational alliances affects a promotion-based enterprise’s 
propensity to survive.  The second study, presented in Chapter Four, scrutinizes the 
impact of promotional alliance announcements by sponsoring firms on their financial 
value.  By undertaking a cross-market evaluation of a standardized international 
promotional platform, this second study contributes a market-based empirical test of the 
integrated theories of commercial sponsorship and strategic alliances.  Together, these 
two studies supply an international, cross-sectional examination of the influence of 
interorganizational alliances on both the promoting enterprise and its sponsoring firms 
                                                 
1
 Team survival data in this study begins in 1950, though promotional alliances were prohibited until 1967. 
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seeking promotion. To conclude this dissertation, Chapter Five engages industry experts 
on both sides of the promotional alliance for a qualitative interpretation and discussion of 
each study’s results and implications. 
 
1.3 Promotional Alliances  
 The term “promotional alliances” is invoked throughout this research to 
characterize the interorganizational relationships under investigation in this context.  
Before moving forward, it is important to understand what constitutes a promotional 
alliance and in what situations such alliances can be considered market-based ties.  The 
promotional alliance concept is theoretically grounded in the marketing and strategic 
alliance literature and describes an alliance focused on achieving primarily promotional 
objectives for one or both parties in an exchange relationship.  These promotional 
objectives may include direct sales opportunities, image enhancement, publicity, sales 
promotion platforms, or other marketing initiatives often classified within the promotion 
“P” of McCarthy’s traditional four P’s of marketing (1960), or considered as Kotler’s five 
elements of the marketing communication mix (i.e. advertising, sales promotion, public 
relations, personal selling, and direct marketing) (2003).  When a firm establishes a 
relationship with another organization with the aim of achieving such objectives, a 
promotional alliance takes shape.  For example, since 1995, Shell has utilized their 
renewed partnership with the Ferrari Formula One racing team to meet promotional 
objectives of creating awareness for Shell’s premium products, sustaining their position 
as a technology leader, solidifying key stakeholder relationships via event hospitality, and 
encouraging purchase through themed point-of-sale promotions (Verity, 2002). 
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 Strategic alliance research has become increasing popular in the last two decades 
as evidenced by a myriad of definitions offered to describe this broad interorganizational 
phenomenon (Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1999; 
Saxton, 1997; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).  In seeking to synthesize these 
definitions, two elements consistently arise: cooperative relationships and resource 
exchange.  Given these commonalities, the specific notion of a promotional alliance 
extends from the conceptualization of a strategic alliance as a “cooperative relationship 
driven by a logic of strategic resource needs and social resource opportunities” 
(Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996, p. 137).  In the case of promotional alliances, the 
strategic resource need is one of access to various promotional tools and capabilities, and 
the social resource opportunity facilitating the relationship continues to be the social 
position, network, or connections of a firm’s decision makers operating within the 
market.      
 Advertising alliances (Samu, Krishnan, & Smith, 1999), cause-related marketing 
partnerships (Lafferty, Goldsmith, & Hult, 2004), endorsements (McCracken, 1989), 
joint branding (Lebar et al., 2005), licensed extensions (Bass, 2004), and commercial 
sponsorship (Meenaghan, 2001) are all common examples of the promotional alliance 
concept.  However, not all interorganizational promotional relationships are necessarily 
market-based alliances.  To the contrary, some scholars have taken a narrow view of the 
market in asserting that strategic alliances are aimed at avoiding market exchange instead 
of creating or enhancing market exchange (Baker, Faulkner, & Fisher, 1998).  While this 
assertion may well be accurate for a broad perspective of strategic alliances that includes 
joint ventures and equity-based alliances (Das & Teng, 2000), the research agenda 
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undertaken here relies directly on Baker et al.’s interpretation of the market as an 
“institutionalized mechanism…which facilitates exchange” (1998, p. 148) and argues that 
promotional alliances represent market-based ties insomuch as they are created, operate, 
and are terminated within such institutionalized mechanisms for exchange.  In other 
words, distinct markets (institutionalized mechanisms) exist for promotional relationships 
where a set of organizations (promoters) possess valuable promotional resources that are 
offered to other firms in exchange for various desired considerations or resources.  Such 
arrangements are typically structured by a contract specifying the resources to be 
exchanged, separate parties involved, and duration of the relationship.  In contrast to this 
characterization are promotional relationships based on equity agreements or the creation 
of a joint venture organization, which do indeed undermine market ties and fall outside 
the scope of a pure market-based alliance as primarily examined here.  However, 
occasionally these equity arrangements arise out of an alliance that was originally void of 
equity considerations, and as such, these relationships can inform one avenue of 
evolutionary alliance dynamics.  In the absence of an equity stake, a promotional alliance 
in the context of this research is formally defined as a strategic alliance based on resource 
exchange between a promoting enterprise (promoter2) and a firm seeking promotional 
considerations based on an ongoing affiliation with the promoter.   
 
                                                 
2
 Promoter is referred to throughout this research in reference to the organization or entity within the 
alliance that either specializes in promotional capabilities (e.g. advertising agencies) or is able to harness 
significant promotional resources, such as media coverage, targeted audience involvement, identification, 
or loyalty (e.g. celebrities, entertainment entities, non-profit causes, or sports events and teams), that are 
sought by affiliating firms.  It should be noted that in some cases, such as licensed extensions, the promoter 
may be an iconic brand that acts to legitimize the partnering firm’s product; whereas in other contexts, the 
same iconic brand may be the partnering firm with a sports event that acts as the promoter in harnessing 
media attention and audience involvement for the promotion of the iconic brand. 
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1.3.1 Resource-based View of Interorganizational Alliances 
 Several theories have been called upon to account for the formation of 
interorganizational alliances, including game theory, the strategic behavior model, social 
exchange theory, power-dependency theory, and the strategic decision making model 
(Das & Teng, 2000). Until recently, the most popular theoretical approach to studying 
alliances was transaction cost economics, which holds that alliances form to enable a firm 
to minimize the sum of its production and transaction costs (Barringer & Harrison, 2000).  
However, this approach has several shortcomings when considered in the context of 
promotional alliances, where the exchange relationship is based on the utilization of 
promotional resources to reach a targeted audience.  The drawbacks of a transaction cost 
approach in this instance include the inability to account for organizational learning, 
creation of legitimacy, and temporal considerations (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996).  
Each of these shortcomings is magnified in the case of promotional alliances where, for 
example, organizational learning around promotional leverage techniques, creation of 
legitimacy for the target consumer, and multi-year contracts that raise a temporal element 
could all be considered commonplace.  
To compensate for these concerns, the recent movement toward the resource-
based view (RBV) as a theoretical framework for the examination of interorganizational 
alliances is adopted in this research (Das & Teng, 2000; Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1996; Gulati, 1999; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).  Instead of taking the perspective 
of cost minimization, the RBV looks to value maximization (Das & Teng, 2000).  The 
attractiveness of the RBV lies in its explanatory power that supports both needs and 
opportunities for alliance formation, as well as its framework for evaluating alliance 
outcomes based on the production of a sustainable competitive advantage (Eisenhardt & 
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Schoonhoven, 1996; Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).   In other words, viewing a 
promotional alliance as an interorganizational relationship based on promotional resource 
leverage and exchange in order to realize a competitive advantage subsumes dimensions 
of purpose, structure, and management, while also offering a theoretical outcome 
assessment tool.   
The purpose of the alliance can be described as the creation and enhancement of 
firm resources through combination with another organization’s resources in order to 
realize optimal, strategic returns (Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).  The structure of an 
interorganizational alliance is based on the individual resources offered, market 
conditions, and the specific outcomes desired by each partner (Das & Teng, 2000).  
Meanwhile, the management of an alliance works toward achieving relational success 
factors, such as trust, commitment, and collaborative communication (Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001), that encourage the realization of the purpose of 
the relationship.  Finally, the outcome will theoretically be judged by whether the 
alliance, as a relationship resource, has become the subject of a value creating strategy 
that is rare, imperfectly imitable, and supported by both organizations, and as a result, 
realizes a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  Therefore by adopting the 
RBV, promotional alliances can be dissected from several dimensions regardless of the 
industry or type of alliance.  Each of these dimensions (purpose, structure, managerial 
factors, and outcomes) are explored in greater detail below following a relevant example 
from the field and an introduction to the promotional mechanism of commercial 
sponsorship, which is utilized for the two empirical studies undertaken here. 
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When the Renault Formula 1 racing team announced its renewed technical and 
promotional alliance with European innovation consulting firm, Altran, the team’s 
managing director spoke to the purpose of the alliance from Renault’s perspective by 
exclaiming, “Altran gives us access to expertise in extremely specialized areas that we do 
not possess within the company, and which are crucial for the development of our F1 
engines” (Renault, 2004).  In other words, by combining its expertise in motor racing 
with Altran’s innovation capabilities, the Renault team aspired to race past its 
competitors.  Strategically, Altran hoped its involvement with the Renault team would 
differentiate it from competitors through the sharpening of its skills in a high-profile 
environment and the alignment of its brand with the promotional resources of a racing 
enterprise that boasts an international audience (Altran, 2008).  An annual commercial 
sponsorship that spanned the Formula 1 racing calendar served as the initial structure of 
the Altran-Renault alliance, which was eventually managed toward the development of a 
multi-year cooperative engineering academy between the two organizations (Renault, 
2008).  The emergence and maintenance of such a collaborative program suggests the 
existence of the relational success factors of managerial trust and commitment within the 
alliance.  While a full RBV analysis of the outcomes of this anecdotal example extends 
beyond its simple purpose here of establishing a relevant promotional alliance example, it 
appears at a cursory level that this particular relationship resource has at least received 
ongoing support by both organizations, which in combination with value creation, 
rareness, and inimitability suggests it could theoretically be the source of a competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1995).  
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1.3.2 Commercial Sponsorship  
 Commercial sponsorship represents a popular condition of the promotional 
alliance relationship, as demonstrated by the preceding example.  Sponsorship has been 
widely characterized in the research literature as “the provision of assistance either 
financial or in-kind to an activity by a commercial organization for the purpose of 
achieving commercial objectives” (Meenaghan, 1983).  This particular type of alliance 
offers an interesting platform for promotional alliance research for several reasons.  First, 
investments in commercial sponsorship as a marketing communications tool have 
expanded rapidly in the last two decades, reaching an estimated worldwide expenditure 
of US$37.7 billion in 2007 (IEG, 2006), and capturing nearly a 20 percent share of 
overall marketing budgets (IEG, 2008).  Meanwhile, scholarly research on the topic has 
recognized the perceived potential for a sponsorship alliance to differentiate and add 
financial value to a brand while serving as a central firm resource leveraged by a range of 
other promotional tools (Cliffea & Motion, 2005; Cornwell, Roy, & Steinard, 2001).  
Despite such versatility as a promotional platform, commercial sponsorship, like many of 
its promotional mix counterparts, still lacks widely-accepted objective measures of 
accountability (Harvey, 2001).  Further, scholars have only recently begun to explore the 
relational aspects of sponsorship’s interorganizational ties, and little to no knowledge is 
available in the literature to suggest how such ties may evolve over time and the 
implications to each alliance partner (Cornwell, 2008; Farrelly & Quester, 2005a).  Yet, 
because commercial sponsorship has become an institutionalized support mechanism 
ubiquitous throughout the sports, entertainment, arts, and cultural events in modern 
society, engagement in this type of promotional alliance spans a myriad of industries, 
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organizations, activities, and individuals.  Therefore, commercial sponsorship offers 
alliance researchers a degree of generalizability across both firms and promoters.   
 Finally, the promotional nature of sponsorship typically requires that the 
organization or activity receiving the provision of assistance (promoter) have some 
degree of popularity or potential for publicizing the relationship.  As a result, data on 
alliances between promoters and sponsoring organizations can often be obtained or 
verified to some degree through public sources.  Given these reasons and the potential 
contribution to the broader promotional alliance context, commercial sponsorship serves 
as the platform for the empirical research conducted in the two studies that follow in 
Chapters Three and Four.   
 
1.3.2.1 Sponsorship as a Promotion-based Strategic Alliance 
Until recently, academic research on strategic alliances and commercial 
sponsorship has evolved rather independently despite striking similarities in their central 
tenants and a convergence in industry practice (Farrelly & Quester, 2005b).  In 2005, the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) described 
their title sponsorship with Sony Ericsson as “a strategic alliance well beyond writing us 
a big check and well beyond receiving your typical sponsor benefits” (“One-on-one,” 
2005, p. 34).  In another instance, the president of Walt Disney World Resort announced 
a ten-year “strategic alliance” with Hanesbrands, which features a stadium naming rights 
sponsorship agreement, by proclaiming, “our alliance with Hanesbrands is a natural given 
they are a leader in apparel and like us, look for strategic, innovative ways to extend their 
brand into communities throughout the world.”  Similarly, the Hanesbrands CEO 
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declared, “our alliance with Walt Disney Parks & Resorts, truly one of the world’s 
greatest brands, is a perfect fit to maximize the brand strength and equity of both 
organizations” (Walt Disney World Public Affairs, 2007, p.1).   Strategic brand 
objectives, which are often cited as rationales for engaging in sponsorship (Cornwell, 
Roy et al., 2001; Gwinner & Eaton, 1999; Thjømøe, Olson, & Bronn, 2002), were 
presented by both executives in the latter example as the basis for the formed alliance.   
Such quotes from the practitioner viewpoint offer some initial illustrations of the 
growing industry movement to conceptualize these interorganizational promotional 
relationships beyond the traditional narrow label of commercial sponsorship and toward a 
broader perception as strategic alliances.  This perspective has become so prevalent that 
the National Basketball Association’s Sacramento Kings have titled their vice president 
responsible for commercial sponsorships as the “Vice President for Strategic Alliance 
Sales” (“Mastalir no stranger,” 2006).  Yet, research to date, with a single exception 
(Farrelly & Quester, 2005a), has failed to explore the implications and potential of this 
confluence of sponsorship and strategic alliances despite several admissions of the need 
for an expanded investigative framework of the interorganizational relationships inherent 
in modern sponsorship practice (Cornwell, 2008; Olkkonen, 2001; Ruth & Simonin, 
2003; Walliser, 2003).  Accordingly, in a recent report on the impact of scholarly 
research, the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) 
recommended stronger academic engagement with practice to improve both applied and 
basic research (AACSB International, 2008).  To perpetuate the integration of these 
research streams toward a more comprehensive reflection of industry practice, Table A.1 
provides an overview of the purposes, structure, relational success factors, and evaluation 
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measures highlighted by strategic alliance scholars, and their counterparts studying 
commercial sponsorship, which is argued here to be simply a specific case of the broader 
interorganizational phenomenon of promotion-based alliances.  
Stark similarities between the strategic alliance and commercial sponsorship lines 
of research emerge from a review of Table A.1.  Not only is the term “alliance” used by 
some researchers in defining sponsorship (Farrelly & Quester, 2005a), but the central 
concept of an interorganizational exchange relationship based on satisfying competitive 
resource needs seems to pervade the themes explored by each stream.  By adopting an 
integrated approach, the studies presented in this paper demonstrate the potential 
incremental contribution achieved by aligning appropriate literature bases to reflect 
contemporary trends in industry practice. 
[TABLE A.1]  
 
1.3.2.1.1 Purpose 
 Much of the existing research on promotional alliances, and specifically 
commercial sponsorship, has focused on the purpose of gaining access to brand 
awareness, image, and attitude-shaping resources through exchange with a promoting 
organization or entity (promoter).  Traditionally, these promotional resources are 
exchanged primarily for financial resources offered by the partnering firm (Cornwell & 
Maignan, 1998).  For example, in the case of licensed brand extensions, a product 
producer acts as a licensee that seeks to affiliate their product with a recognized brand, 
owned by the licensor.  In this way, the licensee is able to access the promotional 
resources of the licensor’s brand awareness, image, and customer loyalty (Hoeffler & 
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Keller, 2003).  For making these resources available to the licensee, the licensor is 
compensated with a royalty fee or percentage of the licensee’s product revenues (Bass, 
2004).  Similar arrangements in purpose and structure are found in cause-brand alliances, 
endorsements, and commercial sponsorship. 
By identifying desired traits and then recognizing symbols, charitable causes, 
events, celebrities, or even other brands that embody these desired traits, marketing 
managers can attempt to align these symbols with their brand (Choi & Rifton, 2007; 
Lafferty et al., 2004; McCracken, 1989).  In the case of sports, attributes such as health, 
young, energetic, fast, vibrant, and masculine are often inherent in the symbols and icons 
that produce the spectacle (Meenaghan & Shipley, 1999).  A marketing manager may 
therefore choose to control and encourage brand associations with these attributes 
through the use of promotional resources, such as sponsorship and athlete endorsement, 
with the goal of facilitating an image transfer impression with the targeted audience 
(Gwinner & Eaton, 1999; McCracken, 1989; Smith, 2004).  As with licensed brand 
extensions, the entity contributing the desired image is typically compensated with a 
monetary sponsorship or endorsement fee.   
Although brand awareness, image, and consumer attitude outcomes constitute a 
majority of the research evaluating promotional alliances, several scholars have 
recognized other objectives for participating in promotional alliances (Bucklin & 
Sengupta, 1993; Copeland, Frisby, & McCarville, 1996; O'Hagan & Harvey, 2000; 
Thjømøe et al., 2002).  Seven categories beyond awareness and image enhancement 
emerge across this line of research: relationship building, community relations and 
support, skill enhancement, resource efficiency, market penetration, sales, and personal 
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interest (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Meenaghan, 1983; Meenaghan, 2005; Varadarajan 
& Cunningham, 1995).  Along with the diversity in objectives, promotional alliances 
have also been aimed at reaching a diverse audience.  Studies that have surveyed 
sponsorship managers have consistently included stakeholder groups such as employees, 
shareholders, suppliers, and other potential business partners as target audiences (Cliffea 
& Motion, 2005; Copeland et al., 1996; Crowley, 1991), yet researchers have, for the 
most part, neglected to empirically investigate the impact of these alliances on audiences 
beyond mass consumers (Cornwell & Maignan, 1998).  The second study offered within 
this paper, joins a small but growing body of research on the shareholder impact of 
promotional alliance announcements.  
 
1.3.2.1.2 Structure 
The basic structure of traditional promotional alliances can be characterized as a 
unilateral contract, where the promotion-seeking firm offers cash as a financial resource 
in exchange for the right to access the promoter’s capabilities and audience, and affiliate 
with the promoter’s brand (Cornwell & Maignan, 1998).   Given this historical 
conceptualization of promotional alliance relationships, a unilateral contract alliance 
structure seems appropriate (Das & Teng, 2000).  However, this traditional view calls 
into question the strategic nature of such an alliance.   In order for a resource to be 
considered strategic, it must enable the possessor to achieve a competitive advantage 
(Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).  To do so according to the RBV, the resource must 
create value while being scarce, inimitable, and without direct substitutes (Barney, 1991).  
Yet, it seems unlikely that a property-based resource acquired for simple financial 
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appropriations could be scarce or inimitable in its own right.  What stops competing firms 
from purchasing the same affiliation resource?  Even if the alliance is of an exclusive 
nature, meaning direct competitors are barred from receiving identical association rights, 
surely other alliance opportunities exist in a diverse market that can deliver access to an 
almost identical promotional property resource.   For instance, home improvement retail 
competitors Home Depot and Lowes both serve as primary commercial sponsors of 
different high-profile NASCAR race teams, often finding their logo-plaid cars side-by-
side on the track during a race.  This rival pairing is not alone in its dual affiliation to the 
sports promoter NASCAR.  After driving to victory in a NASCAR race title-sponsored 
by Pepsi, driver Jamie McMurray proceeded to the winner’s circle to chug his sponsor’s 
signature beverage, Coca-Cola Classic, in front of the myriad of photographers and 
camera crews (“Thirst Quencher,” 2007).  This phenomenon of direct corporate rivals 
facing off in the same promotional arena has been suggested to dilute brand 
differentiation, thereby leading to decreased resource effectiveness and brand parity 
(Cornwell, Weeks, & Roy, 2005). 
Given this typical characterization of commercial sponsorship as simply a right to 
affiliate with a certain promotional property, and these examples from the field, it seems 
difficult to conceive of such promotional alliances as creating a sustainable competitive 
advantage when structured as a unilateral agreement.  Despite this potential strategic 
shortcoming, some scholars have evoked the RBV to argue that promotional alliances are 
in fact capable of attaining a sustainable competitive advantage when managed 
appropriately and treated as a bilateral agreement (Amis, Pant, & Slack, 1997; Das & 
Teng, 2000; Fahy, Farrelly, & Quester, 2004).  Other interorganizational scholars have 
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enhanced this assertion by pointing to several relational factors that contribute to the 
successful realization of an alliance’s strategic aspirations (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; 
Hughes & Weiss, 2007; Hutt, Stafford, Walker, & Reingen, 2000; Saxton, 1997; 
Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).   
 
1.3.2.1.3 Management Success Factors 
Instead of conceptualizing promotional resources as property rights to be 
exchanged in a unilateral transaction, the emergence of contemporary research on 
interorganizational alliance management success factors encourages the consideration of 
the knowledge-based facets of promotional resources that are optimized through 
relational exchange (Chadwick & Thwaites, 2006; Fahy et al., 2004; Sarkar, Echambadi, 
Cavusgil et al., 2001).  Returning to the categories of objectives for promotional 
alliances, knowledge-based capabilities are found in the ideas of leveraging image 
associations, relationship building, skill enhancement, resource efficiency, market 
penetration, and even sales.  Unlike a unilateral transaction, where the firm seeking 
promotional resources trades cash for the right to affiliate with the promoter as a property 
and that single exchange constitutes the relationship, a bilateral agreement is based on the 
ongoing co-production of promotional knowledge-based resources that require each 
partner to contribute to the cooperative relationship (Das & Teng, 2000; Madhok & 
Tallman, 1998).  For example, in their contrasting case studies of two firms engaged in 
commercial sponsorship activities, Amis et al. (1997) pointed out how, in one case, the 
voluntary commitment of incremental resources over time to the promotional alliance by 
both parties produced a valuable sponsorship resource for the firm that was rare, 
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imperfectly imitable, and established limits to competition, thereby fostering a 
competitive advantage.  Meanwhile, the firm profiled in the contrasting case approached 
their sponsorship initiatives with a transactional orientation lacking focus or a coherent 
long-term strategy for developing their promotional resources.  As a result, this firm’s 
property-based alliances with sports organizations and athlete endorsers were disparate 
and presumably easy to replicate by any willing competitor.  The relational conditions of 
commitment and collaborative communication that seemingly differentiated these two 
promotional situations are a subset of the success factors for interorganizational alliances 
identified by scholars.   
The importance of trust, commitment, and compatibility between alliance partners 
headlines the managerial considerations empirically shown to contribute to positive 
alliance outcomes such as longevity, partner satisfaction, and perceived effectiveness 
(Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; Farrelly & Quester, 2003b; Hutt et al., 2000; Sarkar, 
Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001).  Trust in an alliance situation is built through 
reciprocal communication and mutual understanding, often resulting in shared decision 
making (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Ring & van de Ven, 1994).  Trust can become 
the most important aspect of an alliance, culminating in an identity-based bonding (Hutt 
et al., 2000).  In a promotional alliance, trust has been shown to contribute directly to 
relational commitment, which is characterized as “a willingness by the parties involved in 
the sponsorship dyad to make short-term investments with the expectation of realizing 
long-term benefits from the relationship” (Farrelly & Quester, 2003a; Morgan & Hunt, 
1994).  Commitment takes the form of leveraging activities in a promotional context 
where alliance members summon resources beyond those called for in the agreement to 
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promote the affiliation or provoke capabilities that are likely to positively influence 
desired alliance outcomes (Farrelly & Quester, 2003a).  By measuring consumer 
awareness and attitude toward firms sponsoring an art festival, Quester and Thompson 
(2001) empirically demonstrated the positive outcomes of leveraging a promotional 
alliance through various mass media channels.  
Beyond the emphasis on trust and commitment in the literature, compatibility 
remains a third prominent success factor when considering the management of 
interorganizational relationships.  Several studies of promotional alliances have sought to 
measure the congruence, fit, or match-up effect between a promotion-seeking firm and a 
promoter by taking an image-based approach (Gladden & Wolfe, 2001; Gwinner & 
Eaton, 1999; McDaniel, 1999; Speed & Thompson, 2000).  However, the idea of 
congruence as related to the interorganizational alliance relationship extends beyond each 
organization’s image.  If two alliance partners are compatible, that does not mean they 
are identical.  Instead, partners should compliment each other by demonstrating a 
coherent strategic and cultural fit (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001).   
The foundational rationale for interorganizational alliances is to meet strategic 
resource needs (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), therefore, each party should be able 
to stipulate how the resources exchanged within the alliance assists them in reaching a 
sustainable advantage over their competitors (Farrelly, Quester, & Greyser, 2005).  
Otherwise, the alliance lacks a strategic fit and the long-term prospects for the 
relationship are questionable.  If the alliance has the potential for generating strategic 
resources for each party, common ground in organizational culture and operating 
philosophies can enhance understanding and foster a willingness to cooperate (Hutt et al., 
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2000; Saxton, 1997).  Farrelly and Quester (2003a) approached this idea by employing a 
measurement of the alliance members’ market orientation, which was examined as the 
market intelligence generation and responsiveness activities coordinated by each 
member.  Their research called attention to the importance of collaborative 
communication and showed a positive correlation between partners’ market orientation 
and the trust and commitment of their promotional alliance.  Despite this integrated 
emphasis on trust, commitment, and compatibility in the relational success factors of 
promotional alliances, more work is needed to accurately connect these relationship 
characteristics to strategic outcome measures (Farrelly & Quester, 2005a).   
 
1.3.2.1.4 Evaluation 
  To date, the literature on promotional alliances has yet to settle on a definitive 
evaluation measure of the strategic outcomes of such alliances.  Though there seems to be 
a level of agreement on the importance of the theoretical qualities of scarcity, 
inimitability, and imperfect substitution in evaluating competitive resources, researchers 
have relied primarily on longevity or survey measures of partner perceptions as practical 
measures of alliance success (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993; T. B. Cornwell, Roy et al., 
2001; Farrelly & Quester, 2003b; Saxton, 1997).   While the measurement of alliance 
outcomes is complicated by the diversity in their objectives (Gulati, 1998), the 
proprietary nature of marketing plans is suggested by Cornwell and Maignan (1998) as a 
potential reason for the lack of evaluative research in sponsorship strategy.  However, 
this dilemma may be more accurately explained by the causal ambiguity that often 
accompanies a convergence of resources that interact to generate an advantaged position 
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(Fahy et al., 2004).  In such a situation, the relative contribution of each resource can be 
difficult to discern.   For instance, engaging in leveraging activities around a sponsorship 
affiliation has been demonstrated to increase its effectiveness (Quester & Thompson, 
2001), but it remains difficult to determine whether the strength of the relational alliance, 
the marketing skills and capabilities of one or both of the partners, the target audiences’ 
predisposition, or the additional resources called upon to leverage the alliance were the 
substantial contributors to the sponsorship’s overall effectiveness (Cornwell et al., 2005).  
Complicating this causal ambiguity further, is the fact that promotional alliances do not 
operate in isolation.  To the contrary, most firms engage in multiple promotional 
relationships simultaneously and therefore interact within a network of promotional 
alliances that add a layer of social complexity to the potential inimitability of such 
relationships (Cornwell, 2008; Olkkonen, 2001; Ruth & Simonin, 2003).   
 
1.3.3. Beyond the Dyadic Relationship to a Network Perspective 
Business networks have been defined as “a set of two or more connected business 
relationships in which each exchange relation is between business firms that are 
conceptualized as collective actors” (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 2).  From this perspective, 
a group of firms connected to a particular promotional entity might be characterized as 
“collective actors” based on specifying the network boundary as contingent upon a 
specific resource exchange (Rowley, 1997).  For example, public events have been 
examined from a broad network perspective where the various businesses engaged in 
funding, producing, publicizing, and carrying out the operations of the event are all 
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conceptualized within the event network, which through collective action enabled the 
survival and success of the event (Erickson & Kushner, 1999).   
As with a singular alliance, the foundation of the interaction of firms in a business 
network is the resources exchanged with other members of the network.  In their review 
of two decades of interorganizational research, Turnbull, Ford, and Cunningham (1996) 
categorized the resources offered and received amongst businesses in a network as 
financial, network oriented, and skills.  Financial resources may not be inimitable or rare, 
but they do impact an organization’s capacity to acquire new resources or leverage a 
partner’s resources.  A network oriented resource emanates from an organization’s 
position within the network and the resource and informational benefits that correspond 
to such a position.  For instance, a promotional organization such as Disney’s Pixar 
Animation Studios may have access to a desirable consumer market through their theatre 
and licensing distribution network, which Disney’s corporate partners would like to 
engage.  By offering promotional avenues such as product placement, Disney is able to 
exchange the advantages of their network position as an organizational resource (Porsche 
Cars North America, Inc., 2006).   
The last category of resources raised in Turnbull et al.’s (1996) review was the 
skills possessed by firms in the network.  These skills can be decomposed into the three 
competencies of product, process, and marketing.  Product capabilities refer to the 
propensity to design a product or service, and a process competency is demonstrated by 
the ability to produce the product.  Marketing capabilities reference the capacity for 
analyzing the demands of the market and collecting the resources necessary to influence 
and deliver a target audience to other firms.  For a variety of information and 
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entertainment-oriented promoters, these skills act in tandem to produce a central resource 
to be offered to potential business network members.   
For instance, promoters operating in the action sports entertainment segment have 
recognized the demand for extreme sports products from a consumer audience that is 
attractive to many corporate marketers.  Utilizing their product and process skills, these 
promoters bring together talented athletes, media outlets, and event coordinators to 
manufacture events and television productions that engage the Generation Y audience 
(Bennett, Henson, & Zhang, 2003).  In doing so, the promoter materializes their skills 
into a marketing resource to offer to potential corporate network partners, such as 
MasterCard, Slim Jim, and Mountain Dew, who desire to reach the Generation Y market 
(Lefton, 2006a).   
At a basic level, most of the information and entertainment entities our society 
enjoys are built on the business model of providing either an information or 
entertainment product that is in demand by a critical mass of consumers.  These 
information and entertainment organizations, such as television stations, newspapers, 
websites, traveling shows, and sports properties, then act as promoters for firms that 
desire to reach the promoters’ audience with a marketing message (Meenaghan, 1991).  
By leveraging their skill in delivering an audience desirable to firms seeking promotion, 
promoters can access resources through exchange relationships to enable their continued 
operation and expansion (Erickson & Kushner, 1999).      
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1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has set a broad theoretical framework for the upcoming chapters by 
grounding the concept of promotional alliances in the marketing foundations of 
McCarthy (1960) and Kotler (2003) and formally defining it as a subset of strategic 
alliances based on resource exchange between a promoting enterprise and a firm seeking 
promotional considerations through an ongoing affiliation with the promoter.  
Commercial sponsorship was characterized as a pervasive condition of promotional 
alliances that offers a rich setting for investigating the two organizational sides to such an 
alliance.  While sponsorship industry practice has shown a willingness to embrace at least 
the lexicon of alliances, scholarly research to date has neglected to integrate these 
knowledge streams.  By utilizing the resource-based view of the firm to examine the 
dimensions of purpose, structure, management, and evaluation of promotional alliances, 
and specific cases of corporate sponsorship, a theoretical contribution was made to this 
end.  With the broad theoretical framework of promotional alliances established, Study 
One in Chapter Three takes a more detailed look at the promoter side of these alliances; 
while Study Two in Chapter Four ventures into the considerations of the sponsoring firm.  
But first, Chapter Two sets the stage for the subsequent studies by introducing the 
investigative context through a description of the magnitude of corporate involvement 
and depth of resource exchange inherent in the international spectacle that is Formula 
One motor racing.   
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CHAPTER 2 
INVESTIGATIVE CONTEXT: FORMULA ONE RACING 
2.1 Corporate Involvement 
The sporting context of Formula One (F1) motor racing presents a relevant and 
interesting arena for the dynamic investigation of promotional alliances on an 
international scale.  Forty-one of Interbrand’s Top 100 global brands were currently, or 
had been involved in the commercial sponsorship of F1 racing in 2008 (Best global 
brands, 2008).  With annual promotional alliance commitments reaching as high as 
US$100 million in non-equity arrangements, and equity agreements sharply escalating 
from that figure, commercial involvement with a Formula One team does not come cheap 
(Sylt & Reid, 2008b).   
The magnitude of corporate financial support coupled with the functional and 
technical commitments often included in such alliances, enable a majority of the 
competing F1 teams to operate with annual budgets in excess of US$300 million, which 
is close to ten fold greater than the cost of fielding an entry into the NASCAR Sprint Cup 
Series, the most popular US racing series (Smith, 2008).  Such staggering annual budgets 
in F1 create a strong dependence on corporate partnerships to underwrite team 
operations.  A typical F1 racing team generates over 70 percent of its operating budget 
from corporate relationships (Sylt & Reid, 2008a). In fact, the recent deteriorating global 
economic conditions and the uncertain survival of one F1 team formerly underwritten by 
Honda Motors have led the sport’s governing body to collectively engage teams in an 
effort to reduce their operational costs by as much as 30 percent ("F1 costs to be cut by 
30 percent," 2008).   
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2.2 International Spectacle 
Around the globe, the popularity of F1 as a television spectacle is rivaled only by 
the NFL Super Bowl, the football World Cup finals, and the Olympic Games, the last two 
of which occur only every four years (Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2008).  The annual F1 event 
schedule includes close to twenty races that, until 20093, reached every continent on the 
planet except Antarctica in the span of eight months.  Under the current sporting 
regulations, up to twelve teams, each fielding two drivers, can compete for the world 
championship.  While national origins play a prominent role in the series (origin flags are 
frequently displayed on car and television graphics, and on the podium during the playing 
of both the winning team’s and driver’s national anthems following each race), drivers 
are free to contract with any team regardless of the driver’s or team’s claimed nationality.  
The 2007 season, the last season included in the data examined for these studies, saw 
drivers from 12 countries compete as part of the 11 teams that contested the 
championship.  Apart from their drivers’ origins, seven different countries were 
represented by the 11 teams.   Table A.2 summaries the team and driver nationalities 
competing in F1 in 2007.  
[TABLE A.2] 
 
                                                 
3
 After replacing the United States Grand Prix in Indianapolis in 2008 and dropping the Canadian Grand 
Prix in Montreal for the 2009 schedule, F1 will not race in North America in 2009 for the first time since 
F1 formally organized in 1950. 
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2.3 Resource Exchange 
The international reach and popularity of F1 makes the activity an attractive 
promotional platform for multinational firms (Beck-Burridge & Walton, 2001).  Yet 
beyond the awareness and image dimensions of an F1 team affiliation, firms and their 
promoting teams recognize several other resources that such an alliance can provide to 
each partner in the exchange relationship.   Although several of the highest profile F1 
commercial sponsorships do involve a considerable monetary commitment, many of 
these promotional alliances also serve as credentialing platforms for the sponsoring 
firm’s products, services, and capabilities.  Unlike most other entertainment and sports 
activities, motor racing provides a competitive public forum for the development and 
testing of a wide range of technologies and components (Jenkins & Floyd, 2001).  As a 
result, many of the alliance agreements between F1 teams and their sponsoring firms 
contractually specify an exchange of resources that extends beyond the traditional 
unilateral property-based arrangement and provides for the ongoing contribution of 
knowledge-based resources toward the manifestation of a cooperative relationship 
(Hotten, 2000; Sylt & Reid, 2008b).  In other words, when the sponsoring firm produces 
functionally compatible resources for the competition environment, that firm is capable 
of contributing to the actual performance of their alliance team partner on the race track.  
For example, upon announcing a promotional and technological alliance with an F1 team, 
the CEO of Swiss technology company Oerlikon stated that “…together with Red Bull 
(the F1 Team), we will systematically analyze our technology portfolios and launch 
appropriate projects.  The goal is to boost the performance of the Red Bull Racing 
fireballs (race cars) even further with new, innovative components” (Oerlikon, 2007). 
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While the alliance between a commercial sponsor and their promoting team 
composes the focal exchange relationship for this investigation, networks of other 
corporate relationships are also important to note within this promotional context.  The 
Paddock Club, F1’s exclusive hospitality area for each race weekend, presents business-
to-business (B2B) networking opportunities on a grand international scale.  One team’s 
commercial alliance director claims to have driven half a billion US dollars worth of 
business between his team’s partners in just five years (Canning, 2007).  This robust 
assessment of the networking potential within this environment was further substantiated 
by the chief marketing officer for computer manufacturer Lenovo.  Shortly after his firm 
aligned with the Williams F1 team as a corporate and technology partner in a five-year 
agreement reported at $190 million (Lefton, 2007), he admitted: “One of the interesting 
things about F1 is all the other sponsors.  Already in the short period that we’ve been a 
member of this community, the conversation has already started on how can we do some 
co-marketing with other players” (Jones, 2007).   
Given the intense direct competition of F1 teams coupled with escalating 
operational costs, it seems imperative that these enterprises exploit their diverse range of 
promotional resources through exchange relationships with corporate partners seeking 
such resources.  On the other side, many of the firms interested in the promotional 
services offered by F1 teams may possess heterogeneous resources of their own that are 
complementary to the competitive environment of F1 racing.   The study presented in the 
next chapter examines the promoting team side of promotional alliances, and to what 
degree these enterprises rely on this type of interorganizational exchange to access 
different resources to facilitate their survival.   
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1: ACCESSING ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES THROUGH 
PROMOTIONAL ALLIANCES 
 
Utilizing the resourced-based view, Chapter One built a theoretical framework for 
a subset of strategic alliances based on promotional resource exchange.  This 
conceptualization of promotional alliances served as an integrating force between the 
foundations of commercial sponsorship and strategic alliances.  The two organizations 
engaged in this promotional exchange relationship were described in general as the 
promoter and the promotion-seeking firm, or in the specific context of F1 racing 
introduced in Chapter Two, they are represented by a promoting team and sponsoring 
firm.  This chapter dives deeper into the necessity of resource access and exchange from 
the promoting team’s perspective as an entrepreneurial enterprise in a competitive 
environment.  The standpoint of the promoter in such relationships has largely been 
ignored by previous research.  However, here the theories of organizational ecology and 
resource dependency are called upon to supplement the broader promotional alliance 
framework and inform an investigation of how the promotional resource exchange 
impacts the promoting enterprise’s propensity to survive.     
 
3.1 Research Question 
While the popularity of the resourced-based view has focused attention on the 
contribution of firm resources to a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Wernerfelt, 1984), the mere sustainability of operations concerns many entrepreneurial 
enterprises.  Ulrich and Barney (1984) acknowledged this reality when they integrated 
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resource dependency and population ecology theory to suggest that firms must efficiently 
engage in an acquisition of resources to survive over the long term.  This study focuses 
on interorganizational alliances as one of the most common methods for accessing the 
resources necessary for firm survival (Ireland et al., 2002).   
In a competitive environment, new ventures must identify and access resources in 
a manner efficient enough to sustain operations while organizational learning 
accumulates through experience (Levitt & March, 1988).  Although resources play a vital 
role in both the larger administrative and smaller entrepreneurial cultures, often the 
ability of the entrepreneurial firm to control resources depends increasingly on accessing 
such resources via relationships with other organizations (Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985).  
Transaction cost economics suggests that without the accumulated capital and internal 
operational systems of larger administrative firms, younger organizations in a dynamic 
environment might be less inclined to commit financial capital to secure ownership 
control of all, or even a majority of their required resources (Williamson, 1981).  Instead, 
these organizations are more likely to incur the external market costs necessary to meet 
their resource needs.  Often strategic and social dynamics lead such enterprises to form 
interorganizational alliances as a quasi-market mechanism that allows entrepreneurial 
firms to compete efficiently in a rapidly changing environment, while also leveraging 
their own core capabilities as bartering chips in the exchange relationship (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996).   
From an organizational learning perspective, entrepreneurial firms can 
compensate for their own lack of experience by aligning with experienced others for 
resource collaboration (Levitt & March, 1988).  Not only are firms able to appropriate a 
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degree of their partners’ experience, but once engaged in multiple interorganizational 
relationships, firms develop their own alliance formation capabilities and network 
resources, thereby increasing the likelihood of future alliance engagement (Gulati, 1999).  
Furthermore, establishing a network of interorganizational exchange relationships can 
also increase the attractiveness of an otherwise unknown enterprise when such alliances 
are viewed as inter-firm endorsements (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999).  In total, the 
deliberate composition of an alliance network for resource access and exchange can 
positively influence the early performance of entrepreneurial organizations (Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000).   However, resource dependency theory suggests that 
interorganizational relations can lead to undesirable dependence and constraints (Pfeffer 
& Nowak, 1976).  In other words, relying on external organizations to access vital 
resources also entails certain hazards, such as relationship exploitation, resource 
redundancy, and conflicting objectives, which can all contribute to underperformance 
(Das & Teng, 1996).   
The following study seeks to advance and further clarify the theoretical link 
between organizational resources and the survival of entrepreneurial enterprises engaged 
in head-to-head competition.  Utilizing 40 years of data on the alliances between Formula 
One (F1) racing teams and their supporting corporate partners, F1 teams are examined as 
entrepreneurial organizations that access various categories of resources via their 
corporate alliances in order to facilitate performance and maintain operations on an 
international scale.  Explicitly, the overarching research question addressed in this study 
is as follows: 
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 How does an entrepreneurial organization’s access to resources through 
interorganizational alliances influence its survival over time in a highly 
competitive environment? 
 
3.2 Survival of an Entrepreneurial Enterprise  
The survival of organizations in a competitive marketplace depends on a myriad 
of factors that can be broadly categorized as human capital, organizational characteristics, 
and environmental conditions (Brüderl, Preisendörfer, & Ziegler, 1992).  Although 
human capital in the form of the individual traits of the founder received much of the 
early attention from scholars studying entrepreneurial organizations (e.g. Bates, 1990; 
Shaver & Scott, 1991), this psychological perspective eventually yielded to the necessity 
of considering factors beyond the individual level of analysis when considering the 
performance of new ventures (Thornton, 1999).  The theories of resource dependency and 
organizational ecology gained traction in entrepreneurial research as the investigative 
emphasis expanded to organizational characteristics and the institutional conditions of the 
environment (Audretsch, 1991; Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).   
Viewing organizations within a population ecology framework highlights the 
roles of competition and environmental selection in the determination of firm survival.   
This macro perspective proposes that individual organizations do not possess an 
unbounded capacity to adapt to their environment because they are subject to inertial 
pressures resulting from their capital investments, normative history, and political and 
informational connections and constraints (Hannan & Freeman, 1977).  When 
competition exists for scarce resources, ecological theory suggests that organizations best 
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suited to acquire necessary resources will survive.  Therefore, the pressures of inertia in a 
stable environment seemingly benefit experienced organizations with established 
resources.  Conversely, inertia in a rapidly changing environment can become a liability 
as other firms enjoying greater freedom are quicker to adapt to the new conditions and 
access the appropriate resource requirements (Miller & Shamsie, 1996).   In this way, the 
concepts of environmental selection and organizational adaptation are complementary.  
The environment requires its inhabitants (organizations) to rely on certain resources for 
survival.  As the environment changes, the relationship between survival and specific 
resources may also change.  As a result, the inhabitants are forced to recognize and adapt 
to such changes, within the boundaries of their individual constraints, to ensure their 
continued health and survival.   
Exchange theorists have pointed out that relationships between organizations 
enable access to resources outside the traditional constraints of the firm (Levine & White, 
1961).  Often such relationships take the form of a strategic alliance between firms 
(Ireland et al., 2002).  While the rationales for strategic alliance formation have been 
described in various ways (see the ‘Purpose’ section of Table A.1), a vast majority of 
these justifications, if not all, can be summarized generally as attempts to realize 
synergistic value-creation from the pooling of firms’ complementary resources (Das & 
Teng, 2000; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).  Strategic alliances are attractive mechanisms for 
accessing desired resources outside the boundaries of the firm because they allow 
partners to realize the benefits of resources without the full commitment required of 
ownership.  Further, and perhaps more importantly, strategic alliances facilitate access to 
not only the core resources offered by the partner, but also the accumulated knowledge 
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and experience of that partner in leveraging such a resource (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, 
Arregle, & Borza, 2000).  Meanwhile, by offering their own expertise and tradable 
resources as part of the interorganizational exchange inherent in strategic alliances, each 
partner potentially extracts incremental value from their own resource inventory.  
Consequently, strategic alliances are viewed as a viable means by which organizations 
navigate their environment and maintain survival (Baum et al., 2000).   
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), however, would suggest 
that interorganizational resource exchange is not without its drawbacks.  Relying on 
entities outside the firm for access to vital resources fosters dependency and initiates 
another set of constraints on the firm.  Interorganizational exchanges are not devoid of 
power dynamics, and resource dependency implies the ceding of a degree of power to an 
alliance partner (Cook, 1977; Emerson, 1962).  Within this perspective, firms are 
generally hypothesized to avoid such interdependence; yet in reality, the demands of 
adapting to a dynamic environment typically result in a pragmatic balancing of 
dependency and efficiency that necessitates a certain level of interorganizational 
exchange to ensure survival (Baker, 1990; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).   
Beyond the drawback of dependence, alliances are also subject to several other 
organizational risks and constraints such as high behavioral uncertainty, management 
complexities, unintentional proprietary knowledge transfer, culture clash, and the loss of 
decision autonomy (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Parkhe, 1993).  
Despite the potential hazards, the seduction of accessible resources via 
interorganizational alliances has proven to be irresistible to the degree that dense 
networks of alliances have proliferated and extended interorganizational research beyond 
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the dyadic level (Gulati, 1998).  Alliance networks have been shown to impact 
profitability based on their structure (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004), positively influence 
innovation (Ahuja, 2000), precipitate further organizational alliance involvement (Gulati, 
1999), and even facilitate corporate crime (Baker & Faulkner, 1993).  In an 
entrepreneurial setting, the early performance of startup organizations has been linked to 
alliance network composition (Baum et al., 2000), which in turn can be viewed as a 
confluence of strategic resource needs and social opportunities (Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996).   
 
3.3 Theoretical Model & Hypotheses 
The following research project suggests that organizational survival depends, to 
some degree, on leveraging internal resources in the marketplace to facilitate strategic 
alliances with other firms in order to access the full resources necessary for adequate 
organizational competition.  The following theoretical model stipulates the factors related 
to organizational dissolution as considered in this study and detailed in the sections that 
follow. 
Survivialpromoter = f(Experiencepartner, Resourcesperformance, Resourcesfinancial, 
Resourcesoperational, [Erahistoric * Resourcesfinancial], Embeddednesspromoter, 
Performancepromoter) 
 
In the subsequent theoretical descriptions of hypotheses, the variables influencing 
survival are arranged within three categories.  The first involves a characteristic of the 
sponsoring partner, characterized as a corporate firm seeking to fulfill promotional 
objectives through an alliance with the entrepreneurial promoting enterprise (promoter).  
The hypothesized relevant characteristic of these corporate partners is their experience in 
(1) 
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the promotional context.  The second category of hypotheses revolves around the 
relationship between the promoting enterprise and their sponsoring partners.  These five 
propositions entail the type of resources exchanged, the institutional era of exchange, and 
the embeddedness of the promoter in the contextual global network of alliances.   The 
final delineation of variables describes the past performance of the promoter itself.  Each 
of these considerations is theoretically linked to the survival of the entrepreneurial 
promoter within its particular institutional context of competition.  This outcome is 
described in the next section prior to the stipulation of hypotheses.   
 
3.3.1 Survival of the Promoter [Team]  
The mortality of an entrepreneurial enterprise creates a fascinating investigative 
outcome relevant to a range of research disciplines, including economics (Audretsch & 
Mahmood, 1995), psychology (Shaver & Scott, 1991), sociology (Thornton, 1999), and 
management theorists (Baum et al., 2000).  By focusing on dimensions of 
interorganizational alliances based in promotional resource exchange, this study advances 
the research that has taken a resource-based approach to investigating the survival of 
organizations (Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001; Bergmann Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001; 
Sheppard, 1995; Starr & MacMillan, 1990).  Specifically, entrepreneurial enterprises with 
a business model based in promotional service act as the focus of this investigation.   
For their continued operation, promotion-based organizations rely on one of two 
business models.  Either the promoting enterprise directly attracts an audience that is 
desirable to a set of firms, who consequently seek affiliation as a promotional platform, 
or the enterprise acts as an expert intermediary by providing a coordinating service to 
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match firms seeking a promotional platform with an entity that attracts their targeted 
audience.  Festivals, concerts, traveling shows, and spectator sports organizations serve 
as examples of the former and are analogous to the sample of promotion-based 
enterprises used in this investigation.  Advertising and other marketing communication-
focused agencies fit the description of the latter, intermediary type of promotion-
coordinating enterprise.   
To survive, both types of promotional service organizations must maintain access 
to the necessary resources to compete in their dynamic industry environment.  Otherwise, 
the organization will be forced into one of two conditions: dissolution or sale (Freeman, 
Carroll, & Hannan, 1983).  Dissolution occurs when the enterprise ceases to exist as an 
operating organization.  Sale arises when another enterprise subsumes ownership and 
control in exchange for providing the resources the former organization failed to acquire 
in the competitive marketplace.  In the case of a sale, the original organization continues 
to operate but under new ownership control, and often with a revised resource situation.  
It is the more dramatic outcome of enterprise dissolution that serves as the focal condition 
in this longitudinal research, though consideration is given to the propensity of enterprise 
sale to affect this terminal outcome.   
 
3.3.2 Sponsoring Partner Characteristic  
Resource dependency, organizational ecology, and organizational learning 
theories suggest several factors that could plausibly be considered as influential in an 
entrepreneurial enterprise’s survival.  As mentioned above, these factors are categorized 
into three domains labeled as a characteristic of the promotion-seeking (or sponsoring) 
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partners, characteristics of the alliance relationship between the promotion-seeking 
partners and the promoting enterprise, and finally, characteristics of the promoting 
enterprise (promoter) itself.  The first area addresses the experience of the sponsoring 
partners in the promotional context at hand.  The entrepreneurial enterprises under 
scrutiny in this study rely on a promotion-based business model that hinges on direct 
affiliation with a network of corporate alliance partners.  These partners act as sponsoring 
firms who are seeking to achieve promotional objectives based on this affiliation 
(Meenaghan, 1983), but their experience may be of particular interest to the promoting 
enterprise. 
 
3.3.2.1 Experience 
At their outset, entrepreneurial enterprises often must overcome what Freeman et 
al. (1983) term the liability of newness.  In other words, there is an age dependence to the 
mortality of organizations, which suggests that experience contributes to survival.  While 
new ventures can not artificially contrive their own organizational experience apart from 
the restrictions of time, organizational learning theory proposes that the knowledge 
benefits of experience can diffuse between organizations via three primary methods 
(Levitt & March, 1988).  First, a central organization such as a trade association might 
broadcast best practices for an industry to its community of affiliated organizations.  
Second, direct contact between organizations through an alliance, personnel transfer, or 
interlocking directorates can diffuse routines, strategies, or other knowledge between 
enterprises.  Finally, experience-based information may be collected and disseminated 
within a small group, which then broadcasts the knowledge to a larger organizational 
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population.  This last two-stage process can occur through educational institutions or via 
industry consultants and inter-firm trainers.   
Where an entrepreneurial enterprise looks to interorganizational alliances to 
access resources, the enterprise positions itself to take advantage of the second method of 
knowledge diffusion described above.  A promotion-based organization creates an 
avenue for continuing direct contact with their sponsoring firms by establishing an 
ongoing collaborative relationship based on achieving the firms’ promotional objectives 
(Farrelly, Quester, & Mavondo, 2003).  As contact between the organizations intensifies, 
routines develop that can be conducive to knowledge accumulation and organizational 
learning (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2003).  While both parties in an alliance may realize 
learning effects, the effects are not necessarily symmetrical.  The less experienced partner 
maintains a greater learning potential as related to the competitive context than their more 
experienced partner (Hamel, 1991; Hitt et al., 2000).  In an entrepreneurial context, this 
implies that new ventures would be wise to seek out alliances with firms that have 
accumulated experience in the venture’s competitive environment.  Doing so may result 
in a knowledge accumulation through organizational learning that could help to 
compensate for the venture’s own lack of experience.  As a result, the following 
hypothesis is offered: 
H1: The experience of an enterprise’s corporate alliance network is negatively 
related to the hazard of dissolution. 
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3.3.3 Alliance Relationship  
The second classification of hypotheses encompasses characteristics of the 
relational exchange inherent to a promotion-based alliance.  A central premise in this 
study is that accessing resources through a network of exchange relationships with 
sponsoring firms is a primary method by which a promoting enterprise competes and 
maintains survival.  Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995, p. 283) describe a strategic 
alliance as “a manifestation of interorganizational cooperative strategies, entail(ing) the 
pooling of skills and resources by the alliance partners, in order to achieve one or more 
goals linked to the strategic objectives of the operating firms.”  Here, the relationship 
between the sponsoring firms and the promoting enterprise is thus characterized as a 
strategic alliance based on the promotional objectives of the sponsoring firm and the 
promotional capabilities and resources of the promoting enterprise.  Yet as it concerns the 
performance and survival of an entrepreneurial enterprise, not all resource alliances are 
perceived to be equal (Bergmann Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001), and their longitudinal 
value from an ecological perspective is contingent on environmental change or stability 
(Miller & Shamsie, 1996).   In other words, the resources accessed through a particular 
alliance relationship may be valuable when the partnership is initiated, but changes in the 
institutional environment might later make the same resources obsolete or of lesser 
competitive value.  The next set of alliance-related hypotheses begins with three 
propositions focused on the heterogeneity of the resources, followed by a look at the 
dynamic institutional context that frames interorganizational alliances, and a 
consideration of the impact of network embeddedness on the survival of promotional 
enterprises. 
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3.3.3.1 Resource Heterogeneity  
A primary assumption of the resource-based view of the firm is the heterogeneous 
distribution of resources across firms (Barney, 1991).  In stipulating that not all resources 
available to a firm represent identical rent-earning potential, Grant (1991) identified six 
general categories of resources: financial, physical, human, technological, reputation, and 
organizational.  These designations have been modified to pertain to various applications, 
such as Morgan and Hunt’s (1999) specification of additional categories of legal, 
relational, and informational resources in conceptualizing the contribution of cooperative 
relationships to marketing strategy.   
In empirical contexts emphasizing resource exchange, researchers have routinely 
reduced the categorization to designations such as technical versus nontechnical (Chan, 
Kensinger, Keown, & Martin, 1997), marketing versus research (Anand & Khanna, 
2000), and technological versus marketing (Das, Sen, & Sengupta, 1998).  However, each 
of these resource categories tends to describe the actual resource and not necessarily the 
resource or alliance’s potential contribution to the firm in relation to its competitive 
environment.  For example, the high technology firm Oerlikon describes the resources it 
contributes to its alliance with the Red Bull F1 racing team as “immediate access to 
around 1,500 scientists and engineers who develop innovations of tomorrow” (Oerlikon, 
2007).  While this undoubtedly describes a technology resource, the potential for this 
resource to influence the Red Bull team’s survival is markedly different from the 
magnitude of impact such a resource might have on another promotion-based enterprise’s 
survival, such as a traveling figure skating exhibition.  Technology innovation serves as a 
major basis of competition in the environment of a Formula One team, while technology 
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resources would most likely be peripheral to an ice show’s battle for competitive position 
in the marketplace. 
Even within specific industry sectors, such as Formula One racing, resources can 
be heterogeneous in both their distribution and potential contribution to organizational 
competition.  In F1, resources are heterogeneously distributed among enterprises based 
largely on a team’s ability to access needed resources through their alliances with 
sponsoring firms.  Yet certain alliance resources appear to offer a more direct 
contribution to a team’s environmental competition.  This can be seen anecdotally by the 
descriptions of two different alliances by managers of the Renault F1 Team.  In the case 
of their partnership with ING, the financial services firm, the team manager simply stated 
that “ING is a brand that fits perfectly with the Renault F1 Team’s image.  Both 
companies are dynamic organizations seeking to enhance their global brand awareness” 
(“ING confirms,” 2006).   Whereas, when characterizing their team’s alliance with 3D 
Systems, a Renault team manager was much more specific regarding the competitive 
contribution of their new partner’s resources: “In order to improve the competitiveness of 
the Mild Seven Benetton Formula 1 team [now Renault] and maximize the return on 
investment of our new wind tunnel, we have recently moved to a double shift system in 
our Aerodynamic Department.  We felt that increasing our reliance on 3D Systems’ 
stereolithography technology was the most cost-effective solution that also maintained 
the high quality we require for our experimental work” (“3D Systems,” 2000).  These two 
quotes originating from the same F1 team imply differences in the direct competitive 
contribution of various alliance resources.  
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In their empirical examination of the deployment of firm resources, Slotegraaf et 
al. (2003) moved closer to a contribution-based perspective when specifying the 
differential effectiveness of various resources, but their delineation as financial, 
technological, and marketing resources remained descriptive of the resource itself and not 
necessarily its ultimate utilization.  Brush et al. (2001, p. 67) tackled the issue of resource 
distinction by proposing that firm resources be “characterized by their application to the 
productive process, ranging from utilitarian to instrumental.”  Under their classification, 
utilitarian resources were applied directly to production, while instrumental resources 
were utilized in a more flexible fashion to gain access to other resources.  Meanwhile, 
other researchers have approached resource application by characterizing the resource 
exchange within an alliance relationship based on a comparison of each partners’ industry 
or operational context.  This perspective is based on complementarity (Chung, Singh, & 
Lee, 2000; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001), or strategic relatedness (Tsai, 
2000), and implies not only that resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms 
and industries, but also encompasses the former idea that the resources retain a strategic 
dimension relating to their potential utilization.  By categorizing resources based on their 
potential strategic contribution to an enterprise, some consideration is thereby given to 
the surrounding competitive and institutional context.   
With the central concern of this study being the mortality of promotional 
enterprises, the resources accessed by organizations through strategic alliances in this 
investigation are classified by their potential role in the functioning of such an enterprise.  
Therefore, the complementarity between alliance partners is adopted as the appropriate 
basis for delineating diverse resources accessed through an enterprise’s collection of 
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interorganizational relationships.  Sarkar, Echambadli, Cavusgil, et al. (2001, p. 360) 
conceptualize resource complementarity within an alliance as a symmetry consisting of 
“unique and valuable resources available to achieve strategic objectives,” and thus 
enhance “competitive viability.”  This consideration of competitiveness implies a proper 
emphasis on the institutional context of resource utilization, therein suggesting that 
certain resources may be more or less relevant to an enterprise’s survival based on the 
competition faced in a specific environment.  To that end, three resource distinctions are 
proposed within this study, all of which are hypothesized to be negatively related to a 
promoting enterprise’s dissolution in varying magnitudes depending on the 
complementarity to the institutional context.  In other words, the better an acquired 
resource fits the competitive context, the more likely that resource contributes to 
enterprise survival.   
 
3.3.3.1.1 Exchange of Performance-based Resources 
The first resource designation, labeled as performance-based, relies directly on the 
complementarity within an alliance from the competitive perspective of the promoting 
enterprise.  In the examples given in the previous section, the Red Bull and Renault F1 
racing teams were the promoting enterprises that aligned with the promotion-seeking 
firms Oerlikon, ING, and 3D Systems.  Both Oerlikon’s and 3D Systems’ resources as 
high technology firms were implied in the quotes to complement the teams’ performance 
in their competitive environment.  Accessing complementary resources to enhance 
performance is a foundation of alliance formation (Chung et al., 2000; Das & Teng, 
2000).  Yet, organizational performance remains decisively interwoven with competition 
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among rivals (Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1991).  Thus, an alliance partner that 
shares an industry with, or operates in an industry strongly related to that of the focal 
enterprise, such as high technology and Formula One racing, is likely to be better 
equipped to offer strategic resources to combat rivals by directly impacting enterprise 
performance (Varadarajan & Cunningham, 1995).   
In practice, resources relating directly to the production process have been found 
to be more salient to entrepreneurs leading new ventures, who tend to seek out such 
resources through interorganizational partnerships in congruent industries (Bergmann 
Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001). As a result, resources exchanged within such congruent 
alliances are expected to directly influence an enterprise’s performance in head-to-head 
competition and are hypothesized to facilitate survival.    
H2: An enterprise’s access to performance-based resources is negatively related to 
the hazard of dissolution. 
 
3.3.3.1.2 Exchange of Financial Resources 
Financial or monetary resources represent the most ubiquitous designation of firm 
resource categorizations (e.g. Barney, 1995; Grant, 1991; Morgan & Hunt, 1999), which 
is less than surprising given their versatility.  Financial resources possess not only an 
intrinsic transformative nature, but can also symbolize the ultimate aim of an enterprise to 
many individuals, that being to increase financial wealth or basically, “make money.”  
Indeed, this condition is so vital to an entrepreneurial enterprise that it entails one of the 
two essential tests of a viable business model, namely the numbers qualification (versus 
the narrative test) (Magretta, 2002).   
 47 
Beyond simply creating monetary wealth, financial resources provide an 
organization with flexibility because their quality of liquidity enables these resources to 
be quickly exchanged for another resource deemed at the time to be vital to the 
enterprise.  Yet, Barney points out financial resources are often not rare and are therefore 
unlikely to solely generate a sustainable competitive advantage (1991).  While accessing 
financial resources remains imperative to entrepreneurial survival, some research has 
shown that in the early stages of enterprise development, financial resources, though 
relevant, are not as salient to the entrepreneur as those resources relating directly to 
performance (Bergmann Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001; Brush et al., 2001).   
This assertion aligns with the organizational learning perspective that suggests 
entrepreneurial enterprises can compensate for their liability of newness by gaining 
relevant industry knowledge through alliances with established firms (as suggested in 
H1) (Freeman et al., 1983; Hamel, 1991).  However, as their own competitive experience 
accumulates over time, the necessity of accessing performance-based resources versus 
the flexibility of financial-based resources may diminish (Bergmann Lichtenstein & 
Brush, 2001).  Therefore, financial resources are hypothesized to contribute to an 
enterprise’s continued existence, but not be as vital as performance-based resources early 
in the organization’s life.  Instead, alliances offering financial resources are hypothesized 
to increase in importance as an enterprise’s experience accumulates and resource 
liquidity is more useful.  
H3: (a) An enterprise’s access to financial resources is negatively related to the 
hazard of dissolution, but initially at a lower intensity level than performance-
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based resources.  (b) However, as an enterprise ages, the negative relationship 
between dissolution and financial resources intensifies. 
 
3.3.3.1.3 Exchange of Operational Resources 
Resources contributing to the ongoing operation of an enterprise, but not strictly 
monetary or straightforwardly influencing the enterprise’s direct competition with rivals 
are labeled here as operational resources.  This category can be conceptualized as 
analogous to commodity goods and services necessary for the continued functioning of 
an organization and instrumental to accessing further resources (Brush et al., 2001).  For 
most enterprises such resources might include office equipment, internet access, certain 
basic employee services, and other administrative capabilities. This type of resource is 
typically not the primary basis for competition within an industry and tends to be easier 
to access given their near universal utilization.  As a result, operational resources are not 
particularly rare, and similar to financial resources, are therefore unlikely to be a source 
of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).  However, these resources also lack the 
flexibility and liquidity of pure financial resources.  Hence, operational resources are 
considered to contribute to organizational survival, but be less impactful than either 
performance or financial-based resources in predicting the dissolution of entrepreneurial 
enterprises. 
H4: An enterprise’s access to operational resources is negatively related to the 
hazard of dissolution, but at a lower intensity than performance or financial 
resources.  
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3.3.3.2 Institutional Dynamics 
Promotion-based interorganizational alliances represent a primary means by 
which the promotional service enterprises within this study access resources.  While 
some authors have viewed alliances as circumventing market exchanges (Baker et al., 
1998), a perspective of the market as a “social institution which facilitates exchange” 
(Coase, 1988, p. 8) implies that in certain context, such as business-to-business services, 
alliances act within the market as the institutional mechanism by which 
interorganizational exchange takes place.  In these cases, the market takes on a 
coordinating function that facilitates alliance formation for the efficient delivery of such 
services.  For example, popular spectator sports attract large audiences that are often 
desirable targets for promotional messages.  As a means of maintaining their operations, 
sports teams and leagues have developed the institutional mechanism of commercial 
sponsorship to enable the formation of promotional alliances with corporations seeking to 
reach their audience.  The basic aim of these alliances is to meet the sponsoring 
corporations’ commercial objectives through an exchange of the team’s promotional 
service for certain resources provided by the sponsoring firms which the teams deem 
necessary for competition within their sporting industry (Farrelly & Quester, 2005a;  
Meenaghan, 1983).  With the existence of numerous sports teams and leagues, and a 
multitude of firms seeking to communicate their message to an audience attracted to 
sports, the commercial sponsorship market acts as the means of coordinating these 
alliance relationships.   
 50 
Over time, a market becomes institutionalized through phases of emergence, 
stability, and potentially crisis (Fligstein, 1996).  As the market develops, dynamic forces 
such as regulatory change and the evolution of the norms of exchange can impact the 
composition, longevity, and even the likelihood of alliance formation in a particular 
institutional context (Baker et al., 1998).  In the case of commercial sponsorship in 
spectator sports, a relaxing of the regulations by the institutional body (the league or 
governing organization) regarding the permissibility of corporate logos on player 
uniforms would open up another promotional platform for the teams to leverage as a 
resource in corporate alliance exchange relationships.  Conversely, the rise of anti-
tobacco legislation around the globe led Formula One’s regulatory body to ban its teams 
from visible tobacco promotion at institutional events after the 2006 season.  This 
institutional regulation was enacted despite the monetary resource contribution of over 
US$250 million by tobacco brands annually to F1’s teams (Sylt, 2006).  Certainly, this 
type of institutional change would have considerable impact on the resources accessed by 
these promotion-based teams via their alliances with sponsoring firms.   
In their analysis of the Hollywood film industry, Miller and Shamsie (1996) 
demonstrated how the dynamic institutional environment of the mid-twentieth century 
impacted the fluctuating value of different resources.  They suggested that property-based 
resources were more influential in stable periods, while knowledge-based resources were 
desirable in times of change.  A similar hypothesis based on a dramatic change in 
institutional support is proposed here, where a definitive shift in the control of financial 
resources flowing from the regulatory institution created two distinct eras.  In an earlier 
era (pre-1996 in this case), entrepreneurial enterprises received a substantial flow of 
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financial resources directly from the regulatory governing body to help sustain 
operations.  When a new institutional governing agreement was imposed between the 
regulatory body and the participating enterprises, a new era was introduced in which 
enterprises lost direct control over this revenue stream.  In other words, the promoting 
enterprises in this study (F1 teams) could no longer rely on the consistency of financial 
resource allocation from the governing body based solely on their institutional (F1) 
involvement.  As a result, enterprises attempting to survive within this institution are 
hypothesized to have become more reliant on promotional alliances for access to the 
financial resources necessary for survival.  Conceptually, this dynamic is represented by 
an interaction of the institutional era and the number of alliances based on financial 
resource exchange [Erahistoric * Resourcesfinancial], where survival is expected to depend 
increasing on alliances offering financial resources when institutional support wanes.  
Explicitly, the following hypothesis is offered in relation to the dynamics of institutional 
regulation and governance. 
H5: Increased uncertainty in the institutional provision for a necessary resource 
will intensify the survival dependence on external alliances as a means of 
accessing that particular resource.  
 
3.3.3.3 Promoter [Team] Embeddedness in Alliance Network 
Business networks are characterized as “a set of two or more connected business 
relationships in which each exchange relation is between business firms that are 
conceptualized as collective actors” (Anderson et al., 1994, p. 2).  Labeling a group, or 
portfolio, of sponsoring firms connected through promotional service alliances as 
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“collective actors” is contingent upon setting the network boundary as engagement in a 
particular institutionalized resource exchange (promotional service) (Rowley, 1997).  For 
example, a collection of firms engaged in sponsorship alliances with motor racing teams 
represents a promotional network centered upon the sponsorship relationship as the focal 
resource exchange within the regulatory institution of motor racing (Cornwell & 
Maignan, 1998).  In such an example, each corporate actor in the network has been 
granted the various promotional rights and services, and hospitality privileges of an 
official team partner in exchange for financial resources and often technological and 
logistical expertise that facilitate the performance and continued operation of the team.  If 
sponsorship of a racing team is considered as analogous to membership in a club, a two-
mode affiliation network has conceivably formed where each member (sponsoring firm) 
of the business network shares at least one affiliation with a focal set of actors (racing 
teams).  A graphical representation of the business network involving sponsoring firms 
and promoting teams in F1 in a particular sample year is presented in Figure 3.1  
The structural embeddedness of an actor in a business network refers to the 
actor’s position in the network architecture of exchange relationships and the 
connectedness of such a position (Uzzi, 1997).  More embedded actors are generally 
more connected within the defined network.  The concept of embeddedness in an 
interfirm network implies both constraints and opportunities (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 
2000), and each can operate to encourage survival of an entrepreneurial enterprise to 
some degree.  Constraints manifest themselves as group norms, expectations, or 
contractual obligations, which might be viewed as barriers to exit in addition to the social 
ties and status implications inherent in network positions that would be forfeited upon 
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enterprise dissolution.  Stuart et al. (1999) conceptualize a young enterprise’s network 
position as consisting of a collection of status-oriented organizational endorsements, 
which they demonstrate are influential in the enterprise’s ability to access additional 
resources.  From this perspective, network embeddedness shifts to an opportunity where a 
web of alliances is perceived by potential partners as a signal of the enterprise’s viability.   
Theoretically, a signaling effect of network embeddedness, while important to 
note, is most likely cursory to the opportunities of information flow and organizational 
learning arising from a dense network position.  Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison (2001) 
show the positive effect on market performance of an enterprise’s alliance proactiveness.  
This effect is magnified for smaller organizations and demonstrates Gulati’s (1999) 
argument that network position itself is a firm resource because it creates an avenue for 
information flow and a means for organizational learning in regards to alliance formation 
and utilization.  Although Uzzi (1997) points out a potential threshold to the efficiencies 
of embeddedness and the hazards of insulation, the weight of the theory regarding the 
magnitude of network embeddedness leans toward a negative relationship with 
organization dissolution. 
H6: The network embeddedness of an entrepreneurial enterprise is negatively 
related to the hazard of dissolution. 
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Figure 3.1: Formula One 2-mode business network of promoting teams (circles) and sponsoring firms (squares) in 1977. Node 
size indicates the magnitude of embeddedness as measured by betweenness centrality. 
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3.3.4 Promoter [Team] Characteristics 
Thus far in investigating the survival of promotion-based entrepreneurial 
enterprises, consideration has been given to the experience of their alliance partners and 
several characteristics of the enterprises’ alliance relationships.  Yet when reflecting on 
organization survival, certainly some factors of the enterprise itself might be considered 
paramount to its ultimate fate (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995).  One of these factors is the 
enterprise’s own experience, or age.  Age dependence in regard to organizational survival 
has been documented in the literature as a liability of newness (Freeman et al., 1983). Not 
surprisingly, the older an enterprise becomes, thereby enabling it to learn from experience 
(Levitt & March, 1988), the less likely the enterprise is to dissolve.  Through the 
utilization of a time-based hazard model, age dependence is captured within the event 
history methodology employed in this study’s analysis, which is discussed in the method 
and variable sections below (3.4 and 3.5.1 respectively).  First however, one other 
important facet of the enterprise itself must be considered, resulting in the last hypothesis.   
 
3.3.4.1 Performance 
The ability of an enterprise to compete for scarce resources versus the rivals in its 
environment is a basic test of survival in organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 
1977).  Competition may come in the form of sales, alliance formations, certifications, 
ratings, distribution, or even head-to-head product tests.  For both new and established 
ventures, performance in such competitions weighs heavily in the process of 
legitimization, the formation of status hierarchies, and the building of reputation (Rao, 
1994).  In this way, performance may impact access to resources both directly and 
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indirectly.  Superior sales performance, ratings, and achievement in head-to-head 
competitions directly generate financial and organizational resources, which can also be 
employed to acquire further resources.  Additionally, ceteris paribus, potential 
interorganizational alliance partners theoretically desire to align with prestigious others 
(Stuart, 1998), indicating that generating prestige through superior performance might 
create additional alliance opportunities to access even further resources.  In these ways, 
enterprise performance seems highly probable to impact survival. 
H7: The competitive performance of an entrepreneurial enterprise is negatively 
related to the hazard of dissolution. 
 
3.4 Methodology: Event History Analysis 
The event history methodology has gained traction in several disciplines as a 
means of analyzing longitudinal data concerned with an event’s occurrence within a 
population.  In clinical studies, the time until the onset of a condition, relapse, and 
recovery, and the individual or environmental factors that affect such durations are all of 
particular interest to researchers (Willett & Singer, 1993).  In these cases, the event may 
be smoking and scientists are interested in different cessation methods.  As a result, they 
want to track the time until relapse for former smokers who quit by employing various 
cessation techniques, while controlling for other relevant characteristics.  However, in 
samples suitable for such an investigation, some subjects may not have experienced the 
focal event (relapse) and are therefore, right-censored in the dataset.  Removing these 
cases or assigning the occurrence of the event to the last data collection period will 
negatively bias the estimate because some sample subjects continue to avoid relapse.  
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Event history analysis, also commonly referred to as survival analysis, was developed to 
properly analyze such scenarios (Cox, 1972).    
Given the current research question regarding promotion-based enterprise 
survival, the event history method offers an appropriate technique for approaching such a 
longitudinal question.  To proceed, several considerations are necessary to evaluate the 
suitability of this methodological tool.  First, change is being assessed over time, which 
can be either continuous or discrete depending on the event.  Since the institutional 
context of this investigation (Formula 1 motor racing) operates in yearly seasons, time in 
this investigation is designated at discrete intervals based on annual enterprise survival.   
Second, the possible changes in condition of the subjects conceptually represent 
the dependent variable and must be delineated.  This can also be thought of as the 
occurrence of an event.  Analogous to individual patient survival in clinical research, the 
potential outcome conditions in any given time period of the enterprises studied here are 
only two-fold: operational (alive) or nonoperational (dead).  While theoretically this may 
be more difficult to discern when applied to organizations (Freeman et al., 1983), the 
context here allows for a determination based on whether an enterprise (team) competed 
in a public competition (motorsports race) in a particular season or not4.  A binary 
survival variable acts as the actual dependant variable and the hazard rate specifies the 
likelihood of a change in condition occurring at a certain time, given the subject’s 
existence to that point.   
Third, the hazard function plays a critical role in modeling event history data and 
is based on the chronological shape of the hazard rate.  Parametric models assume a 
                                                 
4
 This does not imply that a team scored points in a season; only that the enterprise fielded a race car in an 
F1-sanctioned race during the season. 
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specified shape of the hazard function and the effect of covariates, while nonparametric 
models make no such assumptions.  However, nonparametric models are very limited in 
their ability to consider multiple groups, identified by the covariates, and lack 
multivariate controls.  Fortunately, semiparametric models have been developed to relax 
the assumption of a predetermined shape of the hazard function while still maintaining 
multivariate controls.  Yet, proportionality in the hazard rates between groups must be 
assumed in semiparametric models.  Since the shape of the hazard function is typically 
unknown prior to analysis but several independent variables are often hypothesized to 
affect the function, semiparametric models have become popular in event history analysis 
and will be employed in this study.  Finally, the existence of time dependant covariates 
must be considered so as to specify an appropriate model that also allows for time 
dependence variation in the independent variables.  For example, predictor variables such 
as access to specific resources and alliance network embeddedness will change between 
time periods and these changes are thought to influence the enterprise’s propensity to 
survive (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995).   
Event history analysis has been utilized by several organizational researchers to 
study a variety of outcome events.  Broadly, these studies can be categorized as either 
tracking the survival of the organization itself, as is done in this study, or moving the 
level of event analysis to that of organizational relationships.  Research in the latter 
stream has examined the factors influencing the time until formal connections arise 
between new and existing business units (Tsai, 2000), instability in joint venture 
arrangements (Blodgett, 1992; Park & Russo, 1996), and the dynamics of advertising 
agency – client relationships (Baker et al., 1998).   Meanwhile, event history work 
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focusing on organizational survival has tended to focus on one of three covariate levels: 
the institutional environment (Audretsch, 1991), the firm itself (Audretsch & Mahmood, 
1995; Freeman et al., 1983; Rao, 1994), or characteristics of its founder (Brüderl et al., 
1992).  Typically, these studies have also incorporated control variables from one, but 
usually not both, of the other two aforementioned levels.   
 
3.5 Empirical Data 
 Adopting Hannan and Freeman’s (1977) ecological systems approach to 
appropriately defining the population of organizations to be studied begins by defining 
the organizational form and then the system boundary.  This study defines the 
organization as a motor racing team competing within the system boundary of Formula 
One (F1).  By setting the system boundary based on a particular industry, cross-industry 
discrepancies are negated and the variance between enterprises and their particular 
strategies for navigating a common institutional environment are emphasized (Miller & 
Shamsie, 1996; Rao, 1994).   
In lamenting the lack of empirical organizational survival research, Audretsch and 
Mahmood (1995) identified three measurement issues that have traditionally impeded 
progress: 1) the lack of longitudinal data compilations with discrete startup and closure 
information; 2) the challenge of determining observations in close enough time intervals 
on a consistent basis (i.e. census data tends to be too chronologically sparse); and, 3) data 
must be available at the organizational level, as opposed to aggregated at the industry 
level.  F1 racing teams provide several research advantages in their representation of 
entrepreneurial enterprises that enable these challenges to be overcome.   
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 First, teams have a discrete point of market entry and exit which is well 
documented and defined by their race participation.  Unlike North American sports 
leagues that operate as closed leagues, the institution of F1 allows for an annual flow of 
new team entrants and former team dissolutions5. Second, each team operates as an 
independent organization that must harness and utilize resources to produce a product 
that directly competes against the other products in the industry (Collings, 2004).  Motor 
racing encompasses a rigorous testing environment for both automotive and technological 
product development, thereby encouraging a diverse resource exchange inclusive of both 
property and knowledge-based resources that flow between the teams and their 
sponsoring firms (Jenkins & Floyd, 2001).  Third, each F1 team must produce their core 
product, the race car, within the regulations set forth by the governing body, the 
Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (FIA), similar to how an entrepreneurial 
construction enterprise would be subject to building codes or a new food producer must 
comply with governmental food regulations.  Then in F1, organizational performance in 
competition is captured objectively by race results.  Finally, the interorganizational 
alliances each team establishes to access resources are publicly touted and praised for 
their contribution to the teams’ continued survival and competitive success (Hotten, 
2000).   One team alliance manager described this by stating “our commercial proposition 
is founded on the principle of community and the clear expectation that our partners will 
enjoy being with each other and working together for their mutual benefit, as well as 
ours” (Sylt & Reid, 2008b).   
                                                 
5
 Although regulations exist to theoretically restrict the number of teams at any one point, these restrictions 
are typically modified when a new entrant satisfactorily demonstrates to the Fédération Internationale de 
l'Automobile (FIA), the governing body for F1, that the venture has secured adequate resources to compete. 
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As a result of F1’s historical worldwide popularity and the characteristics 
described above, data on F1 team existence and alliances with sponsoring firms was 
feasible to compile for the period from 1950 to 20076, which represents the historical life 
of the organized institution of Formula One racing.  The foundation of the data was 
acquired from the online database ChicaneF1, which is widely recognized to be the most 
comprehensive source of historical team and sponsoring firm alliance statistics available 
(Davies & Lawrence, n.d.).  Next, the data was cross-checked with recent data the author 
obtained from an internal F1 team source to verify reliability (Black book Formula One, 
2007).  Further, historical F1 texts containing pictures of various teams’ race cars were 
consulted in an attempt to match visible corporate partner logos on the vehicles with 
alliances compiled in the data (Donaldson, 2002; Schlegelmilch & Lehbrink, 2004).  
These cross-verification efforts supported the general reliability of the ChicaneF1 team-
sponsor data and served to clear up ambiguities where present7.  Corresponding historical 
team performance data was compiled via the official Formula One website (Formula One 
Administration Ltd., n.d.).  The resulting data consisted of 124 separate F1 team 
enterprises8, 776 team years9, 1,077 sponsoring firms, and 5,054 team-sponsor alliance 
years.   
                                                 
6
 Sponsoring firm alliance data begins in 1967 as promotional corporate alliances prior to that time were 
disallowed by F1 regulations.  
7
 While such ambiguities were few and far between considering the breadth of the dataset, a few situations 
arose such as team names in the ChicaneF1 dataset that needed to be matched with variations in names in 
the Formula 1 results database, or listings of teams in one dataset and not the other because of a lack of 
points scored in a particular season or a lack of any sponsoring firm alliances for a given team in a 
particular season.  Each of these data cleaning issues was addressed individually by the author in 
collaboration with another researcher in order to remove the possibility of sole judgment bias. 
8
 In addressing team sales (represented by name changes), this collection of 124 team enterprises 
recognizes the organization as continuing to exist as a consistent enterprise when the name changes.  In 
other words, when the Tyrell F1 team became BAR in 1999 and then later became Honda F1 in 2006, the 
enterprise is counted as one organization in this reporting of 124 team enterprises.  This data treatment is 
based on the fact that most team sales (name changes), while involving some organizational modifications 
as would be expected, do not result in complete staff and enterprise changes and commercial alliances and 
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3.5.1 Variables 
In this study of promotion-based enterprise survival, the dependent variable is the 
hazard of dissolution of the enterprise in each given year of existence (Audretsch & 
Mahmood, 1995).  The dataset is both cross-sectional and longitudinal with annual 
intervals.  Essentially, the event history method generates an age-based hazard function 
for the sample of enterprises that represents the chronological probability of team failure, 
given that the team has not yet dissolved.  The hazard probability for a team at a given 
age (team years of experience) is equal to the proportion of the teams at risk at that level 
of experience which incur dissolution (Willett & Singer, 1993).  The hazard function 
accounts for both censored and non-censored cases in computing probabilities, which is 
vital to the analysis given that enterprises still in existence have yet to experience 
dissolution and are therefore right-censored in the dataset.  The probabilities of 
dissolution, or hazard rates, are then predicted by the independent variables that have 
been grouped here as sponsoring firm, alliance relationship, and promoting team 
characteristics.  Table A.3 presents basic descriptive statistics for each variable.   
Experience in the F1 context was the characteristic of the sponsoring firms 
hypothesized to influence promoting team dissolution.  This variable (SprExp) was 
represented by a summation of the years of experience as a sponsoring firm in Formula 1 
for all partners in a team’s alliance network.  Therefore, if a team was engaged in five 
promotional alliance relationships, and each of their five sponsoring firms had been 
                                                                                                                                                 
even previous season team results (for the purposes of grid and pit positioning) are typically transferred as a 
condition of the sale. 
9
 Of the total 776 team years, 576 occurred after 1967 when the institutional regulations first permitted the 
promotion of corporate alliances.  This latter timeframe serves as the context of the investigation here. 
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involved in F1 in ten previous years, whether with that team or another team, the team 
would claim 50 years of sponsoring firm experience in their alliance network.   
The characteristics of the alliance relationships involved five hypotheses.  The 
first three addressed the type of resource exchange between alliance partners based on the 
complementarity of the sponsoring firm’s industry10 to the promoting team’s competitive 
environment (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001).  These designations were 
undertaken by the independent classification of two researchers after extensive review of 
the press announcements of over a hundred alliances, an examination of the firm 
resources literature referenced in the hypotheses outlined above, and the co-development 
and agreement on a resource classification framework that defined three contribution-
based categories: performance (SprPer), financial (SprFin), and operational (SprOps).  
The inter-coder reliability was 89 percent, and conflicts were subsequently reconciled 
through discussion and further clarification of the classification descriptions, as well as a 
review of alliance announcements within the relevant industry under evaluation. 
To test the second part of the hypothesis relating to alliances based on financial 
resources (H3b), a team experience (TmExp) variable is compiled that reflects the 
number of years a team has competed in F1 entering the season of record.  This variable 
is interacted with SprFin to determine if, as hypothesized, the number of financial 
alliances increases in importance for enterprise survival as the team gains experience.       
The hypothesis relating to institutional dynamics was tested through a binary 
variable (Era1996) designating two distinct eras defined by a shift in the institutional 
                                                 
10
 Given the historical nature of the dataset, a primary industry classification for the sponsoring firm was 
only feasible for 91.75 percent of the team-sponsor alliance years in the raw dataset.  For example, even 
after consulting various sources, no solid determination could be made as to what precise sponsoring firm 
“LBT” referenced in relationship to the 1982 March racing team. As a result, the analysis and data 
descriptions are inclusive of solely the sponsoring firm data with verifiable industry designations.   
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environment.  F1 racing operates under an agreement, called the Concorde Agreement, 
between the governing body (FIA) and the competing teams.  Following the 1995 season, 
the FIA, which asserts ownership over the commercial rights to the institution of F1 
(primarily global television and media rights), transferred those commercial rights from 
the association of competing teams to a separate company, Formula One Promotions and 
Administration, which previously had leased the rights from the team association.  
Essentially, this move relinquished the team’s direct financial stake in the 
commercialization of F1 (Collings, 2004).  As a result, the teams lost control over a 
considerable financial resource, thereby increasing their uncertainty in the institutional 
support for this resource.  To capture these separate eras, a binary variable distinguishes 
between the past era (pre-1996) and the modern era (1996 – 2007) (Miller & Shamsie, 
1996), and the institutional dynamics hypothesis predicts that teams will become more 
aggressive in pursuing financial resources via their own alliances in the modern era, 
given the teams’ increased uncertainty regarding institutional financial support.   
Lastly within the grouping of alliance relationship hypotheses, enterprise 
embeddedness in the network of F1 team-sponsor alliances takes the form of betweenness 
centrality (Btwn) for 2-mode data as calculated in UCInet 6 (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Freeman, 2002).   Betweenness centrality measures the proportion of all paths between 
pairs of other network members that include the specified team (de Nooy, Mrvar, and 
Batagelj, 2005).  A high measure of betweenness centrality means that a team is literally 
situated between many of the other actors in the network of F1 sponsorship and therefore 
reflects both greater embeddedness (Rowley, 1997) and the brokerage capabilities of a 
team’s network position.  The betweenness centrality of a team appropriately signifies its 
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relative control over the resources exchanged via the network’s interorganizational 
alliances, as well as its potential for communication and learning within the broader 
institutional network (Freeman, 1979).    
The final hypothesis addresses a facet of the promoting enterprise itself.  The 
performance of the team is represented both recently and historically.  Recent success is 
operationalized through a rolling average of the points earned by a team over the previous 
five years (Av5yrPts).  Historical success is derived by an aggregation of the drivers’ 
championships (CumDrv) won by a team up until a given season.  Drivers’ championship 
was chosen to represent historical success because the drivers’ championship, as opposed 
to the team championship, has traditionally been celebrated to a greater degree by the 
media, fans, and even teams.  Though the institution of F1 officially originated in 1950 
with the awarding of a drivers’ championship, a team championship did not exist until 
1958.  Further evidence of the ongoing priority given to the drivers’ championship is seen 
in the numbering of each team’s cars for a season, which is determined by their top 
driver’s finish in the previous season’s drivers’ championship.  Commenting on the 
importance of earning the number one (reserved for the drivers’ champion) for his team’s 
car after barely missing it the previous season despite winning the team championship, 
Ferrari President Luca di Montezemolo stated that “he'll [current drivers’ champion] have 
the number 1 on his car next season, but he can rest assured of one thing: we'll be doing 
our very best to put it back on a Ferrari” (Elizalde, 2008). For these reasons, the drivers’ 
championship is designated as a better historical indicator of a team’s achieved 
performance within this particular institutional context.   
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Finally, the number of times in which a team has been sold is included as an 
additional covariate relating to the characteristics of a team.  This variable is not 
associated with a specific hypothesis because no clear direction is apparent in the limited 
literature on the topic.  Freeman et al. (1983) proposes absorption into a larger 
conglomerate as the most likely counter to dissolution when contemplating the potential 
fates apart from status-quo survival for entrepreneurial organizations.  In doing so, they 
correctly point out that unlike ultimate dissolution, the merger or acquisition of an 
enterprise can occur for a multitude of reasons.  From a resource dependency perspective, 
these rationales might include reducing reliance on external resource providers, 
decreasing competitive interdependence, and diversifying to lessen the intensity of any 
single dependency (Pfeffer, 1972).   
However, absorption or merger only considers an enterprise joining a larger 
organization, but in some cases, an enterprise such as an F1 racing team might be spun 
out of a larger organization.  Therefore, the sale of an enterprise may indicate conflicting 
signals regarding resource access.  Either greater resources are available with the 
accompanying constraints of a larger organization’s hierarchy, or conversely, less 
hierarchical resources can be accessed but a greater operational freedom is enjoyed 
(Ahuja, 2000; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000).  Yet despite the ambiguous range of 
possibilities, it seems intuitive that changes in ownership would influence enterprise 
survival so it is controlled for in this study.  Changes in the majority ownership of each 
enterprise are designated by a running total that specifies the number of times in which 
the team’s name changed up until a given year.  While it is certainly feasible that a team 
could be sold and not change its name, if anecdotal evidence from the last decade is a 
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reliable indicator, this suggestion would describe a rare deviation from what seems to be 
a steadfast institutional norm.  
Following the descriptive statistics in Table A.3 is the correlation matrix of Table 
A.4.   Unsurprisingly given the large sample size, almost all correlations are statistically 
significant.  However, when examining the variance inflation factors (VIF), no variable 
reaches a level greater than ten, which is typically considered the threshold value for 
serious multi-collinearity (Hair et al., 1995; Marquardt, 1970; O’Brien, 2007)11.  
Nevertheless, several reduced models and alternate variable specifications were analyzed 
in addition to the primary model and these steps are discussed in the results section below 
where applied. 
[TABLE A.3] 
[TABLE A.4] 
3.6 Results 
Cox proportional hazards regression is utilized to the fit the model to the event 
history data in this study (Cox, 1972).  Cox regression is semi-parametric and therefore 
makes no assumptions of the shape of a baseline hazard function, which is the probability 
that dissolution will occur after any given duration.  Although hazard (dissolution) rates 
are assumed to be proportional between groups (signified by levels of the covariates)12, 
this technique is preferred because of its ability to model both time dependant and 
                                                 
11
 VIF statistics ranged from 1.074 to 7.349 (CumDrv).  Even though VIF values less than 10 indicated 
inconsequential collinearity (Hair et al., 1995; O’Brien, 2007), several alternate models were analyzed that 
isolated, excluded, and transformed variables that were correlated above 0.70 (Van den Poel & Lariviere, 
2004).  Coefficient values and model significance did not change substantially between models compared 
to the primary specification. Therefore, estimates within the primary model were judged to be generally 
robust to collinearity concerns.  Models isolating a single independent variable otherwise correlated with 
other predictors are discussed where appropriate in the hypotheses results (H1 and H6). 
12
 This proportionality assumption is relaxed when any independent variable is interacted with time, such as 
the analysis of eras (i.e. the era1996 variable in this study). 
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continuous covariates, such as an F1 team’s points scored.  Across multiple seasons, a 
team will score different quantities of points based on race results.  Therefore, the 
magnitude of a points variable will vary by season (time).  Similarly, the variables 
indicating a team’s number of performance, financial, and operational sponsors, as well 
as the network embeddedness and cumulative drivers’ championships will vary from 
season to season.  Through the use of a counter variable in units of time, Cox regression 
assumes the rate of dissolution increases with time, depending on the model’s 
independent variables (Tsai, 2000).   
The empirical model proposed in this study predicts the dissolution of enterprises 
that rely on exchanging promotional resources for either performance, financial, or 
operational resources.  Comprehensively, the model performed at a highly significant 
level when compared to a constant-only model (-2LL ratio test, Χ213= 79.4, p < .0001).  
This indicates that one or more of the model’s hypothesized variables significantly 
predict the hazard of dissolution for promotional enterprises.  The primary model’s 
estimated parameters and applicable statistics are displayed as Model 1 in Table A.5. 
[TABLE A.5]   
 
The first hypothesis predicted that the aggregated experience of a team’s 
corporate alliance network in the competitive context of F1 motor racing would be 
negatively related to the dissolution of the team.  This effect was not substantiated in the 
primary model.  Although significant in the hypothesized direction in a model isolating 
experience without any other predictors (β = -.027, p < .01), the apparent effect of the 
aligned partners’ experience was seemingly nullified by other correlated variables in the 
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more complete model.  Several alternative measurements of the experience within a 
team’s corporate alliance network, such as the average experience per sponsoring firm 
and the specific experience with the team instead of the broader institution of F1 motor 
racing, were also substituted within the model to reduce collinearity.  However, each 
variable displayed a similar pattern of significance in isolation but non-significance in the 
more complete model specification.  Transformations of correlated variables (SprPer, 
SprFin, SprOps), discussed in more detail later, also did not alter this pattern. 
Hypothesis Two was the first of three hypotheses that examined the effects of 
alliances offering different types of resources to the promoting enterprise.   As generally 
predicted in H2 and H3, access to both performance (β = -0.541) and financial resources 
(β = -0.628) negatively impacted enterprise dissolution to a significant degree (p < .05).  
For each additional performance-based partner a team was aligned with, the team’s odds 
of dissolution the following season reduced by almost 42 percent (or a factor of 0.582)13.  
For financial alliances, it was hypothesized that a negative relationship to team 
dissolution would exist initially at a less intense level than that of performance-based 
alliances (H3a), but would intensify as the team gained experience (H3b).  While the 
odds of dissolution declined by over 46 percent when a financial alliance was added 
(thereby supporting the main effect of H3), the effect did not significantly change as the 
team aged.  Also, according to the magnitude of the coefficients, the main effect of 
alliances based on financial resources actually appears to be slightly more influential to 
                                                 
13
 In the Cox regression model, the anti-log of the variable’s coefficient produces the hazard ratio, which is 
the dissolution rate for an enterprise with one more unit of the variable in comparison to the dissolution rate 
for another enterprise without that additional variable unit.  As it concerns performance-based alliances, the 
anti-log of the estimated coefficient (e^-0.541) produces a ratio of 0.582, which indicates that a one unit 
increase in performance-based alliances yields a 41.8% reduction in the odds of the team dissolving in the 
following season. 
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survival than that of performance-based alliances (-0.628 to -0.541).  However, the 
impact of financial resources (H3a) must be interpreted in the context of a significant 
interaction effect with institutional era (H5).   
Recall that a major change in the teams’ control over institutional revenues (i.e. 
the global media contracts for F1 racing) occurred with a new governance agreement in 
1996.  As a result, it was hypothesized that this change in the institutional environment 
would make teams increasing dependent for their survival on promotional alliances 
offering financial resources.  The interaction of the dichotomous variable indicating the 
more recent era (i.e. uncertainty in institutional support via financial resources) and the 
variable quantifying a team’s financial alliances did significantly predict team 
dissolution, but in the opposite direction hypothesized (β = 1.023, p < .05).  Essentially, 
promotional alliances offering access to financial resources became less influential to a 
team’s survival after the change in the institutional governing agreement in 1996.  In fact, 
the magnitude of the interaction coefficient indicates that teams after 1995 increase their 
odds of dissolution in the subsequent year by over 48 percent with each additional 
financial alliance14.  Upon closer examination, this counterintuitive reverse effect of 
financial alliances after 1995 may highlight a limitation of the study.  Although the 
number of alliances offering access to different resources is quantified, the magnitude of 
the resources exchanged within each alliance is not known.  Therefore it is possible that 
the disparity in the magnitude of resources exchanged within various financial alliances 
increased after 1995 so that certain alliances offered access to a greater quantity of 
                                                 
14
 This calculation is based on the combined impact of the main financial alliance term and its interaction 
term.  Specifically the coefficients are summed (-0.628 + 1.023 = 0.395) and anti-logged to calculate the 
hazard ratio (e^0.395 = 1.484), which is the proportional hazard of dissolution for a team after 1995 with 
one more financial alliance compared to a team without that additional alliance. 
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financial resources than other alliances within the same category.  If this was true after 
1995, a team may have accessed US$50 million annually from just one financial alliance, 
while other teams may have been dependent on five alliances providing US$10 million 
each to access equivalent financial resources.  This restriction to the data is 
acknowledged in the overview of limitations in Chapter Six.  Also, a competing 
explanation of diminishing returns to the number of alliance relationships is explored 
further in the following discussion section.  
The final category of resources accessed through promotional alliances was 
labeled as operational resources.  These alliances were characterized as consisting of the 
exchange of commodity goods and services that were necessary for the continued 
functioning of the organization but not instrumental in an enterprise’s performance versus 
the competition; nor were these alliances based solely on the flexibility of financial 
resources.  Nevertheless, alliances offering access to operational resources were 
hypothesized to support enterprise survival, but at a lower intensity than other alliance 
designations (H4).  The findings did not support a relationship between enterprise 
survival and operational alliances (β = 0.324, p > .10).  Given that alliances offering 
either performance or financial resources were significant contributors to survival, 
operational resources do appear to have comparatively less affect on enterprise 
continuity.   
The sixth hypothesis postulated that the network embeddedness of an 
entrepreneurial enterprise would be negatively related to the hazard of dissolution faced 
by the enterprise.  This expectation was theoretically grounded in the conception of 
network embeddedness as both a collection of status-oriented organizational 
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endorsements (Stuart et al., 1999) and an avenue for information flow and organizational 
learning (Gulati, 1999).  When analyzed within the primary empirical model, the measure 
of network betweenness that operationalized embeddedness was not significantly related 
to enterprise dissolution.  However, like the measure of the experience of an enterprise’s 
promotional partners (H1), network betweenness was a statistically significant negative 
predictor of dissolution when analyzed in isolation (β = -8.733, p < .01).  This finding 
suggests that the model’s multicollinearity may be an issue when analyzing this particular 
hypothesis.  A second measure of network embeddedness, degree centrality, was 
subsequently substituted into the model, but results were similar.  Analysis after 
transformations of several correlated variables (SprPer, SprFin, SprOps) revealed the 
same pattern.  Conceptually, this implies that the benefits to survival of a network of 
organizational endorsements are captured within the other measures of alliance resource 
relationships.   
The final hypothesis (H7) suggested that the competitive performance of the 
entrepreneurial enterprise would negatively impact its dissolution.  In the study, 
performance was operationalized both in the short term (five-year rolling average of team 
points scored) and in the longer-term context of the institutional environment (cumulative 
drivers’ championships).  Both representations of enterprise performance were found to 
be significant deterrents to enterprise dissolution (Av5YrPts: β = -0.067; CumDrv: β = -
0.855, p < .05).  Specifically, for each drivers’ championship accumulated, the odds of 
dissolution reduced by 57.5 percent (or a factor of 0.425).  Interestingly, the effect of 
points scored over the previous five seasons intensified in importance after the previously 
discussed institutional change in 1996 (interaction term significant at α = .05).  Prior to 
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the change, each one-point rise in the five-year average reduced a team’s odds of 
dissolution by just 6.5 percent.  After the adoption of the new Concorde Agreement 
between the governing body (FIA) and competing F1 teams, a one point rise in the five-
year average of team points scored reduced a team’s odds of dissolution by almost 87 
percent.15  While the change in magnitude of the effect is surprising, the general finding 
as hypothesized is hardly unexpected and might be thought of as a control variable in this 
study.  When conceptualized in this manner, the comprehensive findings across 
hypotheses indicate that alliances offering access to certain resources contribute to the 
survival of promotional enterprises even when controlling for the enterprises’ competitive 
performance.   
Finally, a control variable representing the sale of an enterprise was also included 
in the primary model.  As previously discussed, this variable may also be considered in 
some cases as a substitution for the dependent variable of dissolution (Freeman et al., 
1983).  This dichotomous control variable indicating a change in majority ownership of 
the enterprise was not significantly related to an enterprise’s subsequent dissolution.16  
Table A.6 summarizes the results of each of the main hypotheses of this study as 
operationalized in the primary model.   
  [TABLE A.6] 
                                                 
15
 This interaction effect is calculated by anti-logging the aggregated coefficients of the Av5yrPts term and 
its associated interaction with binary variable era1996, which is coded as one after 1995. The resulting 
statistic is the hazard ratio for a unit of a team’s average points scored after 1995.  Specifically, this is 
calculated as e^(-0.067 – 1.959) = 0.132.  This resulting hazard ratio is interpreted as a team with one more 
average point scored over the previous five seasons enjoys a probably of dissolution the following season 
that is reduced by a factor of 0.13174 compared to a team without the additional average point. 
16
 Considering the recent anecdotal effect in F1 motor racing (Honda and BMW announcing their 
withdrawal from F1) of the global economic downturn that arose after the last year of data collection in this 
study, a second control variable was compiled that quantified the annual World GDP growth rate since 
1970.  The primary model was run with the inclusion of this additional macroeconomic control variable, 
but no change was observed in the model’s significance or estimates and the World GDP growth term was 
non-significant (β = -0.017, p > .10).   
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Given the evidence that a degree of multicollinearity does exist in the primary 
model, the main variables representing access to specific resources through the 
quantification of the number of promotional alliances of a certain type were transformed 
into two different measurement applications.  In one specification, the variables for 
alliances offering performance, financial, and operational resources were dichotomized 
so that if a team had one or more alliances of a certain type, the corresponding variable 
was recorded as a one, and zero otherwise.  The estimates generated from this alteration 
of the primary model are displayed by Model 2 in Table A.5.  An examination of these 
statistics shows that the major terms of the primary model remain marginally significant 
(p < .10) despite the loss of data by dichotomizing several variables.  Meanwhile, the 
interaction of financial alliances and institutional era loses significance, which is not 
surprising given that the term is now an interaction of two dummy variables without the 
dimension of magnitude.  The only term gaining (marginal) significance is the team 
experience main effect that is only included in the model because of its hypothesized 
interaction with financial alliances (H3), which remains non-significant.  As a whole, this 
revised model emphasizes the importance for team survival of possessing at least one 
performance and one financial alliance in addition to competitive achievement (team 
points and drivers’ championships). 
In a second specification of the variables representing the three types of alliances, 
the number of alliances of each type (original variables) were divided by the total number 
of alliances of that type in that particular season of F1.  This reformulation of the alliance 
variables had the effect of standardizing alliance “shares” across seasons within the 
institutional context of F1.  In doing so, a team with five performance-based promotional 
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alliances in a season with 25 total performance-based alliances among all F1 teams in that 
season was statistically equivalent to a team with 15 performance-based promotional 
alliances in a different season that boasted 75 total performance-based alliances in F1.  In 
both instances, the example team enjoyed a 20 share of the performance-based 
promotional alliances in F1 motor racing for that particular season.  Model 3 in Table A.5 
shows this model application, which excludes variables accounting for era because of the 
standardization by season.  As in the other specifications, alliances offering performance 
and financial resources were significantly related to enterprise survival along with 
competitive performance (points scored) (p < .05).  No other variables gain statistical 
significance in this reformulated model.   
Between the models, it becomes clear that three main factors are influential in the 
survival of the promoting enterprises studied here.  Interorganizational alliances that offer 
an entrepreneurial enterprise either performance or financial resources exhibit a 
significant negative relationship to the enterprise’s dissolution in every application of the 
model.  This contribution to survival is incremental to the significant effect of the 
enterprise’s performance in competition.  Some evidence is also uncovered to suggest 
that the relationships to enterprise dissolution change between institutional eras.  These 
findings are further explored in the following discussion section.  
    
3.7 Discussion  
This study began by focusing on the perspective of an entrepreneurial enterprise 
with a business model based on promoting an alliance partner to an audience attracted by 
the enterprise.  The primary research question asked how the access to resources through 
these promotional alliances influenced the survival of the entrepreneurial enterprise in a 
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highly competitive environment.  To address this question, teams competing in Formula 
One auto racing over the previous forty years were studied as entrepreneurial enterprises 
that rely on their alliances with sponsoring firms to access different types of 
organizational resources.  The alliances were categorized according to the available 
resources’ potential contribution to the promoting enterprise in relation to its competitive 
environment (F1 racing).  Segmenting alliance resources in this fashion reflected this 
study’s theoretical foundation in organizational ecology, which emphasizes the roles of 
both competition and environmental selection in the determination of enterprise survival 
(Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).  This alliance resource 
characterization is also consistent with recent advancements of the resource-based view 
in marketing research, where theory suggests the “fit between marketing resources and 
the context in which those resources are deployed affects firm performance” (Auh & 
Menguc, 2009, p. 757).  Specifically, three types of promotional alliances were 
delineated.  While promotional services were offered by the entrepreneurial enterprise to 
the sponsoring firm in each case, the reciprocal resources accessed by the promoting 
enterprise via the sponsoring firm were labeled as either performance, financial, or 
operational resources according to their competitive potential in the relevant institutional 
environment.  
The results of the study demonstrated that not all alliances are equal in their 
contribution to the survival of entrepreneurial enterprises.  As predicted in Hypotheses 
Two and Three, alliances based on performance and financial resources were significant 
contributors to enterprise survival.  However, instead of contributing to survival at a 
lower intensity than the other two resource types (as hypothesized in H4), operational 
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resources were not related to enterprise dissolution in any of three variable specifications.  
Though non-significant as a hypothesis test, this result does confirm the expected lower 
priority of operational resources.   
Theoretically, alliances based on performance resources were deemed most vital 
to the promotional enterprise’s initial survival, but alliances offering financial resources 
were hypothesized to grow in importance as an enterprise gained experience (H3b).  This 
conceptualization was based on the theory that the versatility of financial resources would 
be more useful to enterprises that have accumulated knowledge through organizational 
experience (Freeman et al., 1983; Bergmann Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001).  Although this 
theory was not supported through a relationship to organizational dissolution, it remains 
possible that the return on financial resources is indeed enhanced as an organization 
matures, but that survival is not predicated on realizing this enhanced return.   
Alternatively, a reframing of this theoretical shift in resource emphasis with 
enterprise age might focus instead on a decline in the prominence of performance-based 
alliances as an enterprise accumulates its own experience.  Just as organizational learning 
theory suggests that entrepreneurial enterprises might better utilize flexible resources 
with the knowledge that comes from experience (Levitt & March, 1988), it also implies 
that an enterprise may be less reliant on external sources for a competitive performance 
advantage.  Instead, as a maturing enterprise internalizes the know-how of competition 
within its environment, it can become increasingly self-reliant in regards to performance 
expertise.  If this conceptualization is accurate, an entrepreneurial enterprise’s 
dependence on alliances offering performance-based resources to stave off dissolution 
should diminish with competitive experience.  To test this reframing of dynamic resource 
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reliance, an interaction term was formed between a team’s number of performance 
alliances (SprPer) and its accumulated years of experience in F1 entering a given season 
(TmExp).  If the number of performance alliances became less important to enterprise 
dissolution as an enterprise gained experience, a positive coefficient on the interaction 
term would be expected (i.e. this type of alliance becomes less negatively related to 
dissolution with increasing experience).  Indeed, Model 4 in Table A.5 shows this to be 
the case.17  For each season of experience gained by the F1 team, the marginal 
contribution to odds of survival of an additional performance-based alliance is reduced by 
about 2 percent.18  Though a somewhat small effect, its impact is magnified when 
considering the median years of team experience was six and the maximum was forty, 
while the median number of promotional alliances offering a team performance resources 
was three, but with a maximum of 29.   
Graphing the relationship between team experience and performance alliances 
(Figure 3.1) showed that despite the implied greater contribution of performance 
resources to survival early in the life of the enterprise, it is actually at higher levels of 
experience that teams compile more performance-based alliances.  With this in mind, it is 
tempting to dismiss the significant interaction effect as a result of the skewed distribution 
of high levels of performance alliances at teams with accumulated experience.  In other 
words, team experience may facilitate both survival and the accumulation of 
performance-based alliances.  However, given that the lower-order effect of team 
experience is controlled for in Model 4, it appears more likely that performance resources 
                                                 
17
 At this discussion stage of analysis, several repeatedly non-significant variables periphery to the research 
question were removed from the model.  
18
 This interaction effect can also be interpreted as an increase in the marginal odds of dissolution by a 
factor of 1.021, which is equal to the anti-log of the interaction term coefficient (e^0.021).   
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offer diminishing returns to enterprise survival.  To explore this possibility further, a 
quadratic specification of the number of alliances offering each resource type can be 
evaluated.    
 
Before embarking on a model that considers quadratic alliance terms, recall that 
alliances based on financial resources did interact significantly with the institutional era 
to suggest that after 1995, additional financially-based alliances contributed to the odds 
of enterprise dissolution; whereas, these alliances negatively impacted the odds of 
dissolution prior to 1996.  This effect was counter to the hypothesized direction (H5), 
where it was suggested that the waning institutional provision for financial resources after 
1995 would lead to a greater survival dependency on interorganizational alliances to 
access this resource type.  On the surface, it seems counterintuitive to find that alliances 
Figure 3.2:  Graph of the median number of team alliances offering performance-based 
resources by the years of accumulated team experience. 
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offering financial resources would contribute to dissolution of an entrepreneurial 
enterprise.  However, if there is an organizational cost to managing alliance relationships 
and these relationships also generated diminishing returns to the propensity to survive, 
too many alliances may conceivably be detrimental to an enterprise’s continuity 
(Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).  Deeds and Hill (1996) uncovered this effect of 
diminishing returns to strategic alliances when investigating rates of new product 
development.  They described the phenomenon as arising “because the effectiveness with 
which the firm can select and manage alliance partners is likely to be negatively related 
to the number of alliances the firm is managing” (p. 42).  Therefore, employing quadratic 
terms to investigate the possibility of diminishing returns to each type of alliance appears 
warranted.   
Yet, in the case of alliances based on financial resources, this positive relationship 
to enterprise dissolution occurs only after 1995.  To potentially explain this condition, 
consider the inherent correlation between enterprise experience and the more modern era 
of 1996 to 2007.  Just by the lockstep nature of experience and a bounded institutional 
timeframe, enterprises existing at a later time (modern era) would inherently be prone to 
the possibility of greater accumulated experience.  Therefore, if the same positive 
relationship between the number of performance alliances and the years of team 
experience (Figure 3.1) also existed for financial alliances, a greater magnitude of 
financial alliances would proliferate in the modern era and perhaps reach the point of 
diminishing returns; whereas previous to 1996, the same curvilinear relationship may 
have been possible, but lower quantities of promotional alliances based on financial 
resources failed to activate any diminishing returns effect.  Figure 3.2 substantiates this 
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suggested relationship by showing the rise in the median number of alliances based on 
financial resources over the years of F1 competition.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To explore the evidence for diminishing returns to survival for alliances offering 
various types of resources, a fifth model was constructed in Table A.5.  Since greater 
numbers of alliances occur in the modern era, it was suggested that the era binary 
variable might have actually been capturing the effect of diminishing returns in previous 
models.  As a result, the era variable and its interactions were removed from Model 5, 
which now included a separate quadratic term for each of the three alliance categories to 
Figure 3.3:  Graph of the median number of team alliances offering financial 
resources over time with a dotted line designating the start of the modern era in 
1996. 
 82 
represent diminishing returns.  If such an effect existed, a positive coefficient on the 
quadratic terms would be expected, signifying that as the number of promotional 
alliances offering the specified type of resource reached a certain level, incremental 
alliances of that type would positively influence the odds of enterprise dissolution.   
As in previous models, the model inclusive of quadratic terms maintained the 
main effects of the number of performance and financial alliances as significant negative 
influencers of the odds of dissolution  (H0: β = 0, p < .05).  In addition, the quadratic 
terms representing the diminishing returns of both resource types were at least marginally 
significant in the positive direction (H0: β = 0, p < .10).  Neither the main effect nor 
quadratic term for operational alliances was significant.  This interesting result provides 
support for the argument that alliances offering access to performance or financial 
resources contribute to entrepreneurial survival but are not unlimited in their capacity to 
ward off dissolution.  At a certain threshold, adding incremental promotional alliances 
may actually encourage enterprise dissolution, thereby suggesting an inverted U-shape 
relationship.   
Given the limited number of promotional alliances per team before 1996, it may 
be informative to examine if the primary model’s estimations remain consistent when 
only the data from the years before 1996 are analyzed.  This restricted perspective is 
displayed in the sixth and final model of Table A.5.  Little changes between the 
estimations and their significance in the primary model (Model 1) and in the model 
considering only the seasons before 1996 (Model 6).  Alliances enabling access to 
performance and financial resources, in addition to achieved performance (points scored), 
negatively impact the likelihood of team dissolution.  This consistent message across 
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specifications underlines the contribution of this study of entrepreneurial enterprises that 
access varying types of resources through promotional alliances. 
By analyzing over four decades of interorganizational alliances between Formula 
One teams and their corporate partners, this study has taken the perspective of 
entrepreneurial enterprises that engage in alliances by offering promotional services to 
sponsoring firms in exchange for various other resources.  The relationship between this 
exchange process and the promoting enterprise’s propensity to survive was explicated, 
and certain resources were identified as more crucial than others.  These findings offer 
empirical evidence to support heterogeneous contributions of firm resources (Grant, 
1991) and the broadening scope of the resource-based view in marketing, which 
simultaneously considers enterprise resources and their deployment in a dynamic 
institutional context (Auh & Benguc, 2009).  Future research questions are raised by the 
indication of diminishing returns to alliance resources that surfaced after an institutional 
change in 1996 precipitated a major rise in alliance engagement.  These research 
implications, future directions, and the limitations of this study in tandem with the next 
study are explored in greater detail in the last two chapters of this dissertation.   First, the 
following chapter migrates to the perspective of the sponsoring firm.  The second study 
of this line of research examines how the characteristics of these promotional alliances 
influence the market value of the aligning firm.     
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 2: PURSUING VALUE VIA INTERNATIONAL PROMOTIONAL 
ALLIANCES 
 
This chapter moves away from the focus of the previous chapter on the promoting 
enterprise and instead concentrates on the firm seeking promotion through an alliance 
relationship.  Unlike the promoter side of the alliance, which is largely overlooked, 
scholars have taken an interest in sponsoring firms’ attempts to achieve promotional 
objectives through an affiliation with a team, event, festival, show, or other entity that 
engages a desirable audience.  However, less attention has been given to the empirical 
evaluation of this alliance-based promotional strategy at an international level, despite the 
increasing availability of cross-cultural promotional channels.  The study presented in 
this chapter takes the conception of promotional alliances to an international realm by 
applying the theories of cultural positioning and promotional standardization to the 
framework established in Chapter One, which detailed the confluence of strategic 
alliances and commercial sponsorship.   
 
4.1 Research Question 
Marketing strategy has increasingly taken an international aim while also 
becoming more reliant on interorganizational alliances (Varadarajan & Cunningham, 
1995).  Methods for evaluating global initiatives enacted through such relationships, and 
refining interorganizational theory across cultures must keep pace with the rapidly 
disappearing geographic boundaries to promotional efforts.  Yet, marketing managers and 
 85 
scholars share a common challenge in their ongoing attempts to quantify the value of 
strategic marketing initiatives to a firm (Moorman & Rust, 1999).  Gauging the value of 
applied promotional tools such as advertising slogans, product endorsements, ad agency 
alliances, licensing relationships, and sponsorship partnerships through changes in sales 
or consumer surveys is often wrought with complications and difficult to monetarily 
quantify.  Intervening variables lacking appropriate controls can produce misleading or 
inaccurate sales attributions, and self-reported consumer attitudes or even purchase 
intentions are frequently far from precise measurements of the financial value actually 
accrued to a firm from marketing activities (Crompton, 2004; Young, DeSarbo, & 
Morwitz, 1998).  This challenge is further exacerbated in an international context where a 
standardized promotional platform carries a brand message across the globe (Jain, 1989; 
Szymanski, Bharadwaj, & Varadarajan, 1993).  Two emergent research streams, one 
methodological, the other theoretical, are converged in this study to offer scholars and 
practitioners an empirical assessment of the cross-cultural marketing tactic of aligning 
with an internationally recognized promotional property.  
Over the last three decades, the event study methodology has gradually migrated 
from the finance literature to achieve popularity in marketing research as a quantitative 
means of assessing the impact on equity of various marketing tactics (Johnston, 2007).  
While the capability of event studies to link the creation of shareholder wealth to a 
specific marketing program has fueled its acceptance and encouragement among 
marketing scholars, the need to accurately evaluate an international affiliation with a 
promoting organization has yet to be confronted with this empirical tool.  
Simultaneously, the availability and desirability of global marketing communication 
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channels has exploded as media technology continues to advance, thereby offering 
audiences media consumption opportunities far beyond the previously dominant local or 
national outlets (Alden, Steenkamp, & Batra, 1999).  With global brand strategies now 
common in the marketplace (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 1999), the purpose of this study is 
to extend interorganizational marketing theory by evaluating the impact on equity in 
worldwide markets of international promotional alliances.  To that end, the primary 
research question addressed here is as follows: 
 Do international promotional alliances add value to the firm, and if so, what 
characteristics of the interorganizational relationship influence value realization? 
 
 In approaching this question, the dilemma of promotional standardization across 
markets is revisited with a focus on consumer culture positioning and market evaluation. 
This review is followed by a description of the empirical context of commercial 
sponsorship and the presentation of the conceptual model, which identifies the factors 
hypothesized to impact value realization.  A critical examination of the adoption and 
contribution of event studies in marketing is undertaken after the explication of 
theoretical hypotheses.  Results are then presented and compared to similar domestic 
research.  The subsequent chapter offers further discussion of the implications coupled 
with the results of the first study and in combination with industry executives to reinforce 
managerial relevance. 
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4.2 Promotional Standardization and Cultural Positioning 
 Since Levitt’s argument for the globalization of markets (1983) and Kotler’s 
response warning of the pitfalls of standardization (1986), the debate between market 
adaptation of promotional messages and global standardization has raged in the 
marketing literature (for a review, see Theodosiou & Leonidou, 2003).  Meanwhile, the 
explosion of global communication mediums has perpetuated the availability of 
international promotional platforms.  As a result, attaining a consistent brand image 
across markets while realizing production cost savings through economies of scale has 
become an attractive proposition of standardization (Duncan & Ramaprasad, 1995; 
Kirpalani, Laroche, & Darmon, 1988).  However, empirical assessments of the 
performance of a standardized marketing message have been sparse (Fastoso & 
Whitelock, 2007).  Those published have been limited to managerial perceptions gathered 
by survey, where results indicated that globally standardized advertising and marketing 
strategy were perceived to positively affect financial performance (Okazaki, Taylor, & 
Zou, 2006; Zou & Cavusgil, 2002).  
 The growth in worldwide communication and the aforementioned survey 
evidence may tilt the debate toward the modern convenience of standardization, but this 
tentative conclusion is quickly followed by the question of how then to best position a 
brand’s cultural origins on a global stage.  Alden, Steenkamp, and Batra (1999) suggested 
more cross-cultural connections had allowed consumers to become increasingly familiar 
and cognitively integrated with cultures outside of their own.  This integration has led to 
the emergence of a global consumer culture (GCC) that now enables marketers to 
position their brand as global by associating it with universally shared meanings and 
symbols.  However, Alden et al. also point out that promotional standardization could 
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conversely be aimed toward either a domestic consumer culture position (DCC), where 
the brand aligns with symbols unique to the target audience’s culture; or a foreign 
consumer culture position (FCC), where the brand is linked consistently to symbols of a 
specifically chosen foreign culture.   
  In addition to the ideas of standardization and cultural positioning, a third factor 
considered by international marketing researchers has been the potential for varying 
responses to marketing initiatives based on the cultural values of the specific market.  For 
example, collectivist cultures such as Japan tend to value the perceived credibility of a 
brand to a greater extent than do members of an individualist culture such as the United 
States (Erdem, Swait, & Valenzuela, 2006).  In the proper context, these issues create an 
interesting question of whether a standardized international promotional alliance impacts 
the perception of a firm uniformly across cultures, or if variations in cultural positioning 
and values influence the market’s response to a promotional alliance.   
 
4.3 Theoretical Model & Hypotheses 
Commercial sponsorship in Formula One racing provides an optimal context from 
which to examine the value contributed by a globally standardized promotional effort.  
With eleven racing teams claiming primary allegiance to seven different nations and a 
stable of corporate partners that boast origins in 15 countries, the context of Formula One 
enables an eclectic mix of global promotional alliances.  Undertaking an event study 
investigation of these alliances provides an objective financial market assessment of the 
cultural positioning of firms’ international marketing messages.   While almost a third of 
the sponsoring firms in this study aligned their brand with a team claiming a national 
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heritage shared by their own organization (a domestic consumer culture position), the 
remaining firms supported teams based on divergent criteria.  Beyond nationality 
congruence, previous domestic research suggests several characteristics of the firm, 
promoting organization (team), and their relationship that could theoretically influence 
the value implications in the financial markets.  In light of such considerations, the 
conceptual model below is proposed with each element dissected in the hypotheses that 
follow: 
Valuecontribution = f( Complementarityresource, Congruencenationality, Level, 
Leverageplan, Controlssize, name, experience, agency conflict, partner success) 
 
A significant change in the value of the firm is quantified as the dependant 
variable in the model.  Four characteristics of the promotional alliance relationship serve 
as the primary independent variables, and several control factors are also taken into 
account.  The complementarity of the resources brought to the alliance by each party 
relates to their respective operational industries and is discussed as the first hypothesis.  
Next, image and cultural positioning are examined by considering the nationality 
congruence between the promoting enterprise and the sponsoring firm.  The level of 
immersion in the alliance relationship forms a third primary hypothesis, which is 
followed by the final proposition regarding the firm’s identified plans to leverage the 
alliance through other marketing channels.  
 
4.3.1 Resource Complementarity 
The most prominent theoretical rationales for alliance success are rooted in 
resource complementarity and partner compatibility (e.g. Chung et al., 2000; Farrelly & 
(2) 
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Quester, 2005b; Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001), which are frequently 
conceptualized as congruence, fit, functional similarity, or strategic relatedness 
depending on the context (Gwinner, 1997; Johar & Pham, 1999; McDaniel, 1999; Speed 
& Thompson, 2000).  These elements describe the match between alliance partners and 
are often enhanced by trust and commitment (Cullen, Johnson, & Sakano, 2000; Morgan 
& Hunt, 1994; Williams, 2005), which is later addressed in the third hypothesis.  At the 
outset of alliance formation, firms tend to seek out partners that can deliver desired 
resources the firm cannot efficiently produce internally and for which pure transactional 
markets are not ideal for exchange (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993).  In doing so, a firm is 
prudent to identify and align with external resources that enhance the performance of its 
current resources toward the creation of incremental value (Chung et al., 2000).  Such 
optimal alliance performance is often achieved when the resource contributions of each 
partner to an alliance are complementary, but not redundant, and the two partners 
establish an ongoing collaborative relationship (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil et al., 2001; 
Saxton, 1997).   
This characterization of successful alliances suggests that additional value will be 
realized from alliances that extend beyond a simple transactional exchange and toward 
the coproduction of incremental relationship-specific resources (Madhok & Tallman, 
1998).  In order to collaborate beyond a property-based exchange, some degree of 
strategic relatedness is necessary to ensure not only common interests, but also a shared 
technical language (Tsai, 2000).  In addition, where audience identification of the alliance 
is paramount, as would be the case in a vast majority of promotional alliances, the 
industry relatedness or product complementarity of the alliance members can enhance 
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recognition of a partnership (Johar & Pham, 1999; Samu et al., 1999).  Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to expect that interorganizational alliances between two partners 
operating in complementary industries would generate greater value from their 
collaboration than partners from disparate industries.   
Indeed, scholars have demonstrated the significance of a firm’s industry 
compatibility in relation to added financial value in promotional alliances.  The most 
obvious strategically related industry to motor racing is the automotive sector.  As 
expected, firms operating within this industry have benefited from marginally greater 
shareholder returns from promotional alliances in motor racing (Cornwell, Pruitt, & Van 
Ness, 2001; Pruitt, Cornwell, & Clark, 2004).  However, on a broader scale the 
technology industry has emerged as a sector particularly conducive to generating 
incremental value from interorganizational alliances (Das et al., 1998), and the advanced 
technological nature of F1 racing implies the potential for product innovation and testing, 
promotional credentialing, and knowledge transfer (Jenkins & Floyd, 2001).    
Surprisingly, the basis for a positive relationship between a sponsoring firm 
operating in the technology sector and realized incremental returns from a promotional 
alliance has not always relied on the tech industry’s functional congruence to the 
promotional environment.  In fact, operation in the technology industry has been shown 
to add value to promotional alliances involving several major sports leagues (Cornwell, 
Pruitt, & Clark, 2005) in addition to individual teams when stadium naming rights are an 
exchanged resource (Clark, Cornwell, & Pruitt, 2002).  To explain this positive 
relationship where resource complementarity or industry compatibility was not as 
apparent as in the F1 context, these studies evoked signaling theory.  Their assertion was 
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that a promotional commitment to affiliate with a popular sports property often involved 
a significant financial investment that would not be made if the sponsoring firm was in 
unhealthy financial straits, and such a signal is more valuable to firms operating in a 
volatile industry like high technology (Clark et al., 2002).  However, events over the last 
decade, such as the bankruptcy of several high-technology firms engaged in facility 
naming rights agreements, have raised numerous exceptions to the reliable interpretation 
of a major promotional sports alliance as a signal of financial health (Wright, 2002).  As a 
result, the extensive technological demands of the current context of international motor 
racing perpetuates a more plausible, and theoretically supported, rationale of industry 
compatibility to support a hypothesized relationship to the added value realized from a 
promotional alliance.   
Although the complementarity of the technology sector was not considered in two 
United States motor racing studies (Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2001; Pruitt et al., 2004), the 
technological integration of Formula 1 motor racing beyond even other forms of 
motorsport could be construed as both a knowledge transfer and capabilities testing 
opportunity for technology firms.  This type of functional congruence between the 
sponsoring firm’s operations and the promotional activity highlights the alliance success 
factors of compatibility and collaboration mentioned earlier.  For example, German 
technology firm Infineon stated in a press release announcing their newly formed alliance 
with an F1 team that “(t)hrough its activities in motor sport, Infineon is able to optimize 
products before mass production” (Infineon, 2003).  Similarly, the CEO of AirAsia 
commented on his firm’s F1 alliance by saying, “I am delighted that we have begun to 
pro-actively learn from the sport with the view to improving our technology” (“AirAsia 
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using,” 2007).  By offering such opportunities, the alliance represents more of a 
knowledge-based resource, as opposed to purely a property-based resource, and is 
therefore more likely to be the source of a competitive advantage for the firm (Das & 
Teng, 2000).    
H1: Firms capable of contributing resources through their operations that are 
functionally compatible to the promotional activity will realize more value from a 
promotional alliance than firms engaged in non-compatible industries. 
 
4.3.2 Nationality Congruence 
As briefly mentioned in the initial review of alliance success factors in section 
1.3.2.1.3, congruence in a promotional situation has been conceptualized to extend 
beyond just functionally related activities to image-based conceptions (Gwinner & Eaton, 
1999).  With awareness and image enhancement often cited as reasons for engaging in 
promotional alliances (O'Hagan & Harvey, 2000; Thjømøe et al., 2002), associations 
between the partners’ images become a relevant consideration.   
Extending from the associative network model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), brand 
associations are thought to be established in memory through schemas or informational 
nodes that link traits such as attributes, benefits, and attitudes to a brand (Keller, 1993; 
McDaniel, 1999).  Accordingly, cognitive memory is thought to operate based on a 
schematic network of associations in the mind, wherein a particular stimulus (brand or 
corporate name) is processed, encoded, stored, and retrieved in memory based on a 
cognitive structure of prior knowledge and the degree of congruence with an activated 
memory domain (Halford, Bain, Maybery, & Andrews, 1998; Hunt, Kernan, & Bonfield, 
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1992).  As a result, by engaging in an alliance with a promotional entity, sponsoring firms 
can alter or reinforce the associations that comprise their schematic network based on the 
perceived congruence with a set of attributes, benefits, and attitudes inherent in the 
promotional situation or possessed by the promoting partner.  For example, the FedEx 
shipping corporation may seek to enhance its image association with the attributes of 
speed and precision.  One avenue for accomplishing this objective would be to form a 
promotional alliance with a popular entity that glorifies these attributes, such as a racing 
team ("FedEx moves to McLaren," 2007).  In doing so, FedEx looks to establish a mental 
link between the racing team’s attributes of speed and precision, and FedEx’s own image.  
The perceived congruence between promotional alliance partners is generally suggested 
to intensify the strength of this image association and contribute to brand awareness 
(Gwinner, 1997; Samu et al., 1999).  However, a competing perspective argues that recall 
of a promotional alliance between a sponsoring firm and a sponsored event can be 
heighted when a moderate degree of incongruity stimulates further elaborative processing 
on the part of the audience (Jagre, Watson, & Watson, 2001). 
Empirically, the idea of congruence has most often been explored experimentally 
through the identification of corporate image attributes and their match to a sponsored 
activity or endorser’s attributes as related to dependant outcomes of consumer attitude 
and purchase intent (McDaniel, 1999; Rifon, Choi, Trimble, & Li, 2004; Schaefer & 
Keillor, 1997).   While support for a positive image-based congruence effect is growing, 
results are not always conclusive (Till & Busler, 2000), and occasionally the line between 
functional and image congruence is undistinguished (Koo, Quarterman, & Flynn, 2006).   
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A distinctive image dimension that could be particularly important in an 
international alliance, but has received limited attention in prior research, is that of 
nationality. It may be conceivable that a perception of congruence arises from the shared 
nationality of alliance partners operating at a cross-cultural level.  Theoretically, this 
dimension of image congruence may intensify the cognitive schematic network of 
associations in the mind of the audience, thereby reinforcing the alliance and its 
associated set of attributes, benefits, and attitudes (McDaniel, 1999).  Ruth and Simonin 
(2003) demonstrated some support for this positive relationship through their finding of a 
moderating effect of nationality congruence when investigating the impact of 
promotional alliances involving controversial firms.  Additional evidence for a 
geographically-based congruence affect at a more regional level is found in Clark et al.’s 
marginal support (p<.10) for a local firm explanatory variable in the context of facility 
naming rights announcements (2002).   
Broadening the investigation to the international realm enables an examination of 
the value-added benefits of Alden et al.’s global consumer culture (GCC) positioning 
theory versus a strategy of domestic consumer culture (DCC) positioning on a global 
scale (1999).  In the context of this study, these two positions can be represented by 
sponsoring firms that align with an F1 team whose claimed nationality is incongruent to 
their own, thereby adopting a GCC positioning, and those firms that affiliate with a team 
that shares a common nationality to its own origins, or a DCC positioning19.  Extending 
the evidence to date that leans toward a positive influence of image congruence, 
                                                 
19
 It should also be noted that firms aligning with nationally congruent teams are viewed as adopting a DCC 
positioning as it relates to their home domestic market; while outside of that market, their positioning might 
be viewed as a foreign culture consumer (FCC) position.  Since a firm’s domestic stock exchange is used to 
collect the data for analysis in this study, the perspective of the evaluating market is emphasized here. 
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nationality congruence is proposed to enhance the value realized from a promotional 
alliance.  The enthusiasm for a shared nationality is trumpeted by one F1 team boss when 
upon announcing a nationally congruent alliance, he exclaimed, “I have always aimed at 
a partnership with a Swiss group and this long-cherished dream has come true now” 
("Sauber banks," 2001).  
H2: International promotional alliances composed of a firm and promoting partner 
that share national origins will realize incremental value from their partnership as 
compared to firms aligning with a promoter of differing national origins.  
 
4.3.3 Level of Immersion 
The final two relationship considerations hinge on the level of immersion and 
strategic leverage initiatives exhibited by the sponsoring firm as representations of its 
trust and commitment to the alliance.  Trust in a promotional alliance situation serves as a 
precursor to commitment, which is demonstrated by the parties through short-term 
investments in the relationship based on an expectation of benefits over a longer term 
(Farrelly & Quester, 2003a).  The demonstration of commitment has been identified as a 
relational factor central to the ongoing success of interorganizational alliances (Farrelly 
& Quester, 2003b; Gruen, Summers, & Acito, 2000).  The initial commitment signified 
through an alliance partner’s level of immersion is discussed in this section, and the 
ongoing commitment designated by leveraging the alliance with additional 
supplementary resources is detailed in the subsequent section (4.3.4).   
In a promotional context, the sponsoring firm often has several options for forging 
an alliance with the promoting partner based on the firm’s available resources and desire 
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to immerse itself in the promotional context.  At different “levels” of firm immersion, 
various promotional enhancements are available to the firm in exchange for an increased 
initial commitment in reciprocal resources (Gwinner, 1997).  For example, an art 
festival’s highest promotional level available to a sponsoring firm could include the 
incorporation of the firm’s name into the title of the festival (i.e. title sponsorship), such 
as the Cadillac Festival of the Arts.  In addition to the title naming benefit, this highest 
level may come with prime signage and display locations at the event, as well as 
comprehensive inclusion in the event’s promotional media and perhaps a retail promotion 
offering discounted event admission tickets at Cadillac car dealerships.  Meanwhile, a 
firm aligning with the event at a lower level may only receive secondary signage 
opportunities and a restricted presence in the promotional media surrounding the event.  
Although a higher level typically requires greater costs in reciprocal resources, it also 
signals a greater level of commitment to alliance continuity and success that can be 
interpreted by both the firm’s stakeholders and the partner in the alliance (Farrelly & 
Quester, 2003b).   
H3: Firms engaging in a promotional alliance at a higher level, and thereby 
demonstrating greater commitment, will realize greater financial market value 
from the relationship than firms engaged in a lower level promotional alliance. 
 
4.3.4 Leverage 
Beyond the initial commitment of resources to an interorganizational alliance, an 
important factor in generating positive returns from the promotional relationship is the 
ongoing leverage of such resources (Bucklin & Sengupta, 1993).  In the context of 
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commercial sponsorship, leverage has been defined as “promotional expenditures over 
and above the sponsorship fee, including items such as advertising, sales promotion, and 
client entertainment” (Cornwell, Roy et al., 2001, p. 43). Recall that the resource-based 
view of promotional alliances stresses the deployment of additional organizational 
resources in support of the focal alliance as a key to developing a sustainable competitive 
advantage (Fahy et al., 2004; Ireland et al., 2002).  By strategically instigating 
complementary combinations of interorganizational resources via leverage of a 
promotional alliance, a sponsoring firm can perpetuate resource inimitability through the 
generation of social complexity and increased causal ambiguity (Morgan & Hunt, 1999).  
In other words, competitors looking to imitate a sponsoring firm’s advantageous 
promotional position will find it more difficult to parse out which promotional resources 
and employed capabilities of the aligned organizations contributed to such a position and 
how their dynamic interaction created any perceived advantage.  
In a sponsorship situation, where communicating the alliance and its relevance to 
a potentially diverse targeted audience is often imperative to success (Cornwell, Roy et 
al., 2001), leveraging the promotional alliance with other marketing resources takes on a 
heightened importance.  Despite the consumer-based focus of research detailing the 
outcomes of commercial sponsorship, scholars have persistently identified a diverse 
range of audiences targeted through sponsorship objectives (Cornwell & Maignan, 1998; 
Crowley, 1991; Thjømøe et al., 2002).  To realize the maximum effectiveness of an 
investment in commercial sponsorship, the relationship must be leveraged toward the 
specific audiences targeted through the use of supplementary resources or capabilities 
(Cliffea & Motion, 2005).  Beyond general consumers, these targeted audiences might 
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include suppliers and other channel members, employees, politicians, shareholders and 
other community stakeholders.  In the B2B context, for example, commercial sponsorship 
can constitute a critical sales event if the resources and capabilities of a firm’s sales force 
are mobilized to leverage the resources inherent in the sponsorship alliance, such as event 
hospitality and product or service credentialing (Clark, Lachowetz, Irwin, & Schimmel, 
2003).  The theory of “credentialing” through an alliance with a prominent entity, such as 
a popular sports team, suggests that the sponsoring firm not only has the opportunity to 
access the promoting team’s other business partners, but can also gain recognition and an 
assumed status by functionally collaborating with such a prominent partner (Stuart et al., 
1999). 
Strategically integrating promotional alliances with other resources deployed by 
the firm as part of the marketing communication mix encourages the efficient targeting of 
relevant audiences and leverages the sponsorship relationship toward a distinct 
competence (Fahy et al., 2004).  Further, this discerning style of promotional alliance 
management discourages haphazard engagement in an incoherent assortment of 
sponsorship alignments that are ultimately unsuccessful and fail to contribute to a 
competitive advantage in the marketplace (Amis et al., 1997; Amis, Slack, & Berrett, 
1999).  While the body of research concerning the leverage of a promotional alliance 
with other marketing resources remains relatively sparse (Cornwell, 2008; Farrelly, 
Quester, & Burton, 1997), evidence to date has indicated the strategic value of leveraging 
alliances to produce awareness, perceived differentiation, and accrued market value to the 
sponsoring firm (Cornwell, Roy et al., 2001; Crimmins & Horn, 1996; Quester & 
Thompson, 2001).   Therefore, sponsoring firms prepared to commit supplementary 
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marketing resources to be integrated with the promotional alliance should expect 
increased returns to the alliance. 
H4: Firms approaching a promotional alliance with an identified plan to leverage 
the relationship will realize greater financial market value from the alliance. 
 
4.3.5 Value  
The research question explored in this study asks if international promotional 
alliances contribute value to the firm.  Instituting appropriate techniques for measuring 
the relationship between marketing initiatives and firm performance has long been a 
challenge for both scholars and practitioners (Moorman & Rust, 1999).  In order to assess 
this relationship, some parameterization of value must be established.  Otherwise, a 
change in value cannot be quantifiably captured and attributed in some way to a 
marketing tactic such as promotional alliances.  To address this challenge, marketing 
researchers have begun to rely on the use of the event study methodology to quantify 
value in terms of the shareholders’ equity markets (Johnston, 2007).  Doing so allows 
scholars to ascertain a daily measurement of firm value.   
According to the theory of efficient capital markets (Fama, 1970), any event that 
shareholders expect to impact the future cash flows of the firm is assumed to be reflected 
in the stock price.  In other words, markets are efficient to the degree that security prices 
fully reflect all available information. Therefore, in the presence of an efficient market, 
marketing activities that add value to the firm should be reflected in a rising stock price 
approximately simultaneous to the activity’s announcement, representing new 
information to investors.  A primary rationale for firm collaboration via alliances is to 
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realize incremental value from “synergistic combinations of complementary resources 
and capabilities” (Madhok & Tallman, 1998, p. 327).  As a result, it might be expected 
that announcements of a promotional alliance with a high-profile enterprise, such as an 
internationally-recognized entertainment or sport organization, would be represented by a 
positive increase in stock price.  If the assumptions of the theory of efficient capital 
markets are correct and yet an announcing firm’s equity shares fail to exhibit a 
corresponding return, three possibilities exist.  First, shareholders may have anticipated 
the event or been privilege to previously leaked information and thereby already 
incorporated the announced event into the stock price.  Second, shareholders may hold a 
general expectation that the firm will engage in certain marketing initiatives and although 
they were unaware of the specific details of the announced event, the event met their 
general expectations for such marketing activities and was therefore already assimilated 
into the stock price.  Finally, shareholders may not have anticipated the event, nor held a 
general expectation in relation to the event, but instead viewed the event as not relevant 
to discounted future cash flows of the firm, which are theoretically reflected in stock 
prices (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
Studies utilizing the equity market to measure the added value to the firm of an 
alliance have yielded inconclusive results to date, thereby suggesting that collaborative 
factors beyond the simple announcement of the alliance itself may be at work in 
determining the actual financial value accrued to a firm’s shareholders from such 
relationships.  In fact, some cross-sectional evidence suggests that alliances involving 
research or technology collaborations are more likely to be valued by the market than 
licensing and marketing arrangements (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Chan et al., 1997; Koh & 
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Venkatraman, 1991).  Given these factors and the heterogeneous nature of the 
promotional alliances included in the current sample (i.e. variation in the industry and 
size of the firm, levels of involvement, potential partnership foundations in technology, 
image dimensions, nationality, a mix or none of the above), it is expected that the 
realization of financial value emanating from promotional alliances will not be uniformly 
distributed, nor statistically significant for the aggregate sample of alliances (Das et al., 
1998).  Rather, the creation of shareholder value will be dependant on various 
characteristics of the collaborative relationship between the partners as described in the 
hypotheses above, as well as certain individual characteristics of the sponsoring firm and 
its chosen promotional partner, which are included as control variables in the analysis 
(Section 4.5.1.1).   
 
4.4 Methodology: Event study 
The purpose of an event study is to measure the impact of a specific event on the 
value of a firm’s equity in a financial market.  Fama et al. (1969) introduced the 
“modern” version of the methodology in determining the effects of stock splits on 
shareholder returns.  However, the premise of event studies dates as far back as Dolley’s 
published study of stock splits in 1933 (Campbell, Lo, & MacKinlay, 1997).  
Several key assumptions are inherent in the use of event studies to evaluate 
marketing strategy.  Each assumption is based on the expected collective behavior of 
investors beginning with their capacity to rapidly assimilate the implications of a 
marketing announcement.  Next, they must use this new information to predict an impact 
on the long-term future cash flows of the firm, and then buy or sell the firm’s equity 
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shares based on these expectations in relation to the stock price (Lane & Jacobson, 1995).  
Essentially, these first two assumptions rest on the idea that investors are primarily 
rational and those investors engaging in irrational behavior do so unsystematically, 
thereby canceling each other out (Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002).  Lastly, the 
event consideration period, or window, must not be confounded by other events that 
could conceivably affect the stock price beyond the general fluctuation of the market.  
This last assumption highlights the importance of identifying a reasonable event window 
that is not so small as to forgo the complete impact of the specific event, yet not overly 
inclusive so as to incorporate potential intervening variables such as earnings 
announcements or executive personnel changes without appropriate controls (MacKinlay, 
1997).  Well-executed event studies will often perform several robustness checks using 
various event windows, binomial tests, and subsamples (removing outliers, bootstrap or 
jackknife methods) to address these assumptions (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
The “market model” is the most commonly used modeling approach in event 
study research (Brown & Warner, 1985; Fama, 1970).  The model relates the expected 
return of a given stock (E[Ri]) at time t to the return of a selected market index (RMt) 
through a linear specification: 
E(Rit) = αi + βiRMt + eit 
In the model, αi and βi are firm-specific parameters estimated by an OLS regression of a 
stock’s return (Rit) on the market index return (RMt) for a baseline period typically prior 
to the event window.  Recently, a four-factor model that also incorporates a firm-size risk 
factor, value risk factor, and momentum factor has gained popularity, but its use in 
international settings has been deemed unnecessary (Gielens et al., 2008; Srinivasan & 
(3) 
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Hanssens, 2009).  The βi parameter in the base market model can be interpreted as a 
measure of a firm’s stock volatility or risk in comparison to the chosen market index 
(Lane & Jacobson, 1995).  The error term (eit) signifies realized abnormal returns (AR), 
which are simply the difference between the actual return (Rit) and the modeled expected 
return (E[Rit]).  According to efficient market theory, this deviation (eit) should be 
randomly distributed with a zero mean.  Therefore, a hypothesis test that demonstrates a 
statistically significant difference from zero for a cross-sectional mean abnormal return 
(MAR) on the event announcement day (t = 0, which are different calendar days for the 
different firms in the sample) offers evidence of a value-added event at time t recognized 
by the capital market.   
A common practice in event studies is to also examine event windows that 
include days before and after the actual event date to account for the potential leakage of 
information before the formal announcement and to capture any delayed effects.  This is 
accomplished through the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), which are 
simply the sum of daily abnormal returns during a given event window.  However, as 
noted earlier, expanding the event window also increases the potential for confounding 
effects and often leads to reduced statistical power in smaller sample sizes (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 1997).   
Measurements of abnormal returns apparently produced upon announcement of a 
promotional alliance represent value added to the firm in this study.  Several researchers 
have utilized these estimated measures as a dependent variable in testing hypotheses 
related to certain firm or partnership characteristics (Clark et al., 2002; Cornwell, Pruitt et 
al., 2001; Pruitt et al., 2004).  However, this procedure is questionable from an 
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econometric standpoint because the individual abnormal returns that serve as the 
dependent variable in such an analysis are estimated and may, or may not be significantly 
different from zero regardless of the significance of the overall sample (Leeds et al., 
2007).   Therefore, this type of regression analysis could be relying on variance in the 
individual measures of abnormal stock returns that are not recognized as significantly 
different from zero.    
To address the issue of statistical significance at the firm level and simplify the 
modeling steps in an event study analysis, Leeds and colleagues (2007) followed the 
suggestion of Karafiath (1988), who advocated for the use of an event window dummy 
variable indicator in the market model.  Adopting this specification of the event study 
model reduces the multi-step estimation procedure to one step (i.e. model parameters for 
the individual stocks and the associated abnormal returns can be estimated 
simultaneously), and produces an intuitive test of statistical significance for each 
individual stock’s estimated abnormal returns.  To accomplish this, the procedure relies 
on the following model: 
∑
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The dummy variable, Dw, signifies the event window analyzed and together with its 
associated coefficient, δw, these terms differentiate this model from the original market 
model popularized by Fama (1970) and described in Equation 3.  For a two-day event 
window that includes the announcement day (t = 0) and the day following the 
announcement (t + 1), the dummy variable would carry a value of one in the equation for 
each of those two days.  All other days included in the dataset are treated with a zero 
dummy variable and serve to estimate the included parameters similar to the original 
(4) 
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market model.  However, in the “indicator model,” which is using the dummy variable to 
“indicate” the event window, a statistical test of the significance of the dummy variable 
coefficient for an individual stock provides a straightforward evaluation of the hypothesis 
that the abnormal returns in the indicated event window are different from zero for that 
stock.   
The magnitude of the abnormal returns is captured by the value of the dummy 
variable coefficient, δw, and the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of a multiday event 
window is calculated by aggregating the coefficient values across the days of the event 
window (Karafiath, 1988).  Therefore, if the same days used for estimating the αi and βi 
parameters in the original two-step market model are utilized within the indicator model 
along with the identical event window days, the resulting CAR estimations should be the 
same.  This assertion is explored empirically within this study and discussed in the results 
section (4.6).  Despite the advantages of the indicator model in simplicity and statistical 
testing of the individual abnormal return estimates, the original two-step market model 
remains prevalent in the marketing literature.   
 
4.4.1 Recent Applications in Marketing  
 Marketing researchers have employed the event study methodology to measure 
the impact of a range of initiatives, including corporate name changes, product recalls, 
new product announcements, customer service awards, and changes in advertising 
agencies (see Johnston, 2007 for a comprehensive review).  Three studies in particular, 
published in the Journal of Marketing, deserve special attention in relation to promotional 
alliances.  First, Lane and Jacobson (1995) examined the market’s reaction to brand 
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extension announcements and found that the directionality of the reaction (positive or 
negative equity returns) depended on brand attitude and familiarity.  Although this study 
did not specifically address an alliance situation, it demonstrated that consumers’ 
perceptions of a brand, as perceived by investors, may affect the stock market reaction to 
a similar event differentially across corporations.  In other words, a marketing strategy 
that is viewed favorably by the financial market in one case may spark a reverse reaction 
if undertaken by a rival brand.   
 Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) ventured into the arena of promotional alliances 
when they utilized an event study to examine the profitability of celebrity endorser 
relationships.  In this context, two brands (that of the product and of the endorser) 
converge to promote a strategically contrived meaning to consumers (McCracken, 1989).  
An analysis of the stock market effect allows for an aggregated assessment of the 
endorser’s potential impact on future revenue beyond the market’s perceptions of 
associated costs.  However, while an efficient market is assumed to make accurate 
collective assessments of costs when considering new information relating to potential 
revenue generation, often information relating to costs remains proprietary and is not 
necessarily widely known by investors.  Agrawal and Kamakura concede this widely 
accepted limitation of event study analysis in their admission that the costs of celebrity 
endorsement are “significant” (p. 56), yet the specific information needed to include cost 
data in an analysis of abnormal returns is presumed to be unavailable to the researcher.  
The present study overcomes this challenge by directly including promotional alliance 
investment data and other contract relationship elements in the supplemental empirical 
analysis that compliments the discussion section (4.7).  
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 The third marketing event study warranting special attention outside of specific 
commercial sponsorship applications is Geyskens, Gielens, and Dekimpe’s (2002) 
investigation of the shareholder wealth effects of internet marketing channel additions.  
This appears to be the only event study in the marketing literature that includes firms 
with securities listed on different stock exchanges.  However, the four exchanges 
(Amsterdam, Frankfurt, London, and Paris) are all located in Western Europe and no 
cross-cultural effects are reported.   The results of this study and the previous two 
discussed here (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995; Lane & Jacobson, 1995) are included in 
Table A.7 for a comparison of these marketing activities to ten other studies published in 
the marketing and economics literature that investigate athlete endorsement or 
commercial sponsorship announcements as value-adding events. 
Beyond the selected marketing studies discussed above, Table A.7 compares a 
variety of promotional alliances ranging from corporate Olympic partnerships (Farrell & 
Frame, 1997; Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001) to official product designations in the North 
American major league sports (Cornwell et al., 2005).  Samples sizes in these commercial 
sponsorship investigations ranged from a low of 24 NASCAR team sponsorships (Pruitt 
et al., 2004) to 76 various event sponsorships (Mishra, Bobinski, & Bhabra, 1997).  The 
mean abnormal return (MAR) for the various samples on the individual event days 
spanned from -0.24 percent in the case of the primary sponsors of the Indianapolis 500 
race winner (Cornwell et al., 2001) to 0.82 percent in the case of basketball star Michael 
Jordan’s announcement of his return from retirement and the stock price impact on a 
small sample (5) of his endorsed firms (Mathur, Mathur, & Rangan, 1997).  The largest 
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MAR reported in a commercial sponsorship context was 0.73 percent for the 
announcement of a stadium naming rights agreement (Clark et al., 2002).   
Interestingly, stadium naming rights agreements are one of the promotional 
alliance events for which two separate studies have been published.  In a later study, 
Leeds and colleagues (2007) challenged the findings of Clark et al. (2002) when Leeds et 
al. discovered only a 0.18 percent effect on the event days for a slightly larger sample of 
promotional naming rights agreement announcements.  In their analysis, Leeds et al. 
(2007, p. 583) used the indicator model discussed in the previous section, calling it a 
“more familiar econometric method” to measure abnormal returns.  Instead of using a 
two-step modeling approach where the parameters for a firm’s expected return in relation 
to the market index are estimated during a baseline period before estimating the model 
for abnormal returns during the event window, Leeds et al. used the dummy variable 
approach inherent to the indicator model to represent the individual announcement days.  
If the coefficient of the variable was significant, the announcement was thought to have 
an immediate effect on firm equity.  By summing the coefficients of the dummy variables 
representing the event window, the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) was determined.  
According to Leeds et al., this method allows for less restrictive assumptions by not 
assuming the covariance of abnormal returns are zero when computing the standard error 
of the CAR.  They cite this difference in measurement of the standard error, along with 
conflicts in the identified event announcement dates and use of a different baseline 
market index as the main reasons for their general lack of significant findings at the firm 
level.  This finding was contrary to the overall results reported by Clark et al. (2002).  By 
identifying one outlier in the data set (CMGI) that experienced an AR on the event day of 
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15.5 percent, Leeds and colleagues also point out a potentially common problem in event 
study research with limited sample sizes.  When deleted from the sample, the cumulative 
MAR on the event day falls from 0.18 to -0.12 percent, suggesting that the reporting of a 
median abnormal return is necessary to more accurately judge a sample’s distribution.  
The median abnormal return on event day (t = 0) for the Clark et al. (2002) study is 
reported as 0.05 percent, compared to their finding of a significant MAR of 0.73 on the 
same day.   
The other promotional alliance event examined by more than one study reviewed 
here was the announcement of a 1996 Summer Olympics commercial sponsorship 
(Farrell & Frame, 1997; Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001).  These two studies demonstrate the 
importance of choosing a theoretically valid event window.  Despite similar sample sizes 
(26, 27) and the same event choice, the studies arrived at two contrasting conclusions.  In 
the earlier study, Farrell and Frame (1997) found almost no MAR effect (0.01 percent) on 
the event announcement day.  When they expanded their analysis to a three day event 
window that included two days after the announcement date, they found a statistically 
significant negative cumulative MAR (-0.43 percent).  However, in a later study, which 
did not cite the work of Farrell and Frame, Miyazaki and Morgan (2001) uncovered a 
statistically significant positive effect (1.24 percent) for a five-day event window that 
included the announcement day and the four days prior to the event day.  Meanwhile, 
they did not report the MAR for the event day in isolation.  Instead, they reported the 
cumulative MAR for the days t -1 and t = 0 in tandem as 0.12 percent (p> .10).    These 
contrasting results for a similar event demonstrate the importance of subsequent research 
that takes into consideration the assumptions and methodological choices of past studies.  
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Otherwise, comparisons of findings across studies in a research domain become difficult, 
thereby slowing substantive progress toward accepted theory.    
[TABLE A.7] 
 
4.5 Empirical Data 
 As is often the case with a growing collection of research in a specific area, 
inconsistencies emerge and are addressed in subsequent studies to advance the theoretical 
application and development within an investigative domain.  The exploration of 
interorganizational alliances with a promotional agenda has gained some early 
momentum in the literature as demonstrated in the preceding section, and this study aims 
to expand this progress beyond domestic borders and examine immerging theory.  The 
first step to a traditional event study analysis employing Fama’s market model (1970) 
(Equation 3) is to determine the estimation period for the model’s parameters.  Table A.7 
lists the baseline period chosen for several prior event studies in marketing.  The duration 
of the intervals range from 260 days to 50 days with the earliest beginning 320 days 
before the event (Lane & Jacobson, 1995).  Only one study employed a post-event 
estimation window (Pruitt et al., 2004).  In general accordance with a majority of 
previous studies utilizing the two-step model, the baseline estimation period adopted in 
this research ranged from 250 days before the announcement date (t – 250) to 50 days 
prior to the announcement (t – 50).  Individual security and market quotes were also 
compiled continuously through the event date until 50 days following the announcement 
for a total data collection window of 301 calendar days (t – 250, t + 50) for each firm 
included in the sample set.   
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To complete step one in the original market model, an OLS regression was 
undertaken for the baseline period (-250, -50), which specified the appropriate αi and βi 
terms for use in estimating any abnormal returns in the event window.  After this 
calculation, the two parameters were entered into Equation 3 for each day designated as 
part of an event window, and the resulting residual, or error term (eit), was recorded as an 
abnormal return.  Following accepted practice, several event windows surrounding the 
announcement date were designated for analysis with an particular emphasis on a two-
day window inclusive of the day of the announcement and one day following  (0,+1) to 
allow for news distribution and time zone considerations given the global nature of the 
alliances (Geyskens et al., 2002; Lane & Jacobson, 1995).  
Once the market value impact of the announced alliances had been quantified 
through abnormal returns and the main effect evaluated (detailed in results section), 
attention moved to explaining the factors that influenced returns beyond the expectations 
specified in the market model.  In previous studies, this analysis has taken the form of a 
multiple regression with the sample firms’ abnormal returns on event day or cumulative 
abnormal returns within a specified event window as the dependent variable.  However, 
adopting this procedure relies on the magnitude of an estimated statistic (modeled 
abnormal returns) as the dependent variable when the statistic itself is not necessarily 
different from zero at the firm level.  When estimated abnormal returns are non-
significant at the firm level, the null hypothesis that such returns are in fact zero cannot 
be rejected (Leeds et al., 2007).  Therefore, employing the magnitude of such returns as 
the dependent variable in a regression analysis would be inappropriate.  To avoid this 
shortcoming, the current study utilized logistic regression to analyze the realization of 
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abnormal returns significantly different from zero.  Extending the investigation to this 
prescriptive stage facilitates theory building and confirmation by allowing for the 
rationales for abnormal returns in previous studies, or claims of moderator effects, to be 
controlled for while new hypothesized sources of added value are evaluated in the current 
sample of firms, which in this case represent a more geographically diverse cross-section 
of organizations compared to previous research.  Given the increasing globalization of 
promotional efforts (Aaker & Joachimsthaler, 1999), such advancements in both theory 
and sampling frame are necessary to assess tactics across markets. 
 The promotional alliances that paired Formula One teams and their respective 
corporate partners in 2007 composed the sample for this investigation.  Of the 261 
alliances, 167 (64%) involved publicly-traded sponsoring firms.  From that group, 73 
(43.7%) alliances had verifiable announcement dates20 that signaled the release of their 
partnership information to the public.  These announcement dates ranged from Mercedes 
Benz’s announced alliance with the McLaren team on October 26, 1994, to Oerlikon’s 
announced alliance with the Red Bull team on January 23, 2007.  The sample of 73 
alliances consisted of 65 sponsoring firms and 10 promoting teams21.  Within the 
composition of firms, 18 (24.7%) claim headquarters in Asia, including 12 from Japan, 
27 (41.5%) hail from nine Western European nations, and 20 (30.8%) originate from the 
United States.  Table A.8 presents the sample’s descriptive statistics in relation to the 
independent variables described in the following section. 
[TABLE A.8] 
                                                 
20
 The 73 alliances resulted in 70 individual announcement dates as one announcement (Bridgestone) 
included three separate alliances with three different F1 teams announced simultaneously.  As a result, this 
particular announcement is excluded from subsequent analyses considering specific alliance characteristics. 
21
 Table A.2 contains the names and claimed national origins of the 11 F1 teams.  One team (Torro Rosso) 
did not have any publicly-traded corporate partners with verifiable announcement dates. 
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4.5.1 Independent Variables 
The primary independent variables utilized in this study are composed of a series 
of binary measures.  Based on a content analysis of each promotional alliance 
announcement and in consideration of the Datastream Industrial Classification of each 
sponsoring firm, resource complementarity (RCOMP) (H1) and alliance leverage (LVG) 
(H4) were independently coded by two researchers after reviewing the theoretical basis 
for each of these variables described in the hypotheses above.  Recall that resource 
complementary was described in Section 4.3.1 as industry relatedness allowing for the 
coproduction of incremental relationship-specific resources (Madhok & Tallman, 1998); 
while leveraging an alliance was characterized in Section 4.3.4 as the deployment of 
incremental marketing resources to support the alliance’s promotional objectives 
(Cornwell, Roy et al., 2001).   
After examining each sponsoring firm’s industrial classification and the press 
releases announcing the promotional alliances, each researcher independently coded each 
alliance between a firm and their sponsored team as consisting of complementary 
resources (coded ‘1,’ otherwise ‘0’), and as including an announced plan to leverage the 
alliance with supplementary marketing resources (coded ‘1,’ otherwise ‘0’).  The 
resulting inter-coder reliability was 89.5 percent.  Discrepancies were resolved by 
collectively revisiting the theoretical rationales for each concept and achieving 
unanimous agreement following discussion and the consultation of a third researcher.  
The following quotes from two alliance announcements exemplify these two concepts. 
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 Resource complementarity: “Formula One activities are an excellent platform on 
which to showcase breakthroughs for emerging technologies such as the Metris’ 
optical metrology solutions to commercial automotive manufacturers” (“New 
sponsor,” 2005). 
 Leverage: “The title partnership deal will be highlighted through an integrated 
global branding and marketing approach aimed at strengthening the ING brand 
and bringing it more into line with the scope of our global customer base of 60 
million clients” (“ING confirms,” 2006). 
Nationality congruence (NATC) (H2) was determined by a match of the corporate 
headquarters location of the sponsoring firm and the country of origin designation of the 
promoting team (coded ‘1,’ otherwise ‘0’).  Nationality congruence was shared by 22 
(30%) of the alliances included in the sample, and its importance was echoed by several 
of the alliances announcements with quotes such as, “The Dutch heritage of both 
companies played an important role for us” (Spyker F1, 2007).  
The level (LVL) (H3) of the promotional alliance was operationalized at three 
incremental degrees.  The highest level was reserved for alliances involving sponsoring 
firms that either took an equity stake in the promoting team or had their designated brand 
integrated into the name of the promoting team, or both.  These designations were 
typically noted in the alliance announcements as “title partner” or “team owner.”  This 
exclusive level was met by 10 (14%) of the sample’s partnerships.  The middle level 
consisted of alliances not satisfying the relationship conditions of the highest level but 
still involving the commitment of millions of US dollars annually by the sponsoring firm 
to the alliance, as evidenced within the announcement or via a reliable industry source 
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(Black book Formula One, 2007).  Forty (55%) alliances fell within this level, which was 
typically characterized by designations of “team partner,” “corporate partner,” or “official 
partner.”  The final category of alliance levels was that of supplier only.  Alliances at this 
level did not appear to involve any financial exchange and were often referred to as 
“official supplier,” “team supplier,” or “promotional supplier.”  This lowest level of 
commitment was populated by 23 (32%) alliances.  It should be noted that alliances at all 
three levels were commonly described in announcements as involving an exchange of 
resources that extended beyond solely financial considerations.   
When evaluating the level of immersion in an alliance and its contribution to the 
value realized by the sponsoring firm, a continuous variable quantifying the investment 
contributed to the alliance by the firm would seemingly be a more accurate measure than 
the three-level categorical variable described above.  However, in order for such a 
variable to be relevant in an event study, the actors in the market would need to be privy 
to this specific investment, or cost, information.  While a collection of this alliance 
information exists internally within Formula One and its teams (Black book Formula 
One, 2007), it is considered highly confidential.  Unlike naming-rights sponsorships of 
sport stadiums where the monetary cost and duration is often included in various press 
reports, F1 alliance announcements rarely include any investment figures beyond the 
occasional general reference to “multi-million dollar” outlays.  Despite this fact, a 
plausible argument could be made that if researchers can gain access to the data through 
insider networks, the financial markets and its many tentacles might also be able to do so.  
As a result, in the discussion section (4.7) the total investment figure on behalf of the 
sponsoring firm for each alliance is also analyzed supplementary to this hypothesis 
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postulating that the level of immersion enhances the value realized by the firm.  Total 
investment aggregates direct monetary and non-monetary commitments to the alliance.  
Examples of non-monetary commitments include expertise in technology, aerodynamics, 
various component parts, financial leverage mechanisms, logistics, and international 
travel to name a few.     
 
4.5.1.1 Control Variables 
Beyond the collaborative relationship characteristics of an interorganizational 
alliance described above, certain factors of the individual organizations must be 
controlled for when predicting if value is contributed by a promotional alliance.   
Included in Appendix A are three tables summarizing past research that examined the 
financial market impact of domestic promotional alliances.  The tables are grouped by 
characteristics of the alliance (Table A.9), sponsoring firm (Table A.10), and promotional 
partner (Table A.11), and each lists the examined variables, their context, the associated 
coefficient, and test statistic. 
In regards to the characteristics of the sponsoring firm, corporate size may impact 
returns from an alliance in divergent ways.  To begin, a negative relationship between 
realized financial market returns and corporate size may result from the theory that any 
individual sponsorship announcement or event is less likely to impact a large, potentially 
diversified corporation’s future cash flows than it would a smaller, more focused 
corporation (Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2001).  This proposition is rooted in resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer & Nowak, 1976), where a large firm may 
possess more internal resources or external resource links that enable it to reduce 
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dependency on the focal alliance.  As a result, any single alliance takes on greater 
importance to a smaller firm, which relies incrementally on the alliance’s resources to 
contribute value (Koh & Venkatraman, 1991).  Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison (2001) 
demonstrated this relationship in an entrepreneurial environment where smaller firms 
realized a greater performance impact of alliance proactiveness.  In this study, the 
number of employees as reported by Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope Fundamentals 
financial database is used to control for any effects attributable to the size of the firm 
(SIZE), which are expected to be either negligible or of a negative magnitude (Das et al., 
1998). 
Conversely, the use of a corporate name, as opposed to a brand or smaller 
subsidiary name, in the promotional communications touting the alliance has been 
suggested to exert a positive influence on abnormal stock returns (Pruitt et al., 2004). 
Two potential factors account for the hypothesized difference in returns between 
corporate names and singular brand names.  First, when corporations harbor multiple 
brands within their portfolio, these conglomerates offer more avenues for a perceived fit 
with the alliance partner, as well as greater potential to leverage the promotional alliance 
across several brands, which stakeholders may recognize.  Although this assertion 
appears contradictory to the previous argument put forth regarding firm size, scholars 
have substantiated managerial objectives for commercial sponsorship engagement 
beyond brand awareness and exposure that a conglomerate corporation may be better 
positioned to take advantage of, such as community support, employee loyalty, and 
business-to-business relationship building through hospitality (Copeland et al., 1996; 
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Thjømøe et al., 2002).  Second, the utilization of a corporate name in the alliance 
announcement offers a more direct link to the moniker of the market-traded security.   
One example that demonstrates both these rationales is the alliance of energy 
drink Battery with the Williams F1 team.  Battery is a brand owned by Carlsberg 
Breweries and therefore any anticipated future cash flows as a result of the alliance 
should theoretically be reflected in the financial value of Carlsberg.  However, had 
Carlsberg promoted its own corporate name, perhaps in conjunction with Battery and 
other brands under its purview, the alliance announcement could have been more easily 
linked to the stock moniker (CAB), and investors may have interpreted the promotional 
alliance as more valuable given a stated intent to leverage the relationship across multiple 
brands.  Both of these rationales lend credibility to the proposition of a positive influence 
when utilizing a corporate name, and as a result, a dichotomous variable is included here 
to control for the use of a corporate name (i.e. a firm name identical, or closely 
resembling the stock moniker) in promotional communications surrounding the alliance.   
Apart from controlling for sponsoring firm size and the use of a corporate name, 
previous research suggests several other factors that should be accounted for when 
considering the impact of promotional alliance announcements.  Anand and Khanna 
(2000) suggest that, consistent with organizational learning theory (Levitt & March, 
1988), firms learn to create value in alliance situations as their alliance experience 
accumulates.  In the current context, this suggests that sponsoring firms with past 
experience in the Formula 1 context will be more likely to realize alliance value.  To 
account for this possibility, the F1 sponsorship experience of each firm in the sample is 
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represented by a variable summing the years of any promotional involvement in Formula 
One.   
In a high profile promotional alliance such as F1 racing, the potential for an 
agency conflict creates an interesting scenario.  The prospect of a conflict in the 
principal-agent relationship has been characterized as a moral hazard effect where 
executives realize the corporate hospitality benefits of commercial sponsorship without 
the associated personal costs (Mishra et al., 1997).  As a result, executives may be 
tempted to engage their firm in promotional alliances that do not necessarily add value to 
their organization.  Based on the thought that stakeholders would have more difficulty in 
monitoring agency conflicts when cash flow is more accessible for executive discretion, a 
measure of corporate cash flow has been used by researchers as a proxy for the expected 
negative relationship induced by agency conflicts (Cornwell et al., 2005; Pruitt et al., 
2004).  Like most popular international sporting events, Formula 1 offers the executive 
representatives of its corporate partners luxurious hospitality opportunities in the 
exclusive F1 Paddock Club, located just above each team’s garage and overlooking their 
pit stop area at each race (Bartunek, 2007a).  Basking in such elite entertaining could 
certainly be conceived as a moral hazard to stakeholders who evaluate the value to the 
firm of such high profile and costly promotional alliances.  Therefore, a negative 
influence is expected when evidence of an increased potential for an agency conflict 
exists.  In line with previous research, this factor is controlled for through the inclusion of 
a cash flow ratio variable.     
The last set of influential considerations in this study concerns characteristics 
specific to the promotional partner or F1 team in this case.  All else equal, it seems safe to 
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assume that a sponsoring firm would prefer to align with a high-status promoting team. 
Research that views alliances as interorganizational endorsements supports this idea of 
building status based on the status of an organization’s partners (Stuart et al., 1999).  In a 
motor racing context, status of the teams can be operationalized based on their 
performance in direct competition on the track (Pruitt et al., 2004).  In this study, both 
recent and historical performance are controlled for through separate variables.  A 
promoting team’s accumulated points in the year prior to the alliance announcement 
represent their recent performance; while the team’s aggregate drivers’ championships up 
until the alliance announcement demonstrate historical performance in a manner 
commonly associated with status in F1 circles (Elizalde, 2008).  Descriptive statistics of 
all six control variables are included along with the dependent variable and the four 
hypothesized variables in Table A.8.  A correlation matrix is also included as Table A.12.  
While a few significant correlations exist between variables (for example, firms larger in 
size are correlated with higher level sponsorships [highest sponsorships coded 1]), the 
primary independent variables do not show a significant degree of multicollinearity.   
[TABLE A.12] 
 
4.6 Results 
Given the popularity of the two-step market model in prior research and the 
functionality of the indicator model in producing an intuitive significance test of 
individual firm’s abnormal returns, both models were employed in this study.  Starting 
with the traditional market model, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) were calculated 
across several feasible event windows.  Interestingly, two conventional windows 
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representing both an immediate (0,+1) and slightly longer term effect (0,+10) produced 
mean CAR values significantly different from zero across the sample in the negative 
direction (p < .05).  This finding is surprising in light of the sparse evidence for a 
negative impact on value for sponsoring firms.  While Leeds et al. (2007) argued that 
naming rights had no effect on firm value, only Farrell and Frame (1997) have uncovered 
empirical support for a negative effect of commercial sponsorship and it was only 
apparent in the somewhat unconventional event window of (0,+2).  In checking the 
robustness of this study’s initial finding, the exclusion of one significant outlier in the 
negative direction (EMC2), and the exclusion of another firm also with a negative CAR 
that announced multiple team alliances on the same day (Bridgestone), did not change the 
result of negative significance for either event window.  The various event windows 
examined are featured in Table A.13.   
[TABLE A.13] 
This negative result foreshadows a challenge in supporting the four hypotheses of 
this study that predict positive contributions to firm value.  While possible, it now seems 
more likely that certain alliance characteristics might dissuade an overall negative effect 
of Formula One alliances.  To further validate these results, the event indicator model 
was employed initially with only the days used by the traditional market model that 
included the baseline period (-250, -50) and specified event windows.  This allowed for 
the aggregation of abnormal returns within the event windows and a direct comparison to 
the CAR values calculated by the traditional market model, which is discussed below.  
Once this was completed, the event indicator model was also run with all collected dates 
included (-250, +50) and the event window signified with the dummy variable for the 
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appropriate dates, similar to Leeds et al.’s application (2007).  Just as in the traditional 
market model, both event indicator model applications exposed statistical significance (p 
< .05) for a negative effect on firm value across the sample of alliances for the event 
windows (0,+1) and (0,+10).  The various event window coefficients and associated t-
statistics for the full indicator model are also included in Table A.13.  On the surface, 
these findings indicate that a promotional alliance with an F1 team actually reduces the 
value of the sponsoring firm.   
Using a correlation analysis to compare the CAR measures generated by the three 
model applications for each sponsoring firm revealed an extremely high correlation 
between the model estimations (Pearson r > .99 across all three applications for both 
[0,+1] and [0,+10]).  Examining the individual values confirmed almost identical 
measures, which demonstrates the utility of the more straightforward event indicator 
model approach as advocated by Karafiath (1988).  Table A.14 produces these three 
measures for each sponsoring firm in addition to its announcement date (t = 0).    
[TABLE A.14] 
Probing the abnormal returns at the firm level exposed the lack of statistical 
significance for a vast majority of the estimated returns.  This was determined in the 
indicator model by the significance of the event window dummy coefficient for each 
firm.  Meanwhile, a one-sample t-test (H0: CAR = 0) was conducted for every sponsoring 
firm within each event window to ascertain statistical significance at a firm level in the 
traditional market model.  Table A.14 shows that a maximum of ten firms display 
significant returns in any one of the model applications or chosen event windows.  None 
of the three model applications produced any positive significant results for the (0,+1) 
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event window, and although the (0,+10) event window produced a total of 25 significant 
CAR measures at the firm level across the three applications, only seven are positive 
effects.   
After studying the results of the estimation of abnormal returns, it is invalid to 
declare that CAR values at the firm level are not zero in a majority of cases within the 
sample.  As a result, utilizing these estimations as a dependant variable was deemed 
inappropriate22.  Instead, logistic regression was determined to be most suitable for 
testing the effects of the hypothesized alliance characteristics on the value of the firm.  
Employing logistic regression enabled a distinction to be made between firms realizing a 
statistically significant abnormal return and those alliances generating no discernable 
effect.  At this stage of analysis, the event window chosen is conventionally short to 
isolate the announcement’s effects.  Table A.7 shows a majority of prior studies to have 
utilized windows between two and five days in duration.  Following this precedent, the 
event window inclusive of the announcement date and following day (0,+1) was chosen 
as the focus going forward in this investigation (Geyskens et al., 2002; Lane & Jacobson, 
1995).  In regards to the three applications of the market model discussed above, the 
CAR estimations produced by the event indicator model that included all collected dates 
(column four of Table A.14) were used to designate significant returns at the firm level in 
the subsequent regression analysis (Leeds et al., 2007).  The cross-sectional examination 
                                                 
22
 Although this paper firmly maintains that utilizing the magnitude of non-significant, estimated abnormal 
returns as a dependant variable is inappropriate, given the use of this procedure in previous research, a 
regression analysis was undertaken to explore the results when the estimated CAR values were employed 
as a predicted, continuous variable.   Similar to Model 2 in Table A.12, no predictor variable achieved a 
marginal level of significance (p > .10), but when isolated as the sole predictor, nationality congruence was 
marginally significant in the positive direction (t = 1.89, p = .063).  The coefficient suggested that 
nationally congruent sponsoring firms enjoyed a 1.2 percent rise in stock price compared to nationally 
incongruent firms upon announcement of an F1 team promotional alliance.   
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of these CAR estimations showed a negative effect on firm value that is highly significant 
(p < .01) when compared to the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns.   At the firm 
level, seven alliances displayed event window coefficients deemed to be statistically 
significant from zero (p < .10), and all seven were in the negative direction.  Therefore, 
the dependent variable for the logistic regression analysis was coded as one (1) for 
sponsoring firm alliances producing at least a marginally significant negative return, and 
zero (0) otherwise, which would designate non-significant abnormal returns in the event 
window.  
Focusing first on the four hypothesized variables, Model 1 in Table A.15 outlines 
the effects of the logistic regression predicting significant negative returns.  Contrary to 
expectations, the model did not contribute to explaining negative returns beyond the 
constant-only specification (p > .10).  Amongst the individually hypothesized variables, 
only nationality congruence (H2) appeared to demonstrate the potential for influence on 
negative returns.  No support was apparent for resource complementarity between the 
alliance partners (H1), level of immersion of the sponsoring firm (H3), or identified plans 
to leverage the alliance (H4).  Before exploring the possible relationship between 
negative returns and nationality congruence further, the various control variables were 
added to the model to ascertain any possible effects (Model 2 in Table A.15).  Again, the 
model lacked overall improvement from a constant-only model and no individual 
variables reached a standard level of significance (p > .10) in the expanded model. 
[TABLE A.15]     
Reducing the model to concentrate on the sole effect of nationality congruence 
(Model 3) yielded a specification that significantly contributed to the likelihood of 
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negative returns beyond the base, constant-only model.   Surprisingly, the relationship 
between nationality congruence and a reduction in firm value is opposite the 
hypothesized association (H2).  By computing the anti-log of the logistic regression 
equation and translating the result to a probability, the relationship can be interpreted as a 
higher probability (19.06%) for significant negative returns when a sponsoring firm and 
sponsored team claim the same national origins compared to divergent national origins 
(4.17%).23  As an odds ratio, the odds of significant negative returns are 5.41 times 
greater for nationally congruent alliances versus those non-congruent in nationality.  In 
other words, the results of this analysis indicate that aligning with a sponsored enterprise 
that does not originate from the same country can decrease the chance of realizing a loss 
in firm value from the promotional alliance.  It therefore appears as if the financial 
markets are punishing firms that engage in F1 promotional alliances with teams in the 
firm’s home market.  This interesting phenomenon is explored further in the following 
discussion section (4.7).   
 
4.7 Discussion 
The results of this study characterize promotional alliances in Formula One motor 
racing to be potentially detrimental to the value of the sponsoring firm.  At the very least, 
such alliances do not seem to add value to the firm as interpreted by worldwide financial 
markets.  This empirical finding contradicts the prevalent assertions of similar domestic 
research in the United States that finds positive value implications of commercial 
                                                 
23
 This anti-log procedure for nationally congruent alliances is specified by e^(-3.135 + 1.689(1)) = 0.2355; 
which is converted to a probability as 0.2355/(1 + 0.2355) = 19.06%.  Likewise, non-nationally congruent 
alliances is specified by ((e^(-3.135 + 1.689(0))) / (1 + (e^(-3.135 + 1.689(0))) = 4.17%.  The resulting 
odds ratio is computed as e^1.689 = 5.414. 
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sponsorship announcements (Clark et al., 2002; Cornwell et al., 2005; Pruitt et al., 2004; 
Mishra et al., 1997).  Several possibilities exist that could account for this contradiction.   
First, unlike the majority promotional alliances studied in prior research, F1 
alliances may be regarded as either a net drain on sponsoring firm resources or any 
benefits accrued are considered by investors to be offset by the substantial costs of such 
an alliance.   Similarly, when re-examining the effects of stadium naming rights 
sponsorships at the individual firm level, Leeds et al. (2007, p. 583) stated that “(t)he 
market does not interpret the announcements of naming rights as a positive event because 
the cost of the naming rights is comparable to any future cash flow benefit.”  Given a 
median cost of about US$3 million annually for firms aligned with F1 teams (Black book 
Formula One, 2007), this possibility is certainly plausible in this promotional context and 
is explored further when discussing the level of immersion (H3) below.   
A second rationale for the discovery of a negative influence on firm value, despite 
the positive findings of previous scholars in similar context, is that promotional alliances 
in F1 motor racing might be perceived to entail a particularly enhanced agency conflict 
(Farrell & Frame, 1997).   While Formula One’s Paddock Club is heralded for its 
business networking opportunities (Bartunek, 2007b), it is simultaneously notorious for 
its trackside opulence.  At F1 races around the globe, executives of sponsoring firms 
commonly arrive by helicopter at the track to avoid event traffic.  Once on-site, they 
enjoy private tours of the teams’ working pit areas and personal introductions to drivers 
and other team-invited celebrities before retreating to their team’s private suite within the 
Paddock Club complex.  Once they reach their team’s luxury hospitality area, sponsoring 
executives are treated to imported wine, champagne and a four-course meal catered by 
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the Austrian company, DO&CO regardless of the location of the particular race 
(Bartunek, 2007a).   
Although an attempt consistent with prior studies was made in this investigation 
to control for the moral hazard effect of agency conflicts, such a control variable is only 
as accurate as its ability to quantify the hazard.  In this research, the use of a cash flow 
ratio to market value as a proxy for an agency conflict showed no significant effect on the 
likelihood of negative abnormal returns (p = .62).  Despite its negative significance in one 
study (Pruitt et al., 2004), the continued use of cash flow as a proxy for an agency 
conflict remains a relatively crude measure of an executive’s prerogative regarding 
his/her firm’s promotional investments.   While the general assumption that a firm’s high 
cash flow margin reduces institutional monitoring may or may not be correct; if needed, 
executives can justify promotional expenditures in various ways given the lack of a 
universal gauge of marketing value (Moorman & Rust, 1999).  Therefore, a sponsoring 
firm’s cash flow may be a weak or inaccurate approximation for investors’ perceptions of 
an agency conflict in a promotional alliance situation.  If that is the case, shareholders 
could view certain high-profile promotional alliances as nothing more than an executive’s 
holiday excursion at the firm’s expense, and the reflection of this assessment in a market 
reaction would not be captured through a relationship with the traditional cash flow to 
market value ratio.   
Finally, any event study utilizing the financial markets as a measure of an event’s 
impact on firm value is simultaneously testing two hypotheses.  The main hypothesis is 
that the event in question will influence the future cash flows of the firm (Fama, 1970).  
The underlying, implied hypothesis is that financial markets are efficient and 
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participating investors can interpret all relevant information and accurately apply the 
information to the market’s valuation of the firm (Geyskens et al., 2002; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997).  While it is possible that investors in general make poor judgments 
regarding the value of promotional alliances and therefore financial markets are 
inefficient in measuring the value of this particular marketing tool; it is also possible that 
investors in the US markets are substantially better or worse at interpreting the value of 
certain promotional alliances compared to their counterparts in other global regions.  If 
this was the case, a sample of only US firms might show a result different from a globally 
diverse sample.   
To check this possibility, the 20 alliances involving US firms were selected and 
their estimated CAR values for the event windows (0,+1) and (0,+10) were tested as a 
subsample against the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns.  Although not 
statistically significant for the immediate event window (0,+1) (t = -1.15), the effect was 
negative; as was the effect for the longer event window (0,+10), which was significant (t 
= -2.37, p < .05).  This evidence dispels the prospect that US markets positively evaluated 
Formula One alliances, leaving other markets to drive the negative effects of this study.  
However, given the diversity in the sample’s sponsoring firms, perhaps the negative 
effect is not consistent amongst other geographic regions. 
Though not formally hypothesized, a unique contribution of this investigation is 
the analysis of alliance effects on sponsoring firm value across different markets.  
Whereas previous promotional alliance research had limited investigation to the United 
States market, this study’s sample of alliances contained sponsoring firms hailing from 
14 different nations.  Each firm’s home securities market was used to generate the 
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financial returns analyzed throughout this research.  Across markets, these returns were 
interpreted as changes in the value of the represented firm based on investors’ collective 
assessment of the impact of a promotional alliance announcement.  Yet, organizational 
research has suggested that cultural values are not consistent across the globe (Hofstede, 
1983), and these differences can affect international marketing strategy and priorities 
(Erdem et al., 2006; Kogut & Singh, 1988).  To evaluate the potential for differing effects 
by culture, the sample was categorized into four regions representing Japan, other Asian 
nations, Western Europe, and the United States.  The resulting logistic regression showed 
no discernable effects by market region as neither the model nor any of the categorical 
variables comparing regions approached significance (p > .10).  This finding was 
reinforced by a non-significant, between-groups ANOVA that compared the estimated 
CAR values between regions.  These supplementary tests of the data confirm that the 
negative influence of F1 alliance announcements was not isolated to one region’s 
markets; thereby implying that the markets’ evaluation of this standardized promotional 
tool was somewhat consistent between cultures.   
Moving beyond the macro effect of F1 promotional alliances in the sample, a 
discussion of the hypothesized influences is warranted despite their general lack of 
empirical support within this study.   The first hypothesis postulated that sponsoring firms 
able to contribute complementary resources to the alliance context would realize greater 
value at the announcement of their alliance with an F1 team.  This assertion was based on 
the theory that aligning with partners that possess external resources that enhance the 
performance of a firm’s internal resources facilitates the creation of incremental value 
(Chung et al., 2000).  Such resource complementarity is most often found between 
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alliance partners in strategically related industries (Tsai, 2000).  Consequently, 
sponsoring firms engaged in the automotive or high-technology sectors were deemed to 
offer resources complementary to F1 motor racing.  Both industries had shown relevance 
in previous studies of sports-based promotional alliances (Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2005; 
Pruitt et al., 2004).  However, no distinction was made between sponsoring firms 
generating services and those producing tangible products.  Yet some alliance research 
implies that audiences are more likely to recognize an alliance when compatible products 
are involved (Samu et al., 1999).  To explore if the delineation between product and 
service offerings accounted for the lack of support for this hypothesis, the resource 
complementarity categorization was subdivided into product and service-based 
sponsoring firms.  Nevertheless, subsequent analysis of the newly categorized variable 
yielded similarly non-significant results in relation to reduced firm value.  This lack of 
support for an influence of complementarity in promotional alliances suggests that 
industry compatibility may not be sufficient to justify certain marketing expenditures in 
the eyes of investors.   
Another hypothesis with scarce support in the empirical model was the influence 
of an announced plan to leverage the promotional alliance (H4).  The literature on 
leveraging promotional investments has only gained traction in the last decade and 
remains sparse (Cornwell, 2008).  Nevertheless, strategically deploying organizational 
resources in support of a focal promotional alliance has been considered vital to realizing 
a competitive advantage according to the resource-based view of the firm (Fahy et al., 
2004; Ireland et al., 2002).  Therefore, alliance announcements that specify a plan to 
leverage the relationship through integration with further firm resources would appear to 
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be closer to achieving a competitive advantage than sponsoring firms failing to disclose 
such a plan.  However, this assumption was not apparent in the markets’ reactions to 
alliance announcements.   
One possibility is that investors assumed that all sponsoring firms had some plan 
to leverage the alliance even if the firm did not mention any leverage initiatives in their 
announcement.  Given the multi-million dollar commitment involved in F1 alliances, this 
may seem like a logical assumption.  Yet, research on commercial sponsorships has 
demonstrated that sponsoring firms do not always have a coherent plan for integrating 
their promotional alliances with other strategic marketing resources (Amis et al., 1997; 
Farrelly et al., 1997).   
Another possibility for the lack of impact of announced plans to leverage the F1 
alliance is that the firms’ strategies were not adequately communicated to investors who 
were evaluating the value implications of the alliance. To further explore this prospect, 
data was gathered on the number of news stories published within a 21-day window (-10, 
+10) around the announcement date of each alliance.  Lexis Nexis’ Major World 
Publications database, which includes the world’s major newspapers, magazines, and 
trade publications, was used to quantify the mass media dispersion of news of each 
alliance announcement (Demers & Lewellen, 2003).  While the mean publication 
quantity was just over four (4.17), about half (51.4%) of all alliances in the sample did 
not generate any discernable press coverage in the world’s major publications24.  This 
                                                 
24
 Keep in mind that alliance announcement dates and content was originally ascertained and verified 
through sponsoring firm and F1 team press releases, as well as Formula One news outlets and other public 
sources. 
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finding is somewhat surprising given the global popularity of F1 racing and the 
promotional purpose of these interorganizational relationships.   
On the surface, this data seems to suggest that despite the investment involved, 
many sponsoring firms may indeed not have a plan in place to promotionally leverage the 
alliance when initiating the relationship.  Otherwise, a reasonable expectation would be 
that a sponsoring firm’s public relations personnel would tactically maximize the 
publicity of the alliance’s commencement.  If the formation of a promotional alliance is 
not being trumpeted in the press, then investors must rely on internal or specialty sources 
to describe the new relationship or remain unaware of the partnership.  Awareness and a 
degree of alliance information are necessary conditions for a sponsoring firm’s leverage 
initiatives to influence the perceived value of the announced alliance.  To determine if the 
level of publicity played a role in investors’ assessments of the value of F1 alliances, the 
number of stories printed in Lexis Nexis’ major news outlets was regressed against the 
dichotomous dependent variable signifying negative returns.  The result showed no effect 
of publicity (p = .57) on likelihood of realizing significantly negative abnormal returns.   
In light of the supplementary data regarding the amount of publicity and the 
negative overall effect on firm value, a final possibility concerning the hypothesized 
effect of an announced plan to leverage the alliance is that some sponsoring firms may 
actually be avoiding mass media coverage of their alliance announcements.  Instead of 
attempting to generate initial publicity and outlining their plans to utilize the alliance, 
perhaps sponsoring firms have become fearful of investors’ perceptions of the initial 
resource commitment required and agency conflicts inherent in these promotional 
alliances.  As a result, firms might not orchestrate a media splash for the announcement 
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of the alliance, and instead integrate the desirable facets of the alliance with their 
complementary operations and marketing resources over time; thereby gradually 
incorporating the alliance into their promotional channels and messaging.  Although the 
alliances in this investigation were announced over the last 15 years, this possibility is 
even more feasible in the current economic climate, where the scrutiny of promotional 
alliances and the monetary commitments that often accompany them has entered the 
public debate (Lefton & Mickle, 2009).   Typically, the monetary investments involved in 
forging a promotional alliance are directly reflected in the identified “level” of immersion 
with the sponsored enterprise.  This premise served as the basis for the third hypothesis of 
this study. 
It was proposed (H3) that sponsoring firms at a higher level of immersion in the 
alliance signified greater commitment and would be more likely to realize additional 
value.  Recall that this hypothesis was originally operationalized at three categorical 
levels: owner/title partner, official partner, and supplier.  The reference category was set 
as “supplier,” the lowest of the three levels, for the primary logistic regression model.  
Neither higher level showed a significant difference (p > .10) from the reference level in 
the primary model or a reduced model considering only H3.  These results imply that the 
level of immersion in the promotional alliance as measured by sponsorship designation 
does not affect the likelihood of significant negative returns upon announcement of the 
alliance.  However, a superior measure of the commitment to a promotional alliance 
could be the initial investment agreed to at the commencement of the relationship.  While 
the magnitude of this investment might carry a positive connotation of immersion and 
strategic commitment, it also signifies a resource outlay, opportunity cost commitment, 
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and often a considerable monetary expenditure; all of which carry negative connotations 
with investors.  Beyond the uncertain directionality of any effect of initial alliance 
investment on firm value, there remains a question of whether the market actors have 
access to this information.  A vast majority (81.4%) of the alliance announcements 
analyzed for this study did not contain numeric details on the initial exchange of 
resources or the stipulated resource exchange over the duration of the alliance.  
Therefore, the level of alliance designation was conceptualized as an appropriate 
representation of the theory that greater commitment demonstrated through alliance 
immersion would result in a higher likelihood of positive returns. 
Conversely, if market actors were aware of, or could accurately approximate the 
details of the sponsoring firm’s resource commitment beyond the general publicized 
information, the market may estimate the future benefits to be outweighed by the required 
costs of an F1 promotional alliance.  Leeds et al. (2007) surmised a similar cost/benefit 
analysis in the minds of investors when evaluating the value of naming rights agreements 
to the sponsoring firm.  Using an F1 team source (Black book Formula One, 2007), the 
estimated alliance investment for each sponsoring firm in the study’s sample was 
ascertained and recorded within the database of independent variables.  The firm’s 
investment was defined in millions of US dollars and was an aggregation of monetary, 
technology, expertise, component, and other commitments to the alliance.  Investment 
estimations ranged from US$50,000 to US$350M annually, with an average of 
US$27.2M and a median of US$2.9M.   
To empirically test the possibility that the likelihood of sponsoring firms’ 
negative returns was related to the detailed magnitude of investment in the alliance, a 
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logistic regression model (Model 1 in Table A.16) was analyzed with a dichotomous 
indicator of significant negative returns as the predicted variable and the estimated 
investments of sponsoring firms as the independent variable.  This model proved to be a 
significant improvement from the constant-only model (χ21 = 5.718, p < .01), and 
suggested that the odds of significant negative returns in shareholder value are 1.011 
times greater for every US$1M invested in an F1 promotional alliance.  Table A.17 
(column 3) shows the probabilities of significant negative returns at various alliance 
investment levels.  These computations demonstrate that although statistically significant, 
when the magnitude of investment is considered in isolation, the probability of negative 
returns remains relatively stable at low levels of investment.  However, as the resource 
commitment escalates, the probability for reduced shareholder value simultaneously 
grows.  The analysis indicates that contrary to the theoretical foundation behind the 
positive influence of the level of immersion (H3), market actors actually perceive 
commitments to an F1 promotional alliance as incremental costs detrimental to firm 
value.  Given that the categorical level of sponsorship was non-significant, the finding 
also implies that market actors are more sensitive to the magnitude of investment than the 
alliance designation in mass media reports and press releases.     
One caveat to the model employing a continuous variable representation of 
alliance investment as the sole predictor of significant negative returns is the apparent 
lack of fit to the observed data according to the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (p = .034), 
which tests the null hypothesis that there is no difference between observed and predicted 
values.  In rejecting this hypothesis, there is concern that the model’s estimates do not 
adequately fit the observations in the sample.  The Hosmer and Lemeshow test evaluates 
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this contention by dividing cases into predicted probability deciles and calculating the 
chi-square based on the frequencies of observed and expected significant negative returns 
(dichotomous dependent variable).  With the small number of significant negative returns 
in the sample, the test indicates their dispersion by investment magnitude may be greater 
than the model predicts, thereby hinting at the influence of outliers, which is discussed 
further below.  To potentially improve the fit of the model, alliance investment might be 
considered in tandem with the impact of nationally congruence.  
Nationality congruence between the sponsoring firm and the sponsored enterprise 
was found to also be detrimental to firm value (Model 3 in Table A.15), contrary to 
hypothesized expectations (H2).  Considered in isolation, sponsoring firms sharing a 
national origin with their sponsored F1 team were over five times more likely to 
experience a significant reduction in shareholder value than firms aligning with a team 
that claimed a different nationality.  The finding suggests that market actors are less 
concerned with image congruence theory, which states that the perceived congruence 
between alliance partners positively influences consumer brand association and 
awareness (Gwinner, 1997; Samu et al., 1999), and perhaps more concerned with the 
common alliance objective of expansion into new international markets (Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995).  Further, investors seem to favor a global cultural positioning as 
opposed to a domestic cultural positioning.  Alden et al. (1999) contend that the 
expansion of the global marketplace has created widely accepted symbols of global 
consumer culture, and by strategically associating with such symbols, brands can be 
viewed by consumers as global brands.  International branding research also asserts that 
the perception of a brand as global can raise its esteem and positively contribute to the 
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pursuit of a competitive advantage (Johansson & Ronkainen, 2005).  When evaluating the 
multi-national promotional context of F1 motor racing, investors appear to value the 
global dimension of the marketing channel and might feel as though nationally congruent 
alliances fail to take full advantage of the promotional potential.   
The primary and supplemental analysis undertaken in this study has revealed a 
negative effect on sponsoring firm value upon announcement of an F1 promotional 
alliance.  The likelihood of incurring a reduction in shareholder value seems to be 
influenced by the nationality congruence between the firm and the sponsored team, and 
the magnitude of investment committed by the sponsoring firm.  To better understand the 
confluence of these two factors, a final logistic regression model was composed inclusive 
of the two significant variables.  This model is presented in Table A.16 (Model 2), which 
shows it to be a significant improvement over a constant-only model (p < .01).  Both 
nationality congruence and the total investment are individually significant, and the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test now indicates the model to be a good fit to the observed data. 
[TABLE A.16]   
To interpret the effects specified by the final model, consider the examples of 
FedEx, which invested just below the median F1 investment in their alliance with the 
McLaren team estimated at US$2.75M annually; and Toyota, which commits one of the 
largest single investments in F1 at US$260M each year to field its own team carrying the 
Toyota nameplate.  If each of these two sponsoring firms had aligned at their same 
investment level with an F1 team of a different national origin from their own, the 
probability of realizing a significant reduction in shareholder value would be 1.69 percent 
for FedEx and 33.49 percent for Toyota.  On the other hand, if FedEx and Toyota had 
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decided to each form a promotional alliance with an F1 team that shared the same 
nationality as their own firm, the probability of reduced market value would rise to 13.42 
percent for FedEx and 81.90 percent for Toyota25.  Table A.17 (columns 4 & 5) displays 
the likelihood of this reduction in shareholder value by nationality congruence and total 
alliance investment of the sponsoring firm at varying levels.  The modeled data presented 
implicates sponsoring firms at high investment levels as being particularly susceptible to 
a negative reaction from shareholders, especially when aligning with a team native to 
their own country.  To conceptualize this finding in relation to the sample’s sponsoring 
firms and their estimated cumulative abnormal returns for the immediate event window 
(0,1), Figure 4.1 plots these CAR values by alliance investment and distinguishes 
between nationally congruent and non-congruent promotional alliances.  
[TABLE A.17] 
                                                 
25
 The probabilities listed in this example can be calculated as follows.  Beginning with a non-congruent 
nationality alliance, the FedEx probability of significant negative returns is, (e^(-1.90059 + 
(0.01311642*($2.75M)) - 2.199)) / (1 + (e^(-1.90059 + (0.01311642*($2.75M)) - 2.199))) = 0.0169  For 
Toyota, (e^(-1.90059 + (0.01311642*($260M)) - 2.199)) / (1 + (e^(-1.90059 + (0.01311642*($260M)) -
2.199))) = 0.3342.  Transitioning to a nationally congruent alliance situation, the FedEx probability is, (e^(-
1.90059 + 0.01311642*($2.75M))) / (1 + (e^(-1.90059 + 0.01311642*($2.75M)))) = 0.1342.  For Toyota, 
(e^(-1.90059 + 0.01311642*($260M))) / (1+(e^(-1.90059 + 0.01311642*($260M)))) = 0.8190. 
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Figure 4.1:  Scatterplot of CAR estimates according to the sponsoring firm’s investment 
in the announced F1 promotional alliance and the firm’s nationality congruence with the 
sponsored team. 
 
A close examination of the scatterplot reveals the graphic placement of the 
alliances that generated CAR values significant at the individual firm level (designated by 
solid markers).  These locations suggest that outliers may be influential in the right-
skewed sample.  In fact, the two highest spending firms, Honda and Toyota, both 
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experienced significantly negative abnormal returns upon announcement of their F1 
alliances.  While removing these two firms from the sample does transform the impact of 
the alliance investment magnitude to make it non-significant (nationality congruence 
remains marginally significant [p < .10]), keep in mind that removing these data points 
also reduces the number of sponsoring firms with significantly negative abnormal returns 
by a third in the logistic regression model.   
In summary, this event study has uncovered a significantly negative financial 
return across a cross-sectional sample of firms announcing a promotional alliance with a 
Formula One racing team.  Within a two-day event window that encompassed the 
announcement date and the following day, 64.3 percent of alliance announcements were 
accompanied by cumulative abnormal returns in the negative direction for the sponsoring 
firm.  A similar significantly negative effect was also present for a longer event window 
inclusive of the announcement date and the ten following days.  Utilizing an econometric 
dummy model to signify the event window (Karafiath, 1988; Leeds et al., 2007), the 
alliances exhibiting statistically significant abnormal returns at the individual firm level 
were designated for use in a logistic regression analysis.  The subsequent investigation 
was aimed at discerning the likelihood of such returns based on several characteristics of 
the alliance, the sponsoring firm, and the sponsored team.   
Only the nationality congruence within the alliance and the magnitude of the 
annual investment by the sponsoring firm influenced the probability of realizing negative 
returns upon the alliance announcement.  The effect of alliance investment was primarily 
felt at very high levels of expenditure, thereby implying that investors are particularly 
weary of annual commitments to F1 that reach into the hundreds of millions of US 
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dollars.  Financial market actors also appear to be especially skeptical of the value of a 
firm’s alliance with a domestic F1 team.  This may indicate that investors view such 
international promotional alliances as opportunities to expand or strengthen a firm’s 
reputation outside of its home market.  However, both these findings must be interpreted 
cautiously given the general lack of significant abnormal returns at the firm level and the 
dispersion of returns represented in Figure 4.1.  It is certainly possible that despite the 
global popularity of F1 racing, many firms aligning with teams for promotional purposes 
will not discern a significant stock market impact; while others will experience a negative 
reaction by shareholders.  
Unfortunately for both alliance partners, this study demonstrates that a 
significantly positive return in financial market value for a sponsoring firm is unlikely 
regardless of the characteristics of the specific alliance.  On the surface this declaration is 
discouraging because publicly-traded corporations will continue to be scrutinized based 
on their ability to create value for investors.  Yet, research probing the rationales for 
commercial sponsorship indicates that the immediate objective of these alliances is not 
necessarily to influence stock prices (Cornwell, Roy et al., 2001; Thjømøe et al., 2002).  
To explore this assertion further and proactively assess the practical implications of this 
study, the next chapter engages executives from both sides of the promotional alliance 
relationship.  Their opinions and interpretations of both studies included in this 
dissertation are highlighted and frame the relevance of the work.  A concluding chapter 
that reviews both the contributions and limitations of these studies, as well as the 
potential research extensions, closes the body of the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
APPLIED CONTRIBUTION 
The concept of a promotional alliance between two organizations was developed 
and investigated in this dissertation.  By embarking on two studies, each side of the 
alliance was featured.  The first study focused on the perspective of an enterprise that 
attracts an audience desirable to commercial organizations.  Through an 
interorganizational alliance, the enterprise exchanges promotional services with a 
commercial organization for various resources offered by the commercial entity.  For 
both studies completed within this dissertation, the specific institutionalized mechanism 
for such an exchange was Formula One (F1) team sponsorship.  In the context of F1, a 
motor racing team acts as a sponsored enterprise that offers promotional services to 
various corporate partners in exchange for performance, financial, and operational 
resources.  The initial study examined the impact accessing these resources had on the 
survival of the F1 team, which was characterized as an entrepreneurial enterprise.  The 
latter study moved to the perspective of the sponsoring firm and focused on the influence 
these alliances exerted on the firm’s shareholder value.   
Collectively, the two studies empirically confirmed several theoretical 
expectations, but also uncovered statistical evidence contrary to other hypotheses and 
prior research.  Specifically, promotional alliances with corporate partners offering 
certain resources were found to contribute to the survival of sponsored enterprises.  
Meanwhile, in some cases the announcements of such alliances were demonstrated to be 
detrimental to the shareholder value of sponsoring firms.  The former finding extends to a 
promotional context the resource-based view of entrepreneurial organizations, which 
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suggests that the continued existence of such enterprises depends in part on the resources 
obtained through interorganizational alliances (Bergmann Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001; 
Sheppard, 1995).  Yet, the latter finding contradicts prior research that suggests the 
promotional resources received by the sponsoring firm in a commercial sponsorship 
relationship are recognized by shareholders as beneficial to the firm’s value (Clark et al., 
2002; Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2005; Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001; Pruitt et al., 2004).  When 
approaching these two key outcomes from an alliance framework, the exchange 
relationship appears to favor the sponsored enterprise, which relies in part on the 
sponsoring firm for its mere existence.   Despite this apparent asymmetry in outcomes, 
corporations continue to engage in promotional alliances in the form of commercial 
sponsorships at a global level approaching US$40 billion (IEG, 2006).   
 
5.1 Expert Interviews 
To further explore this interorganizational phenomenon and the implications 
arising from the research completed within this dissertation, this chapter utilizes 
qualitative methods to reach out to industry practitioners as informants on either side of 
the promotional alliance relationship.  There are both rewards and risks to this approach 
as a supplemental tool of analysis.  The core benefits of qualitative research are well 
documented, and its tools are uniquely suited to explore organizational phenomena such 
as agent (employee or executive) perceptions and ascribed meanings (Lincoln & Denzin, 
2000; Morgan & Smircich, 1980).  Specifically, the interpretive approach is committed to 
understanding an agent’s own experiences from her/his viewpoint as related to a chosen 
organizational phenomenon (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).  In their article on the stock 
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market’s reaction to brand extension announcements, Lane and Jacobson (1995) 
demonstrated the usefulness of expert interviews to actively qualify their findings for 
industry application.  Here, experts are treated as informed members of the commercial 
sponsorship industry.  As informants, their insights, opinions and interpretations of the 
studies’ findings are solicited to facilitate the explication of industry implications, as well 
as raise potential limitations and future research that is further discussed in the 
concluding chapter.  The interviewing of informants allowed for a degree of personal 
rapport-building between the researcher and the industry expert, which was especially 
important in the context of organizational resource commitments, where the conversation 
could be viewed as being of a confidential nature.  To overcome potential sensitivities, an 
interview setting enabled the researcher to relate to the participants on a personal level, 
thereby establishing as much trust and empathy as possible within the limited interaction 
timeframe (Taylor & Bogdan, 1998).   
Nevertheless, introducing interview data carries with it some risks in the inherent 
assumptions of the method (Seidman, 1991).  In seeking to draw out informants’ 
interpretations of the research findings and investigate agent decisions through 
solicitation of an expert informant’s own conscious descriptions of underlying drivers of 
behavior, an assumption was made that it was possible for an informant to identify and 
convey the reasons for their actions within the industry.  In analyzing this type of data, a 
certain degree of participant-perceived truth is claimed as the researcher sought to build 
an inductive interpretation of the organizational phenomenon.  At this point, it is 
important to explicitly recognize and take steps to mitigate the potential pitfall of 
collecting and disseminating mere cultural assumptions via the interview process 
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(Silverman, 1993).  In other words, data collected in expert interviews is subject to 
several potential biases.  First, the interviewee holds a unique perception of the 
investigated phenomenon from his or her position in the professional and social world.  
This perception may represent reality for the interviewee but not necessarily reality for 
others.  Second, the interview process relies on the accurate and forthright passing of 
these interpretations and perceptions from the interviewee to the researcher.  Where 
experts are embedded in the research context, an insider perspective can be valuable but 
also subject to the bias of professional desirability.  For instance, a sponsoring firm 
executive might be able to offer a nuanced explanation for how a particular promotional 
alliance creates value for his or her firm, but the same executive is also unlikely to admit 
when an alliance fails to achieve value objectives yet permits her to travel the world and 
engage in prestigious entertainment hospitality.  Therefore, even when the embedded 
expert perceives negative implications, they could very well be withheld from the 
researcher because of the professional undesirability projected by such admissions.  This 
likelihood of an agency conflict on the part of the informants must be properly 
acknowledged as a preface to insider interviews.   
In order to overcome such biases where possible, the interviewer must work to 
establish rapport and aim to achieve a level of depth with the expert that moves beyond 
the verbal representation of cultural or social expectations.  To do so here, the author 
recognized the reflexivity of the interview process.  Essentially, the informant and the 
interviewer worked together to produce this supplemental data (King, 2004).  While 
certain assumptions were made on the part of the expert participant (e.g. that he could 
 147 
accurately verbalize the meaning perceived within his role in the industry), there were 
also inherent assumptions brought to the interviews by the researcher. 
In this case, the researcher attempted to approach the interviews from an 
interpretive orientation, attempting to hold back preconceived notions of the experts’ 
potential rationales, feelings, values, and applied meanings (Seidman, 1991).  The aim 
was to create an interview environment where the participant felt encouraged to place 
themselves within the phenomenon and thereby attach meaning to their involvement, 
despite the presence of the researcher facilitating the social interaction.  Still, the 
researcher’s prior work in the industry, view of the interorganizational phenomenon and 
the world in general, and production of the two empirical studies, framed the 
interpretation of interview data and therefore must be properly acknowledged.  When 
seeking a naturalistic understanding of the phenomenon through qualitative data, 
removing the researcher entirely from the environment of her/his data collection is an 
impossibility (King, 2004; Silverman, 1993).  However, by explicitly attempting to 
identify and make known the assumptions inherent in this additional analysis, hopefully 
the value and contribution of the supplemental data will become apparent. 
Following the example set by Lane and Jacobson (1995), five experts engaged in 
high-profile, international promotional alliances were interviewed to ascertain their 
interpretations of the research conducted in this dissertation.  Two informants, Ted and 
Thomas,26 were directly involved in F1 commercial sponsorships through their 
employment as executives in the commercial alliance division of an F1 team.  The three 
other experts interviewed, Fran, Fey and Aaron have each represented major corporations 
                                                 
26
 All personal names used in this chapter are pseudonyms. Ted and Thomas represent the team; Fran and 
Fey represent sponsoring firms; and Aaron represents an agency perspective. 
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in their firms’ negotiations and management of various international promotional 
alliances.  Fran is the Senior Vice President for an international financial institution and 
acts as the Motorsports Platform Executive for all marketing partnerships in that domain.  
Fey served as the Vice President for Marketing at a major sports equipment and apparel 
manufacturer that maintains numerous league, team, and individual athlete sponsorship 
relationships.  Aaron has extensive experience on both sides of the promotional alliance 
relationship, but has most recently worked on behalf of sponsoring firms.  After serving 
as Vice President for Corporate Sponsorships for a US professional basketball team, he 
founded a sports marketing agency in 1998 that has represented numerous sponsoring 
firms such as Pepsi, Blue Cross Blue Shield, Kmart, and Lucent Technologies.  In 
addition, his agency has owned and managed several minor league teams as well as a first 
division football club in the UK.   
In the interviews, the executives raised four topical themes that structure the 
remainder of this chapter.  The first two implications emerged from discussion of the 
findings regarding the survival of entrepreneurial enterprises sponsored by firms seeking 
promotional benefits (Study One).   These two topics were the prioritization and 
usefulness of different alliance resources and the heterogeneous nature of enterprise 
circumstances.  When considering the value implications to the sponsoring firm (Study 
Two), the experts’ insights focused on two final themes: the responsibility and 
mechanisms for justifying these alliances, and the potential asymmetries between the 
markets’ actors and those intimately involved with such interorganizational relationships.   
Before proceeding to these four themes, recall the theoretical framework 
advanced by this dissertation (Chapter 1) converged the conceptions of strategic alliances 
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and commercial sponsorship.  Interestingly, Fran formerly served as the Vice President 
for Strategic Alliances for a major packaged food manufacturer and distributor.   When 
questioned about the title, Fran responded, “Calling us a sponsorship group wasn’t 
something that was valued by our organization.  We look at it more as strategic alliances, 
which includes sponsorships, but is more of a promotional relationship.”27  While 
anecdotal, this initial quote emphasizes well the applicability of the theoretical 
perspective advanced here.  
 
5.2 The Survival of the Sponsored Enterprise  
The interviewees were not generally surprised by the significant relationship 
between certain alliance resources and enterprise survival documented in Study One, 
though Aaron pointed out that interorganizational alliances should be viewed as “just a 
piece of it (survival).  Smaller in some cases; bigger in others.”28  For certain sports 
organizations in particular, Aaron went on to emphasize the importance of attracting an 
audience (ticket sales) and adequately controlling costs (player payroll).   Without a core 
consumer audience, sponsoring firms are unlikely to find the sports enterprise to be an 
attractive promotional alliance partner, and organizational costs are likely to dictate the 
level of resources that need to be accessed through alliance partners.  Therefore, in his 
opinion, accessing resources through alliances should be viewed as an important piece of 
a promotional enterprise puzzle that also includes cultivating an audience and managing 
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 Quotes from Fran throughout this section were taken from an interview conducted on November 4, 2009. 
28
 Quotes from Aaron throughout this section were taken from an interview conducted on October 20, 2009. 
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costs.  Yet, the size of these pieces can vary widely depending on organizational 
circumstances, which is discussed later in this section.  
Overall, the experts representing sponsored enterprises viewed financial resources 
as the most vital in their organizational experiences.  Speaking from his experience on the 
team side of promotional alliances, Aaron was blunt with his assessment of the 
prioritization of various resource types, “You want to get cash but if you can’t, you go 
trade (for services or other resources available).”  Ted justified the preference for 
financial resources at his team by saying, “if we get the cash, we can buy the exact 
resources we need; rather than partner with a company and have to use their resources, 
which may not necessarily be what we want.”29  Thomas elaborated on this same mindset 
when he stated the following:  
“The financial part is a very important component.  The money they 
(sponsoring firms) contribute allows us to develop faster cars and to go 
racing. … We do a vast amount of our own internal manufacturing and car 
development so there is not a huge amount that outside partners can 
contribute to certain areas of the business, and therefore the most valuable 
contribution is often financial because that allows us to ensure that we 
have the best equipment, people, and so forth.”30   
    
Conversely, on the other side of the alliance, Fey emphasized the importance to 
his sponsoring firm of playing a role in the performance of the sponsored enterprise 
beyond just a contribution of financial resources.   
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 Quotes from Ted throughout this section were taken from an interview conducted on October 23, 2009. 
30
 Quotes from Thomas throughout this section were taken from an interview conducted on October 10, 
2009. 
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“It was a huge factor.  The whole strategy was if we’re going to talk the 
talk, we need to walk the walk and we’ve got to be providing high-level 
equipment at every aspect of the [sponsored competition]. If we’re the 
heart-lines producer and sponsor, that doesn’t do us any good unless we’re 
backing it up and having the actual equipment [in competition]. And then 
we have to translate what’s [used by the sponsored enterprise in 
competition] to what’s in the retail environment in order to get that return 
on investment.”31 
 
A potential conflict in the sponsorship relationship arises here, where a sponsored 
enterprise prioritizes one resource type (financial), but sponsoring firms may prefer to 
contribute performance-based resources to the alliance as described by Fey.  In such 
cases, Thomas agreed that a different calculation of alliance resource potential must be 
employed when the non-financial resources, both tangible and intangible, offered by a 
sponsoring firm can substantially impact the sponsored enterprise’s performance.   
“In certain key areas it is quite important.  … I think we would make a 
decision (on resources) based on the quality of what they (sponsoring 
firm) bring perhaps over and above the financial contribution they can 
make.  Our key objective is really to make competitive racing cars and win 
races so anything we can do to achieve that we really will do, and that’s 
obviously to the benefit all our existing partners.  We are not the type of 
organization that makes very short term decisions in that regard.” 
 
                                                 
31
 Quotes from Fey throughout this section were taken from an interview conducted on October 23, 2009. 
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Tangibly, official suppliers “naturally contribute to [the team’s] effort through 
discounts and supply of their products, such as trucks that provide transport to European 
races,” stated Thomas.  Then speaking of the more intangible assets of expertise and 
credibility accessed through sponsoring firms, he concentrated on the example of a global 
management consulting firm that has been aligned with his team for close to a decade.  
This sponsoring firm has provided consultancy work that ranges from “lead 
manufacturing to systems developing to the exploitation of intellectual property 
developed outside of motorsport.”  In Thomas’ estimation, such activities represent a 
“substantial amount of value (for the team) every year.”  Similarly, Ted cited how the 
team’s alliance with a computer and data technology provider had enabled the team to 
run their “computational fluid dynamics data analysis three-times quicker” than before 
the alliance was initiated.  In further expounding on the intangible benefits a sponsoring 
firm can bestow upon an entrepreneurial enterprise, Thomas also described below the 
interorganizational endorsement effect that can occur within an alliance portfolio, which 
was characterized by Stuart and colleagues (1999) and examined through H632 of Study 
One. 
“There is an interesting intangible benefit in building up the partnership 
base that we’ve got – I think it’s up to eight Fortune 500 companies.  That 
makes the [sponsored enterprise’s] internal business-to-business 
environment very attractive to existing partners as well as other partners.  
So the individual partner may put in financial benefits to the [sponsored 
enterprise] but just having them on-board, a company like [a major 
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 While this networking benefit may be important for reasons other than enterprise survival, no support 
was found in Study One’s primary analysis to indicate that network embeddedness reduced the likelihood 
of team dissolution.   
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international telecom firm] lends a huge amount of credibility to what we 
do.  And also provides opportunities for [company B] to go and speak to 
them, or [company C] to go and speak to them and so forth.”    
 
In actuality, the range of resources accessed by sponsored enterprises through this 
manifestation of interorganizational alliances is a function of both “the industry and 
capabilities of particular partner(s),” as raised by Thomas, and the specific resource needs 
of the enterprise.  Despite Aaron’s frank admission of cash as king, he went on to say, “if 
there are other things the sponsor can put into the mix, you add that too.”  Specifically, he 
gave the example of an energy company his agency is pursuing as a potential alliance 
partner for one of his teams because the team is spending US$270,000 a year on energy 
costs.  As Aaron put it, “if we can get US$500,000 for a sponsorship, I’d be happy to take 
US$270,000 of it on trade.”  This example demonstrated the prevailing sentiment from 
the experts speaking on behalf of sponsored enterprises that while different resources 
were in fact accessed by their sponsored enterprises via promotional alliances, in most 
but not all cases, resources other than financial were simply a replacement or 
streamlining of ancillary operational costs.   
In that regard, it is not surprising that operational resources such as the energy 
example given above were not found to be significantly related to enterprise survival in 
Study One.  Yet, alliances offering performance-based resources were robust contributors 
to the survival of sponsored enterprises and were still overshadowed by the interviewees’ 
strong partiality for financial resources.  This overwhelming preference is perhaps not as 
surprising as it first seems given that the sponsored enterprises represented by these 
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experts had each already accumulated a considerable amount of experience in their 
respective sporting context.  When questioned about whether the prioritization of alliance 
resources was contingent upon the experience of the sponsored enterprise, Thomas 
conceded that an entrepreneurial enterprise starting from scratch was indeed likely to 
have a differing view of the value of various resources available to an F1 team through 
alliance relationships.  This admission is in line with the changing reliance on 
performance-based alliances uncovered in Study One, where younger enterprises were 
more dependent on accessing performance resources for survival (SprPer*TmExp in 
Model 4).  It also highlights the second theme that arose from the experts’ comments 
regarding the first study’s research: the heterogeneity of circumstances surrounding 
promotional enterprises. 
Admittedly, an objective of any sample-based researcher is to control for 
extraneous variance between sample members while investigating a specific research 
question.  Still, limitations in data collection, the balance of sample size and breadth, a 
desire for parsimony, and bounded foresight restrict the researcher from accounting for 
all differences between examined organizations.  Due to these inherent boundaries, 
published studies frequently contain admissions of the research limitations and 
suggestions for future research on the topic (as are included in the next chapter of this 
dissertation).  Likewise, part of the value added by bringing industry experts into the 
research process is the contribution of their nuanced expertise in relation to the research 
findings.  Here, in addition to the dynamics of enterprise experience mentioned above, 
experts emphasized the legitimacy of considering varying institutional factors and the 
potential for path dependency.  Specifically, Thomas realized that the samples for the two 
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studies in this research operated within a common institutional structure, but he also 
recognized that F1 was different in many ways from other institutions that support 
promotional alliances.   
In comparing the institutional environment of F1 motor racing to other sporting 
contexts where commercial sponsorship is also widely employed, Thomas indicated that 
less control trickled down to the individual team enterprises.  In F1, the governing body 
(FIA) and commercial rights holder (FOM) dictate much of the competitive structure and 
can make it easier or more difficult for upstart enterprises to survive.  Unlike football 
(soccer), where teams own and control the venue of competition in which fans gather, in 
motor racing the teams compete at independent venues that negotiate a promotional 
relationship with FOM.  Likewise, television and media rights contracts are controlled by 
FOM and not the individual teams.  Because a portion of the resulting revenue is then 
distributed to the teams based on competitive performance, according to Ted, a “vicious 
cycle” develops for access to the financial resources apart from a team’s corporate 
alliances.  As he put it, “competitiveness is necessary to raise funds, …but budget plays a 
part in competitiveness.”  Therefore, the effectiveness of a team’s marketing staff in 
supplementing the budget through corporate alliances becomes one of the primary factors 
influencing an F1 team’s propensity to survive.  If the number of promotional alliances 
that provide a team access to performance and financial resources is considered a proxy 
for the effectiveness of a team’s marketing staff, Study One’s results would empirically 
support Ted’s assessment of the vital role of marketing personnel within an F1 team.   
While neither Ted nor Thomas had the history in F1 to offer detailed personal 
insight as to the institutional shift that seemed to occur in accordance with the adoption of 
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the new Concorde Agreement in 1996; both agreed that the evolving dynamics of F1’s 
governance structure was “highly likely” (Thomas) to influence the teams’ promotional 
alliances.  Furthermore, both went on to suggest that the heterogeneous ownership 
structures within individual teams were also germane to enterprise continuity through the 
path dependence it established (Liebowitz & Margolis, 1995). 
Thomas emphasized the difference in ownership structures as relevant to 
enterprise survival by stating that his team “doesn’t have a sugar daddy,” meaning there 
was “not one sole large partner,” nor a billionaire owner behind an infinite budget.  One 
result of such a structure, according to Thomas, was that the team had to “allocate a high 
level of service to all partners;” thereby implying that each individual corporate partner 
was more vital to his team than they might be at other teams with a single dominant 
‘sugar daddy’ (i.e. a corporate owner or billionaire investor with business interests 
outside of racing).  In referring to these teams without a ‘sugar daddy’ as ‘independent’, 
Ted offered a detailed explanation as to how the ownership differences impacted 
longitudinal enterprise continuity: 
“Increasingly, there were less and less independent teams, so [Team A] 
was until recently one of the few independent teams in F1.  The majority 
of teams are owned by car manufacturers, and then there’s two teams 
owned by Red Bull.  The difference with that structure, with those teams 
and those manufacturers, is that they are very unlikely, unless you are 
Ferrari, to stay in Formula One for 50 years.  So as we’ve seen with 
Honda pulling out of F1; BMW pulling out of F1; Renault was in, then 
out, now back in; and we don’t know how long they’re going to stay in 
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again. So car manufacturers come and go. Once they’ve achieved what 
they want to achieve in their marketing program, they’ll leave.  But [Team 
A] is slightly different in that it (F1) is all we do. We’re a racing team and 
we don’t do anything else other than build Formula One cars so we’ll 
always be in the sport as long as we can rub two pennies together.”   
 
Therefore, the heterogeneous ownership structures supporting the teams within F1 
racing would seem to be a factor in the survival of the entrepreneurial enterprises 
operating in this particular institutional environment.  Although a control variable (Sold) 
was used in Study One to capture changes in ownership, it did not delineate one 
ownership structure from another.  However, the ‘Sold’ variable, which was non-
significant in all models, did allow for some differentiation between a completely new 
startup enterprise and one that was simply the continuation of an existing enterprise under 
new ownership.  Nonetheless, the variance in ownership and concentration of support 
(i.e. ‘sugar daddy’) remains a limitation of the research here that is also addressed in the 
next chapter.  As Thomas put it, “a unique set of factors allows a team to come into 
existence each time a team enters,” and path dependency would suggest that these 
heterogeneous factors impact the team’s propensity to survive (Liebowitz & Margolis, 
1995). 
   
5.3 Influencing the Value of the Sponsoring Firm 
The final two themes emerging from the insights of the executives corresponded 
with the findings of the second study of this dissertation.  First, it was evident from their 
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comments that a burden for justifying these promotional alliances for the sponsoring firm 
was increasingly being felt by both parties to the relationship; and second, a disconnect 
was claimed between the internal and external understanding, and perception, of such 
relationships, perhaps resulting from information asymmetry.  When asked to 
characterize a successful sponsorship alliance, Aaron described a relationship in which 
“both sides win,” but when elaborating further, he focused solely on the need for the 
sponsoring firm to justify the alliance, seemingly taking for granted that the sponsored 
entity had achieved a win.  “When a (sponsoring) company can actually see the benefits 
versus the costs, and justify it, then it makes sense.”    Similarly, Thomas stated, “we 
typically expect partners to receive three-times return on investment just in terms of TV 
exposure, so it’s not an unjustified investment.”  In light of the research findings in this 
dissertation, it is interesting that experts from both sides of promotional alliances focused 
their discussion of justification on the sponsoring firm.  Such a one-sided burden appears 
to be born out in the primary results of this research, where sponsored enterprises reaped 
survival benefits from their corporate alliances, but the promotional relationship was 
potentially detrimental to the shareholder value of the sponsoring firm.  This 
demonstrates the necessity of the alliance for the sponsored enterprise, but calls for an 
explanation for the continued alliance investment on the part of the sponsoring firm. 
All five experts spoke of the importance of collaboration on leveraging activities, 
or activation, as a mechanism to meet this felt burden for justification.  Fran and Fey 
particularly emphasized return on investment (ROI) for their sponsoring firms, which 
Fran explained as follows. 
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“We look at sports that have a middle-tier business opportunity for us.  
When you look at Major League Baseball (MLB), it’s where we have a 
significant banking relationship; be it with the [specific team] and [team 
owner] in financing a new stadium or in refinancing the debt for a league 
like MLB.  We know that we have an underlying business that helps 
generate ROI for the marketing investments.  And then we look at the 
marketing investment and the assets we receive through that investment 
and how that can drive the consumer side of our business; be it through 
our credit card, checking card, checks and all the affinity banking part of 
our business. So we’re not totally reliant on that (B2C) business to 
generate all the ROI for a major sponsorship in a league like the NFL or 
MLB and in motorsports.” 
 Fran’s quote illustrates his firm’s efforts to link their promotional alliance 
engagement with tangible business opportunities on both the commercial and consumer 
dimensions.  However, the financial markets do not seem to recognize, or remain 
skeptical of this internally perceived correlation, which is discussed later in this section.   
Speaking from his firm’s experience, Fey was critical of the sponsored 
enterprises’ capabilities to meet the demand for ROI.  “We tried to justify that (ROI) as 
much as we possibly could.  Where most (sponsored) organizations fell short was in 
providing activation activities that would provide you with a positive return on 
investment.”   This claim seems to indicate that in Fey’s opinion, alliances initiated with 
an identified plan to leverage the relationship would be more likely to add value for the 
sponsoring firm.  Yet, the variable in Study Two that attempted to capture the element of 
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planned activation was non-significant in influencing the markets’ evaluation of F1 
promotional alliances (H4).  With the longest professional experience in commercial 
sponsorship of the five experts, Aaron perceived this collaboration in leveraging the 
alliance as a relatively recent phenomenon.  “For years, teams didn’t care.  Now teams 
need to make sure it works for their sponsors so they can keep them.”  To encourage 
leveraging activities, Ted’s team customizes their promotional service for each 
sponsoring firm.   
“There are different ways of a partner exploiting the parts depending on 
what sort of company they are.  Some of our partners are what we would 
classify as B2B partners, in that they really don’t have a consumer 
element…their package is very different from someone like [company B] 
which is a consumer product.  So, if we focus on companies like 
[company A], it’s all about B2B access; so the VIP hospitality, the money 
can’t buy experiences, access behind the scenes with their VIPs to meet 
the drivers, etc.  The likes of [company B], because they’re more 
consumer focused, they leverage it heavily across all marketing platforms: 
internet, television advertising, print advertising, in-store imagery, photos 
of drivers next to a [company B product] encouraging you to buy the 
[product], and radio.  Literally, the whole gamete of their marketing 
portfolio they would use our imagery and the F1 program.”     
 
Still, whether and how this customized activation activity ultimately results in the 
payoff of future cash flows for the sponsoring firm remains debatable by both financial 
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market actors and researchers, who have recently suggested that marketing capabilities 
contribute to firm value through a two-step process (Ramaswami, Bhargava, & 
Srivastava, 2009).  First, the marketing resources and capabilities must impact 
performance in a market-facing process like new product development or customer 
management.  Then, only after this initial impact has been achieved, will financial 
performance result.  In the case of leveraging promotional alliances, it may therefore be 
necessary for the planned activation to be substantiated through more tangible 
marketplace outcomes before the financial markets recognize a positive influence.   
The prerequisite of the first step in the process is borne out in Study Two, where 
despite ex-ante claims of specialized collaboration to meet a particular sponsoring firm’s 
objectives, investors punished firms engaging in these international promotional 
alliances.  Furthermore, identifying a leveraging plan in the announcement did not 
significantly affect the negative result.  The two-step theory described above would 
suggest this occurs because investors first require some evidence of the alliance’s 
effectiveness in terms of marketplace impact (i.e. customer development, retention, 
expansion, etc.).  Financial market actors are likely to recognize the agency bias inherent 
in a sponsoring firm’s announcement of a promotional alliance and the prognosticated 
ROI touted due to planned leveraging activities.  While the firm’s agents may be acting in 
what they perceive as the best interest of the firm in initiating an alliance, investors also 
realize good intensions do not always parlay into financial results.  Additionally, a 
personal interest is intrinsic to many sponsorship arrangements that include lavish 
corporate hospitality and entertainment, which can raise suspicion of an agent’s true 
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motives.  Unfortunately, capturing such an agency conflict as a control variable in 
quantitative analysis proves elusive, as was discussed in Chapter Four (Section 4.7). 
The practitioners from sponsored enterprises viewed the markets’ skepticism of 
these promotional alliances as disappointing, but attributable to an asymmetry in the 
understanding of global promotional alliances.  As Thomas stated, “I thought it (Study 
Two) would be analogous to NASCAR (referring to Pruitt et al., 2004) and show positive 
effects because the market understands the investment.  …(But apparently, the) market 
doesn’t have enough information to understand the implications of Formula One 
sponsorship.”   Specifically, he pointed to the finding that aligning with a nationally 
congruent team increased a sponsoring firm’s odds of a negative return.  “There might be 
an expectation that when a sponsorship is announced in local marketing from a local 
company, (investors think) ‘hang on a second, why are you spending so much money on 
marketing when Formula One’s presence in this country is one race a year or we don’t 
even have a race?’ …and (local investors) don’t see it as contributing significant value.”  
However, he reasoned that aligning with a nationally incongruent team signaled to the 
market that the sponsoring firm was utilizing the promotional resources of F1 because of 
the “footprint opportunity it provides around the globe,” and not solely for a myopic 
presence in the local market.  Essentially, Thomas’ argument rests on his perception of 
imperfect information in the markets and a reliance on signaling cues that lead to 
inefficiently in evaluating the likelihood of future cash flows.   
When considering the contrasting result to Pruitt et al.’s study (2004) executed in 
NASCAR, Fran offered a slightly different explanation.   
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“I think in NASCAR for a long time, it was recognized in the business 
community that NASCAR really is a smart investment.  You can generally 
get good deals in NASCAR that do provide value.  It would be interesting 
to do that same study today.  I think that the price of a NASCAR 
sponsorship caught up to the market a little bit.  And I don’t know if that’s 
recognized, but my guess is that it is by the investment community.  You 
might not have the same reaction to the announcement of a NASCAR deal 
today that you did five-plus years ago.  …In the case of F1, it’s just the 
sheer size of a sponsorship.  In F1, you know it’s going to be a drain on 
your marketing resources.  …If you’re going to be a real player in F1, 
you’re going to spend $20 million.  …Anybody that looks at that is going 
to question, ‘Are they getting a little a drunk with their success and 
throwing money around?’”   
 
Fran’s assessment of the outside perception of F1 alliances accurately matches the 
relationship uncovered in Study Two, where the magnitude of investment contributed to 
the likelihood of negative shareholder returns.  Through this relationship, investors 
appear to concur that value is more elusive as affiliated costs rise.  On this point, Ted 
agreed there may be a sticker-shock effect to F1 promotional announcements, but by 
citing an example, he elaborated on how in his opinion, this negative reaction is 
ultimately still driven by a misunderstanding or value underestimation of stakeholders 
external to the alliance. 
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“Generally, I would guess that the perception of a Formula One deal is 
extraordinarily expensive because the vast majority of people don’t 
understand the value that a company gets out of the relationship.  So, if for 
example a major piece of branding goes on the car, the analysts might look 
at it and say ‘Whoa, that’s 10 million pounds (£) per year, and over the 
next five years that’s 50 million.’…But what they don’t see is the brand 
value that it adds and also the business opportunities it provides and I’ll 
give you a very specific example.  [Company A] is our partner and when 
they joined us they wanted to do business within F1, and we said ‘OK 
we’ll introduce you to all of our partners so there may be some 
efficiencies we can add to your business.’  So we introduced them to 
[company B].  [Company B] will look to do some work with them to 
increase their efficiency in their communications platforms, but more 
importantly and very demonstrable was the introduction we made for them 
to meet with [company C].  Now [company C] are not a sponsor of ours 
but of [another F1 team].  …After that introduction, [company A] then did 
a presentation to the [company C] board.  We set up the meeting. We set 
up the opportunity to meet with the [company C] board because we knew 
their CEO very well.  And after that, [company A] got a global supply deal 
with [company C] to supply 400 new hotels that [company C] are building 
with [company A] televisions, [company A] irons, [company A] kettles, 
etc., etc.  So it was somewhere in the region of 100 million dollars worth 
of business.  That is something that most analysts would never know 
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about. They would just see the bottom line figure of a marketing spend 
and not see the benefits come back in the other way.”   
 
As this example describes, there may be a degree of asymmetry in the information 
available to financial market actors and the insiders involved with initiating and 
managing an alliance.  Thomas and Ted both characterized internal alliance evaluation 
metrics used by their team’s sponsoring firms.  According to Ted, ‘company A’ in his 
example above tracks a net promoter score that indicates how likely a respondent might 
be to recommend ‘company A’ to a friend.  Company A’s research has allegedly linked a 
consistent rise in their net promoter score to their F1 alliance activation.  Similarly, when 
discussing a different partner’s proprietary brand building metric, Thomas said, 
“[company D] for example has done quite a bit of work on that in the last few years and 
the relationship with Formula One shows a major shift there.  So we’re very confident 
internally about the value it contributes; which means we disagree with the market or 
disagree with the lack of knowledge in the market.”  However, the imperfect information 
rationale for negative returns, which seems to be at the core of the argument made by 
these team executives, is subject to several counterarguments.    
First, proprietary information is not a novelty in the financial markets relating 
exclusively to F1 alliances.  Insider trading regulation is based on the realization that 
certain internal constituents will be privy to information not readily available to the 
markets (Chiang & Venkatesh, 1988); yet financial markets are still generally considered 
efficient in their setting of security prices.  Recall for instance that the markets reflected 
negatively on the magnitude of F1 alliance commitment despite the fact that frequently 
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no specific numbers quantifying the commitment levels were released in public press 
reports.  Still, market actors seemed to either acquire the information via other channels 
or construct a reasonable approximation of the commitment based on other signals.  
Second, if the information described by Ted and Thomas is indeed unknown by market 
actors, the question of whether the additional alliance information would in fact influence 
the assessment of a sponsoring firm’s value remains untested.  At best, the newly 
publicized information may be interpreted as predictive of incremental future cash flows 
and therefore warrant an increase in firm value, but the information might just as well be 
disregarded if actors are unable to decode a substantial link to firm value (Ramaswami et 
al., 2009).   
Zuckerman (1999) suggested corporate actions can often be dismissed when 
market actors are unable to quickly categorize firm information due to a deficiency of 
comparison basis.  Therefore, if investors and analysts are unaware of how to categorize 
F1 promotional alliances and lack the capacity to judge their value against other 
promotional initiatives (an opportunity cost to the alliance), the actor is likely to 
downgrade or ignore the alliance.  Theoretically, for supplementary information to better 
inform this evaluation and improve the markets’ perceived efficiency, the provided data 
would need to conform to a category or format readily recognized by financial market 
actors.  Ted rationalized why such information might be slow to disseminate in the wider 
marketplace.  
“Sometimes unfortunately our partners are reluctant to give out too much 
data on their sponsorships because they feel it’s proprietary data, and also 
they don’t want to come back to us and go ‘this program’s brilliant’ 
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because they’re worried we’re going to increase the price.  So in some 
respects, we’re sort of a devil to ourselves because they’re getting great 
value but they don’t necessary want to admit that.  They’re worried, as I 
said, that we might say ‘OK, well it’s worth a bit more than we asked for 
in the first place.’”   
 
This sentiment of an ongoing disconnect in both evaluation and understanding 
between those involved directly with these promotional alliances and the investors who 
analyze the relationships in the financial markets was generally shared by Fran and Fey 
from the sponsoring firm’s perspective.    However, contrary to the initial reaction of the 
team executives, Fey was not surprised by the shareholders’ reaction to these promotional 
alliances.   
“What jumped out at me was ‘yea, no kidding.’ The markets don’t like 
anything except for something that’s objectively, quantifiably going to 
deliver greater profits. … Most of the population thinks that marketing is 
very illogical and not very quantifiable.  And there’s a lot of 
misunderstanding about what marketing and sports marketing is all about.  
So that’s part of it.  The other part of it is ‘yea, some of this is true.’ What 
is the true value of sponsorship?  What is the true value of naming rights? 
If Wall Street can’t put their finger on an exact number, they’re not going 
to celebrate a sponsorship announcement.  They don’t like spending 
money; they like making money.  So that result didn’t surprise me at all.”    
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Essentially, Fey is lamenting Wall Street’s treatment of marketing initiatives as 
expenses rather than investments.  He believes that, similar to the two-step process 
proposed by Ramaswami et al. (2009) and described earlier in this section, the markets 
will hold this line until the promotional initiative can be substantiated quantitatively.  
Pending such substantiation through a market-recognized metric, promotional alliances 
will continue to be categorized inaccurately according to Fey.  Again, this conception 
falls in line with the imperative of categorization for favorable market treatment 
(Zuckerman, 1999).  Likewise, Fran acknowledged the increasing need to educate 
external stakeholders and begin to close the information gap by providing some ROI 
numbers.  
“We had to explain that what you’re seeing is a credit card and deposits 
program but there’s a significant portion of our ROI that is below the line; 
so you’re not going to see that.  We’re not going to show you all our 
numbers but we’ll say that for every dollar we spend in sports we have ten 
dollars in revenue and three dollars in EBIT (earnings before interest and 
taxes).  It’s a good business for us.”   
 
Nevertheless, until sponsoring firms are willing to be more transparent and show 
the numbers that connect the promotional alliance to revenue and EBIT, the markets 
appear unlikely to take an agent’s claim at face value.  Without a quantified basis for 
comparison that warrants categorizing these promotional alliances as an investment, 
market actors cast them as expenses.   
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Upon further reflection, Thomas rationalized the disconnect between promotional 
alliance insiders and the evaluating investors to go beyond just informational asymmetry 
and include a time dimension as well.  According to him, insiders not only have more 
extensive information regarding the performance of these alliances, but also a potentially 
differing perspective in regards to an alliance investment’s payoff period.   
“Is this going to generate additional income for this company?  Is it going 
to build their brand long term?  I think it depends on which sort of investor 
you are talking about.  Are they looking to flip the stock in 6 months at 
which time the effects of this sort of long-term brand building exercise, as 
is the case with us and [sponsoring financial firm], then it’s largely 
irrelevant to them (i.e. short-term investor) and actually detrimental 
because it’s an additional cost in the first year with relief much later on.  
So whether or not their analysis of value is that sophisticated, I think will 
depend on the individual investor but I think for some of them that would 
be the calculus they weigh for the investment.”  
 
The imposition of a short-term versus long-term dilemma was not lost on Fey 
either.  As a sponsoring firm executive, he conveyed strong convictions when addressing 
this potential conflict between investors’ immediate interests and the business horizon 
ahead.   
“You do what’s right for the business. You don’t do what’s right for the 
stock price.  If you fundamentally believe that this is what’s going to 
drive the business forward, then as a management team or as an 
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individual executive you need to make the right decisions for that.  
Justifying the spend is a whole different question.  …It (speaking of a 
specific eight-year, US$125 million commercial sponsorship he 
negotiated on behalf of his sponsoring firm) was hard to justify it from a 
dollars and cents standpoint, but it was harder to justify for the long-term 
viability of the business if we didn’t do it.  …You can’t run your 
business by worrying about what the stock price is going to do or what 
Wall Street is going to think because if you do that, then you’ll be a slave 
to what Wall Street will be thinking.  You won’t effectively run your 
business because Wall Street doesn’t know about running businesses, it 
knows about running numbers.”   
 
While these comments by Thomas and Fey retain some face validity, according to 
the theory of efficient capital markets (Fama, 1970), the share value of a security should 
reflect the estimated discounted future cash flows of the firm.  As a result, if investors 
anticipate a future payoff of an alliance investment, it would be absorbed into the share 
price when the markets initially became aware of the alliance.  Theoretically therefore, it 
should not matter if an investor planned to hold the stock until a payoff from the alliance 
actually occurs because the anticipated time-discounted payoff would already be 
incorporated into the current market value.   
If, as the experts’ collective comments have suggested in this chapter, sponsored 
enterprises and their sponsoring firms do collaborate in best practices to produce alliance 
mechanisms to justify ROI for the sponsoring firm; yet the full information yielded by 
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such practices is deemed proprietary and thereby facilitates an asymmetry in the broader 
marketplace, what can be done to rectify the markets’ treatment of promotional alliances 
as expenses instead of corporate investments?  This closing question arises from the 
industry experts’ interpretations of Study Two’s results and is imperative to the future 
evolution and evaluation of these alliance relationships.  Given the reliance of the 
sponsored enterprise on such relationships for survival, as demonstrated in Study One, 
the continuity of the promotional alliance system should be of utmost concern to these 
enterprises.  The financial markets’ negative reaction to F1 commercial sponsorship 
threatens the sustainability of the alliance system if the “misunderstanding” and 
asymmetric view is not broached.    Ted addressed this difficult challenge for the 
sponsored enterprise.  
“Clearly from our perspective we want as many people as possible to 
know about the good work we do for our partners. And I think the 
companies we’ve got as partners, [names a couple of the Fortune 500 
firms that align with this team], they’re not stupid.  They’re very 
experienced marketers.  They’ve got a lot of knowledge and research to 
tell them what programs to support.  …What we try to do is encourage our 
partners to talk about their successes.  To share research they have to 
demonstrate the success of the program.  And to enter awards, sponsor 
awards programs, so they can win ‘X’ sponsor of the year….  Because in 
those awards you have to give very tangible results on the business effect, 
the brand effect, within the sponsorship.”   
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On the other side of the alliance, the sponsoring firm has to contemplate the 
potential loss in value from a first-person perspective.  Their own shareholders are 
bearing the risk in potentially lost value while judging the contribution of these alliances 
to future returns.  As a result, Fey emphasized the importance of persuasive 
communication with these shareholders when announcing promotional alliances.   
“(You) make a decision and you stand by the decision. …You scream it 
from the rooftops.  You make it sound like the best thing that’s ever 
happened.  It’s like any marketing program that you do.  You’re trying to 
influence the greatest number of people at any one given time. Never do I 
think it should be signing a deal that you’re your not proud to announce in 
the loudest possible manner.” 
  
Interestingly, this assertion is contrary to the possibility put forward in the 
discussion section (4.7) of Study Two, where in supplemental analysis it was determined 
that over half of the alliances in the sample failed to generate any discernable press 
coverage in the world’s major publications33.   In light of such a finding, it was suggested 
that perhaps sponsoring firms were attempting to minimize their publicity at the outset of 
these promotional alliances because of the connotation of the costs involved.  Fran 
indicated that his firm fell more in line with this measured approach.   
“There’s a lot more discussion about how its positioned and how we 
announce it.  At one point we would have been much more aggressive 
with pumping our fists and saying ‘hey, we got a great deal done.’ Today 
we’re going to take a much more restrained approach to it.  That doesn’t 
                                                 
33
 As determined through a search of Lexis Nexis’ Major World Publications database.   
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mean we turn that business down, because we still believe its good 
business.  We just have to take a different approach to how we’re 
involved.” 
 
Such a deliberative approach may be considered prudent given that the magnitude 
of the costs associated with these high-profile promotional alliances, though typically 
unannounced, was shown to be significantly related to the likelihood of realizing negative 
abnormal stock returns.   Nevertheless, the experts seem to agree that completely 
avoiding the markets’ pessimistic perception is not a constructive approach to alleviating 
the conundrum presented by investors’ disapproving perceptions.   
The industry experts concurred that Study Two highlighted empirically a 
disconnect that exists between the internal and external parties to these promotional 
alliances.  Given the results of the study, the interviewees asserted that while justification 
in terms of ROI is improving between the internal parties to the alliances, this 
information is not sufficiently reaching relevant external stakeholders.  As discussed 
within this chapter, another potential contingency is the accurate interpretation and 
categorization of the information once it does reach actors in the financial markets.  
Industry executives may be wise to develop ROI metrics that are comparable to those 
already recognized by the markets.  Thus far, a barrier to improved communication 
outside the alliance has been the competitive ramification of the release of more data both 
in terms of alliance renegotiation and competitor intelligence.  Nonetheless, informants 
agreed that overcoming these obstacles is increasingly necessary when the value of the 
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sponsoring firm and the continuity of the promotional alliance system are at stake, as 
evidenced by the collective findings of this research.   
While the experts’ rationalizations of the studies’ results are informative in 
detailing an industry perspective, it is important in concluding this chapter to recall some 
of the assumptions and limitations to presenting insiders’ claimed reality.  The 
interviewees engaged here all relied on promotional alliances as the basis for their 
careers.  Consequently, each informant was subject to the norms of professional 
desirability inherent to the sponsorship industry.  For example, the possibility remains 
that financial market actors are generally aware of the internal information the experts 
claim as proprietary, just as investors seemed to ascertain the magnitude of alliance 
investment despite its omission from public announcements.  In which case, the financial 
markets are evaluating these promotional alliances as detrimental to firm value even after 
weighing potential internal metrics, such as net promoter score, against the assumed 
costs.  However, even if the experts here perceived this possibility, they held a personal 
incentive as well as a sponsorship industry expectation to rationalize the markets’ 
negative reaction in a manner that does not dismiss the alliances as unnecessary.   
Conversely, where the interviewee was an agent of the sponsoring firm, they also 
held a duty to their company and shareholders to act in the best interest of the firm.  Here 
an agency conflict can easily arise and must be acknowledged when contemplating their 
offered insights.  Yet hopefully, the risks of introducing the qualitative elements of this 
chapter are outweighed by the rewards of actual practitioner involvement in assessing 
industry implications.  By engaging field experts as informants, the applied interpretation 
offers more than researcher speculation and allows for the consideration of these human 
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biases in combination with purported rationales, potential limitations, and future 
directions that draw upon professional experiences beyond that of the researcher.     
The final chapter of this dissertation pulls together the design and results of the 
two studies, the context of the investigations, and the insights of the industry experts to 
address the research contributions and limitations to a further extent.   First, the 
conceptual contribution made by this work is reviewed, followed by several empirical 
and theoretical implications resulting from the two studies.  To close the body of the 
dissertation, the limitations of the endeavor are acknowledged and future research 
recommended.   
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Research Contribution  
This dissertation set out to investigate interorganizational alliances based on the 
exchange of a promotional resource.  The theoretical underpinnings of strategic alliances 
and commercial sponsorship were reviewed and compared in Chapter One, where the 
concept of an interorganizational exchange relationship based on satisfying competitive 
resource needs was highlighted as central to the themes explored by each research stream.  
While already common in sponsorship industry circles (“One-on-one,” 2005; Walt 
Disney World Public Affairs, 2007), the term “alliance” has recently crept into 
sponsorship research to describe the bilateral relationship between organizations engaged 
in this promotionally-based association (Farrelly & Quester, 2005a).   To appropriately 
designate the confluence of these ideas, the term ‘promotional alliance’ was coined as a 
strategic alliance based on resource exchange between a promoting enterprise and a firm 
seeking to fulfill promotion-based objectives through an ongoing collaboration with the 
enterprise.  Conceptually, this designation represents a research contribution by 
establishing common ground between the strategic alliance and commercial sponsorship 
literature. 
While numerous similarities between strategic alliances and commercial 
sponsorship are evident in the research overview presented in Table A.1, a few 
differences arise that differentiate the two concepts and spell out the middle ground of 
promotional alliances.  The idea of a strategic alliance encompasses the search for a 
competitive advantage and in that regard is more strategy-oriented than the generic 
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conception of a commercial sponsorship, which is characterized simply as assistance 
offered to an activity for commercial purposes (Meenaghan, 1983) or the right to 
associate with the activity (Cornwell & Maignan, 1998).  Yet, strategic alliances subsume 
a much broader range of exchanged resources and means to achieve the desired 
competitive advantage (see ‘Purpose’ section of Table A.1); as well as several structural 
manifestations not common to commercial sponsorship, which is typically limited to a 
unilateral or bilateral contract-based structure (Das & Teng, 2000).  By conceptualizing a 
promotion-based subset of strategic alliances, sponsorship relationships based on 
collaborative resource exchange and competitive advantage join several other types of 
marketing-oriented interorganizational relationships (e.g. co-op advertising, licensing, 
and brand extensions) that also have the potential to meet such criteria.  Approaching 
these phenomena as promotional alliances support the emerging resource-based view of 
commercial sponsorship (Amis et al., 1997; Fahy et al., 2004), while also reducing the 
academic silos that discourage cross-functional research (AACSB International, 2008), 
and better reflecting the industry trend toward strategic collaboration (“One-on-one,” 
2005).   
In the chapters that followed this conceptual contribution, two empirical studies 
were completed that evaluated the utility of promotional alliances from each side of the 
relationship.  For the sponsored enterprise, the usefulness of promotional alliances as a 
means of accessing resources that contribute to survival was empirically documented in 
Study One.  Study Two employed shareholder value as a measure of the anticipated 
contribution of promotional alliances to the sponsoring firm’s future cash flows.   
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Beginning with the first study, the research contribution emanates from the 
longitudinal association between entrepreneurial enterprise survival and resource access 
via alliances.  While several case studies have examined this relationship (Bergmann 
Lichtenstein & Brush, 2001; Brush et al., 2001), studies with larger samples have tended 
to focus on organizational performance metrics (Baum et al., 2000) or the dissolution of 
the alliance (Blodgett, 1992; Baker & Faulkner, 1998), and not necessarily dissolution of 
the enterprise itself.  By utilizing a sport competition setting, the study embarked upon 
here was able to control for firm performance and evaluate the impact of alliance 
resources on enterprise continuity.  Though Baum and Oliver (1991) established an 
association between organizational survival and institutional linkages in the childcare 
industry, the current study migrated to a more business-to-business context and 
distinguished between the resource types available to a promotion-based enterprise.  This 
progression in organizational research design is particularly important given the 
expansion of the resource-based view (Auh & Menguc, 2009) and Grant’s (1991) theory 
of the heterogeneous rent-earning potentials of various organizational resource 
categories. 
The development of the resource-based view of the firm refocused the search for 
a competitive advantage from external industry factors to internal organizational 
resources (Barney, 1995).  Since that time, scholars have migrated back toward the 
middle ground where external elements such as institutional norms, regulations and 
governance, and even other firms can impose limits, offer provisions, or present access to 
useful resources (Auh & Menguc, 2009; Madhok & Tallman, 1998).  The latter of these 
suggestions framed the context of Study One, where entrepreneurial enterprises in a 
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common institutional environment have turned to promotional alliances as an 
interorganizational mechanism for resource acquisition and utilization.  The results of this 
study empirically demonstrated the vital role interorganizational alliances play in 
facilitating the resource access necessary for entrepreneurial enterprise survival.  In the 
organizational research domain, implications arise from this study’s findings in three 
interwoven areas.   
First, though an enterprise’s offerings in a network of interorganizational alliances 
may be consistent (i.e. promotional services), the reciprocal resources accessed are not 
necessarily equivalent and their impact on enterprise outcomes may differ.   By accessing 
either performance or financial resources through promotional alliances, entrepreneurial 
enterprises in this environment were able to reduce their odds of dissolution by over 40 
percent.  However, alliances offering operational resources had no effect on the 
enterprise’s propensity to survive.  Therefore, further research in this area should be 
mindful of not only the heterogeneity of alliance resources, but also the utility of resource 
categorization based on their strategic application in the relevant institutional 
environment.  This argument corresponds with Skilton’s recent claim that dividing 
resources as knowledge-based or property-based (Miller & Shamsie, 1996) is too broad 
and should be “supplemented by an understanding of the functions of different resources 
in a production system” (Skilton, 2009, p. 840).  In this study, alliances based on 
performance resources consisted primarily of those offered by automotive, aerospace, and 
high technology firms; and these alliances maintained a robust impact on race team 
survival through various analyses.  This nature of categorization and subsequent finding 
substantiates a comprehensive resource-based view that recognizes resource value is 
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contingent on contextual deployment (Slotegraaf et al., 2003).  At the same time, 
institutional forces often change the competitive environment and in doing so, influence 
the resource dependency of the enterprises within the relevant context (Auh & Menguc, 
2009; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).     
The potential impact of an institutional force was also raised in this study and the 
resulting analysis informs a second research implication.  Within the study’s Formula 
One context, evidence of a major alteration in institutional governance emerged in 1996, 
when the flow of financial resources from the regulatory institution (FIA) was disrupted, 
thereby precipitating a rapid proliferation of promotional alliances to fill the void.  
However, instead of becoming more influential in staving off dissolution, alliances based 
on financial resources became less vital to enterprise survival to the point where 
additional alliances actually increased the odds of dissolution.  Such a drastic reversal in 
alliance resource utility emphasizes the peril in neglecting dynamic institutional forces 
present within an investigative context (Miller & Shamsie, 1996).  Though many 
interorganizational studies do not take a longitudinal approach, recognition of the 
institutional conditions and their influence on the current reality as well as their potential 
for change is a necessary contemplation toward relevance (Koza & Lewin, 1998).  
Failure to consider the institutional dynamics within this particular case would have not 
only overlooked the changing influence of financially-based alliances, but also left 
hidden the possibility for diminishing returns.  The increasing quantities of alliance 
relationships compiled in the era after 1995 revealed support for a diminishing returns 
effect on enterprise survival, which offers a third implication to this study’s research. 
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Strategic alliance theory suggests that enterprises possess an alliance management 
capability (Ireland et al., 2002).  Recently, the potential for this capability to be strained 
to varying degrees by different types of alliances has been explored in high technology 
ventures (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).  The first study of this dissertation offers initial 
evidence in a promotional context to support this emerging theory.  Not only did financial 
alliances reverse their effect at higher magnitudes (seen after 1995) to become a positive 
influence on enterprise dissolution, but an empirical model incorporating quadratic 
alliance terms (Model 6 in Table A.5) also demonstrated significant diminishing returns 
of both financial and performance alliances.  This finding agrees with the notion that 
alliance management capabilities are bounded.  Though Deeds and Hill (1996) uncovered 
a similar effect when examining the influence of alliances on rates of new product 
development, the idea of diminishing returns to alliance engagement has yet to be widely 
adopted in interorganizational research (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2006).  At the very least, 
studies quantifying alliance propensity as related to enterprise performance should 
consider curvilinear possibilities.  Yet, more detailed research into alliance management 
capabilities and potential institutional restrictions is needed to better explicate the factors 
behind this effect.  The evidence offered for its existence in this first study, in 
combination with the dynamic impact raised by institutional forces and the varying 
influence on survival of different alliance categories discussed above, composed three 
distinct implications for ongoing research in this vein.  
The second study of this dissertation extended and challenged previous research 
on the value of promotional alliances to a sponsoring firm.  By moving to an international 
context, the investigation broached the neglected research topic of nationality congruence 
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between promotional alliance partners.  The study also produced evidence contrary to the 
positive value influences suggested by past literature, and offered a methodological 
challenge to the previous use of non-significant estimated abnormal returns as a 
continuous dependant variable in multiple regression analysis.   
The vast majority of published research that evaluated the implications of 
promotional alliance announcements on the shareholder value of sponsoring firms 
claimed a positive and statistically significant, cross-sectional effect (Clark et al., 2002; 
Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2005; Mishra et al., 1997; Miyazaki & Morgan, 2001; Pruitt et al., 
2004).  Nevertheless, recent research has begun to question the actual value accrued by 
an average (or median) firm within these studies (Leeds et al., 2007), and this 
investigation now joins one smaller-scale study that suggests a negative return may be 
more likely for sponsoring firms in certain cases (Farrell & Frame, 1997).  Identifying 
what qualities these negative cases share is the sequential step in this line of research, and 
work to date has implied only the theory of an agency conflict as a potential explanation 
for negative returns (Farrell & Frame, 1997; Pruitt, et al., 2004).  The second study 
completed in this dissertation not only contributes evidence of other influentially negative 
elements (alliance nationality congruence and investment), but also questions the method 
by which such assessments should be undertaken.   
Once the abnormal returns have been estimated within a designated event window 
for a sample of sponsoring firms, past research has employed these estimations as a 
predicted variable in a multiple regression analysis (Clark et al., 2002; Cornwell, Pruitt et 
al., 2005; Farrell & Frame, 1997; Mishra et al., 1997; Pruitt et al., 2004).  However, 
within this dissertation it is argued that utilizing the magnitudes of estimated statistics not 
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demonstrated to be statistically different from zero is inappropriate.  In analyzing a 
sample of naming rights sponsorships at the firm level, Leeds et al. (2007) point out the 
danger of outlier influence in making cross-sectional judgments.  Heeding this caution, a 
firm level analysis of this study’s sample of 70 sponsoring firms reveals only seven 
cumulative abnormal returns to be significantly different from zero at the firm level (p < 
.10).  Such a finding suggests that the returns of all other firms in the sample may in fact 
be zero, and their model estimated magnitudes are therefore unreliable as a predicted 
outcome variable.  To compensate for this statistical constraint, logistic regression is 
suggested in this work as the most appropriate method for addressing the research 
question of what alliance characteristics impact the realization of abnormal returns.  
While logistic regression limits the researcher to a binary outcome, by designating 
between firms realizing statistically significant abnormal returns and those experiencing a 
negligible impact, a more accurate assessment of the influential alliance factors can be 
discerned.  
In regard to Study Two’s results, the negative cross-sectional finding reinforces 
the need for continued research into the value implications of promotional alliances.  
While event studies serve as just one method to investigate the value proposition of these 
relationships, a clear mandate within this particular line of research has yet to immerge 
across studies.  Momentum in recent years, as gauged by published research, seemed to 
be leaning toward added shareholder value for sponsoring firms engaged in promotional 
alliances.  However, the findings in the international setting of this study have clearly 
contradicted any claim of added shareholder value.  Therefore, researchers committed to 
this domain of investigation must be increasingly open to the prospect of negative 
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influences to value realization.  Specifically, nationality congruence within the alliance in 
this international context was found to negatively influence value.  Also contributing to 
the likelihood of negative returns was the magnitude of the alliance investment by the 
sponsoring firm.  As it impacts continuing research, this finding confirms that actors in 
the equity markets have access to, or make accurate judgments of, the magnitude of 
resource commitments beyond the information publicly announced.  Therefore, when 
possible, researchers should not limit their purview to alliance characteristics assumed to 
be publicly available.  Further consideration is given to this directive and the 
aforementioned research implications in suggesting future research below.   
6.2 Limitations 
Even without the confines of journal publication guidelines, no dissertation 
research is devoid of limitations.  The limitations to the research presented here can be 
categorized by data, methodology, and context.  First, the data used in these analyses 
were quite extensive in terms of quantity and comprehensiveness.  Amongst other data, 
over five thousand alliance years spanning 41 calendar years were analyzed in Study One 
and 301 days of stock returns for 73 alliances were carefully compiled for the modeling 
of Study Two.  Yet, certain restrictions in data collection must be acknowledged.   
When evaluating the impact on enterprise survival of promotional alliances 
offering various resources (Study One), a weighting of each alliance by the quantity of 
resources exchanged would be a more accurate measure of each alliance’s meaning.  
Instead, because of the longitudinal nature of the dataset, a count of the alliances that 
offered a certain designation of resource (i.e. performance, financial, or operational) to 
the sponsored enterprise had to be sufficient.  The scope of conclusions that can be drawn 
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from the analysis is confined by this research compromise since some alliances may 
actually contribute much more in terms of resources than other alliances.  This was 
highlighted in the View from the Field section (5.2) when an executive referred to the 
influence on survival of a “sugar daddy.”  In this instance, he was speaking of two 
possibilities: either, 1) a dominant alliance partner that provided a majority of resources, 
or 2) a wealthy owner supporting the team through financial resources generated via 
other business involvements.  Because longitudinal data on either of these two 
circumstances was unavailable, and likely to be non-existent for a four-decade span, 
alliances were identified by resource category and not by the magnitude of resource 
contribution, and ownership structure was not considered beyond the ‘sold’ control 
variable in this dissertation.   
In categorizing alliances into distinct resource groups, some assumptions also had 
to be made on the part of the researchers (author and other independent coder).  Given 
that the actual resources exchanged in the over 5,000 alliances during 41 years was 
unknown, the researchers used press reports and conversations with experts to compose a 
guide of industry relatedness to F1 racing.  Then alliances with sponsoring firms in 
particular industries were assumed to offer a certain resource designation, which matched 
the evidence suggested in media reports and by industry experts.  Nevertheless, it should 
be acknowledged that many of the alliances undertaken during this longitudinal time span 
likely offered the team multiple resources.  Specifically, most recent alliances involve an 
exchange of financial resources (collected by the team) even when other resources are 
also provided to the team as well (Black book Formula One, 2007).  While this does not 
necessarily change the focus of the alliance as it relates to F1 competition, which is the 
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basis of the study’s research, it does add a dynamic to the finding of diminishing returns 
to alliances based on financial resources.  In other words, if appropriate data was 
available, a valid question for future research would be if returns to financial alliances are 
diminishing because the financial resources necessary for survival are being accessed 
through alliances that also offer performance and/or operational resources. 
In Study Two, the largest data limitation was the restrictions to the sample size.  
Although 73 promotional alliances represent a respectable sample size when compared to 
other event studies (see Table A.6), it only includes about 28 percent of the 261 F1 
promotional alliances active in 2007.  This data limitation is bounded by publicly-traded 
firms with an identifiable announcement date, which is a function of the use of the event 
study methodology to evaluate the construct of value.  Arguably, the value of a 
promotional alliance is not limited to its direct influence on stock price.  An array of 
rationales for alliance engagement have been suggested in the literature (see ‘Purpose’ 
section of Table A.1), and it is possible that by achieving one or more of these purposes, 
a promotional alliance could indirectly add value to the firm.  However, if this added 
value is expected to ultimately result in incremental cash flows, the time-discounted 
effect should be reflected in the stock price if markets operate efficiently (Fama, 1970).  
Within this argument are two limitations of the event study methodology.  First, markets 
are assumed to be efficient, which while still generally accepted, continues to be the 
subject of debate (Malkiel, 2003).  Second, for the method to attribute abnormal returns 
to an alliance announcement, market actors must realize and react appropriately to the 
value implications of the alliance within the event window period designated by the 
researcher.   Otherwise, if the value of an alliance only becomes apparent to market 
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actors at some unidentified later point in time, the effect is unrecognizable amid the noise 
of other potential influences to future cash flow.  More generally, in an event study, value 
is limited to its manifestation in stock price.   
Alternatively, through an event history model, Study One judges the value of 
alliances by their association with entrepreneurial enterprise survival.  While offering a 
different perception of alliance value, the event history method shares some general 
limitations with event studies.  Neither method offers the inside-the-organization depth 
that is boasted by qualitative research methods (Lincoln & Denzin, 2000; Morgan & 
Smircich, 1980).  Recognizing this limitation and the contribution a qualitative effort can 
make to personifying archival data, expert interviews were incorporated into the 
discussion of industry implications (Chapter 5).  Yet, undoubtedly an endeavor focused 
solely on the qualitative approach would have yielded a substantially different depth of 
investigation but also addressed the research questions without the breath of longitudinal 
and cross-sectional analysis achieved through the methods employed here.  One specific 
example of an issue that arose in this research that qualitative methods might well address 
is the full dynamic effects of the institutional change in 1996.  While the primarily 
quantitative approach taken in this dissertation uncovered both a change in the quantities 
of promotional alliances after this event and the emergence of diminishing returns to 
team survival, a complete explanation of why this change was enacted and how it may 
have impacted the actors in this environment beyond mere survival and alliance numbers 
is a story left untold here.  However, such an investigative fixation on one particular 
event in this unique setting is also outside the scope of the broader research questions 
framing this dissertation.   
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Given that like all research methods, the tactics called upon in this dissertation 
possess inherent strengths and weaknesses, the investigative context in which the 
methods were deployed also limits the studies to some degree.  Formula One motor 
racing offers an extremely interesting environment with several beneficial qualities for 
organizational research, most of which were described in Chapter Two.  Nonetheless, 
certain intricacies of the context also limit the prospect of generalization to all 
organizations.  In Study One, F1 teams are examined as entrepreneurial enterprises.  
Appropriately, the characteristics of the enterprise and its relationships with other 
organizations are studied in relation to its survival within the institutional environment of 
Formula One competition (Audretsch & Mahmood, 1995).  However, it must be 
acknowledged that the institutional support system in F1 is fairly unique in that once 
teams are accepted for a racing season, they share disproportionably in the media 
revenues of the series34.  Essentially, given that F1 is at its core a sporting competition, 
the teams have a vested interest in each others’ survival to the extent that an attractive 
base of competition exists for spectator interest.  The sporting dynamic thereby 
contributes a dimension to the context that remains distinct from pure corporate 
competition35.  Therefore, as with any research in a given context, consideration of the 
nuances of F1, some of which were raised in the last chapter’s interviews, must be 
recognized in any argument for the generalization of the results discovered in these 
studies.   
                                                 
34
 The formula for this allocation, while widely speculated on, is a closely guarded secret of Formula One 
Management, which owns the media rights to the racing series (Collings, 2004). 
35
 Yet from an entrepreneurial standpoint, enterprise dissolution remains a very real possibility in F1 as 
evidenced by a total dissolution rate of 12.1 percent across the longitudinal timeframe.  Generally this 
suggests that on a season-to-season basis, more than one in every ten teams fails to survive to the following 
season.    
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6.3 Future Research 
While the knowledge surrounding various iterations of interorganizational 
alliances has expanded remarkably in the last several decades (for an overview, see 
Chapter One as well as Das & Teng, 1996; Ireland et al., 2002; Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995), opportunities remain for further research.  The work embarked upon 
in this dissertation represents an advance in the conceptualization of strategic alliances 
based on promotional objectives, but this avenue of interorganizational research is just 
beginning to flourish.  Commercial sponsorship has only recently been viewed in the 
research literature as an alliance between cooperating organizations (Farrelly & Quester, 
2005a; 2005b).  As a result, the cross-disciplinary contribution of these two literature 
streams remains relatively untapped.   When an integrative perspective is applied to the 
composition, structure, moderators, outcomes, value, and stakeholders of these alliances, 
several future research possibilities emerge.   
Distinct from other alliance relationships, promotional alliances rely on a 
promoting enterprise to essentially propel their partners’ prospective customers through 
the customer learning curve from need recognition to retention, or at least encourage 
movement along particular segments of the curve (Hellmen, 2005).  Identifying what 
dimensions of a promotional alliance relationship best apply to the various steps between 
need recognition and customer retention is an applicable area of research, but these 
associations must be preceded by a thorough understanding of the dimensions offered 
within promotional alliances.  Sponsorship survey research strongly suggests that 
relationship building is likely to be one of these dimensions (Copeland et al., 1996; 
Crowley, 1991; O’Hagan and Harvey, 2000; Thjømøe et al., 2002), while the strategic 
alliance literature implies interorganizational endorsement or credentialing as another 
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dimension (Stuart et al., 1999).  Still several other facets of these alliances may be 
relevant to their operation and ongoing effectiveness.  Such a descriptive exploration of 
the composition of promotional alliances may be tackled most effectively by qualitative 
research similar to that offered in the last chapter, which engaged actors from various 
alliance perspectives.  Internal to the alliance, Farrelly and colleagues (Farrelly et al., 
2003; Farrelly & Quester, 2003a) draw on the relationship marketing literature to 
emphasize the importance of trust, commitment, and collaborative communication 
between the promoting enterprise and sponsoring firm (Morgan & Hunt, 1994); but how 
these relationship qualities impact the achievement of an alliance’s promotional 
objectives remains uncertain.   
A structural dimension of promotional alliances warranting further study is the 
fact that the promoting enterprise often provides their marketing service to several firms 
simultaneously, thereby forming a network of B2B relationships (Erickson & Kushner, 
1999).  While interorganizational research has evolved beyond the dyadic perspective to 
now commonly incorporate a network approach to resource acquisition (e.g. Brass et al., 
2004; Gulati, 1998; Gulati et al., 2000; Ritter & Gemünden, 2003), resource networks in 
a promotion-based context remain unexplored despite the likelihood that a promotional 
organization’s survival is contingent upon such networks.  The results of the first study 
executed here demonstrate this imperative.  Certain scholars have acknowledged that 
employing the tools of social network analysis would be beneficial in explicating the 
power dynamics within this type of resource network (Wolf et al., 1997), but empirical 
research has not yet followed through on this prospect.  Does providing resources of a 
scarce type signify power in promotional networks?  If so, how does the power 
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distribution affect network evolution?  Is there also power in network positions that fill 
structural holes between firms (i.e. serving as a broker of B2B relationships) (Burt, 
1992)?  Such a conception of power may be beneficial to a sponsored enterprise that can 
forge business relationships between sponsoring firms.  Perhaps developing a network 
competency of brokering relationships provides an advantage to one promotional 
enterprise in competition with others for the resources offered by sponsoring firms.  The 
initial study of this dissertation is one of the first to examine the perspective of the 
promotional enterprise within these alliances and thus many questions such as these are 
unanswered at this time.  
Even though the sponsoring firm’s perspective has been more popular amongst 
researchers, the findings of Study Two renew some questions regarding the tenets of 
commercial sponsorship and more broadly, promotional alliance relationships.  As 
operationalized in this research, two of the foundations of commercial sponsorship 
theory, complementarity and leverage (Gwinner, 1997; Quester & Thompson, 2001), 
were not valued by the shareholders of sponsoring firms.  In the case of complementarity, 
this finding seems contrary to some of the interview data in the last chapter and the 
positive significant results for industry congruence in domestic US research that utilized 
abnormal returns as the dependent variable in multiple regression analyses (Cornwell, 
Pruitt et al., 2001; Cornwell, Pruitt et al., 2005; Pruitt et al., 2004).  Beyond the 
previously stated objection to the use of estimated abnormal returns as a predicted 
variable, future research might explore if aligning with complementary promoting 
enterprises is unrecognized as value enhancing in other international settings as well.  If 
so, either investors on the international stage are correct in their assessment and the 
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complementarity between promotional alliance partners does not affect the sponsoring 
firm’s future cash flows, or complementarity does indeed matter and investors simply do 
not recognize its contribution, as seemed to be suggested by the experts interviewed.  If 
sponsorship theory is correct and complementarity enhances desired outcomes, can 
investor perceptions of the value of alliance complementarity be positively influenced by 
more explicit descriptions in alliance announcements of why complementarity is likely to 
enhance future cash flows for the firm?  An extensive content analysis of past alliance 
announcements would be a starting point for this avenue of research, and a controlled 
manipulation of factitious press releases could add an experimental element to such an 
investigation.   
The second study of this dissertation utilized a content analysis of F1 promotional 
alliance announcements to identify the acknowledgement of a plan to leverage the 
relationship.  Despite scholars’ description of leveraging activities as a necessary 
condition for commercial sponsorship to act as a strategic resource (Fahy et al., 2004), 
this study’s findings show investors to be skeptical of the value of leverage initiatives.  
While this may be because the initiatives are unrealized at the time of announcement, if 
investors perceived the activities as likely to occur and result in enhanced cash flow, the 
market value should reflect that perception.  Although the research on leveraging 
promotional relationships is much less developed than that of industry congruence, the 
same value dilemma arises in regard to judging the actual effectiveness of leveraging 
sponsorship with other resources, or simply educating market actors better in alliance 
announcements.  Given the early state of research on leveraging promotional alliances, 
future study should first be directed toward the former of these questions regarding how 
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leveraging an alliance through the commitment of other supporting resources actually 
enhances its effectiveness.  Cliffea and Motion (2005) have suggested that promotional 
alliances should be leveraged toward specific customer targets of the sponsoring firm, but 
exactly which supporting resources should be deployed and their moderating impact on 
various measures of effectiveness, such as awareness (Crimmins & Horn, 1996; Johar & 
Pham, 1999), image enhancement (Javalgi et al., 1994), purchase intent (Koo et al., 2006; 
Madrigal, 2000), and loyalty (Sirgy et al., 2008) have yet to be determined.  Without 
more precise knowledge of how leverage activities influence such outcomes, perhaps it is 
not surprising that investors have so far failed to recognize the subsequent link to 
shareholder value.   
In summary, Study Two indicates that shareholders of sponsoring firms view F1 
promotional alliances as costs rather than investments likely to yield future cash flows in 
excess of their related expenses.  Future research needs to build on this finding by 
investigating if investors are mistaken in this assessment and these alliances are in reality 
associated with future cash flows, and through what process (i.e. by positively impacting 
which stage of the customer learning process [Hellmen, 2005]), or if investors are correct 
in their categorization of such alliances as liabilities.  Central to this general theme is the 
link between the theorized promotional alliance outcomes mentioned above (awareness, 
image enhancement, purchase intent, and loyalty) and shareholder value.  An assumption 
of utilizing shareholder value as an ultimate outcome variable is that through efficient 
markets it reflects a range of other positive effects realized by the firm.  However, 
promotional alliances may act as theorized and affect certain customer outcome measures 
without impacting shareholder value if a strong connection does not exist between the 
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customer measures touted in theory and future cash flows.  Research into this link is vital 
to the future proliferation of event studies in marketing research and would also be 
informative in the evolution of theory surrounding the tools of marketing communication.    
 Finally, this dissertation has expanded the knowledge of strategic alliances based 
on promotional resource exchange.  A strong association between promotional enterprise 
survival and alliances offering financial and performance-based resources was 
established and information on the utility of other types of alliance resources was also 
investigated.  Financial markets’ negative assessments of the value of an international 
promotional alliance were analyzed, which provided the view of sponsoring firms’ 
shareholders.   Yet, several other stakeholders in the B2B relationships forged by 
promotional alliances have not been addressed in this research and are generally 
underrepresented in the topic’s current literature.  Studies investigating the effects of 
promotional alliances have focused almost exclusively on a consumer audience despite 
the diversity of goals and targeted audiences found in research on sponsorship objectives.  
When surveyed, marketing managers have consistently included stakeholder groups such 
as employees, suppliers, shareholders, and other potential business partners as target 
audiences for commercial sponsorship (Crowley, 1991; Copeland et al., 1996; Cliffea & 
Motion, 2005); but researchers have neglected to empirically investigate the impact of 
promotional alliances on these audiences.  For example, one of the most common 
dimensions of commercial sponsorship is event hospitality, but its strategic use to 
leverage the alliance as a business-to-business relationship builder has been ignored thus 
far in scholarly research.  Further, companies heavily engaged in promotional alliances 
that also boast large employee populations, such as UPS and Home Depot, have 
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anecdotally referred to employee benefits such as commitment and pride in popular press 
articles (Bradley, 1996).  Nevertheless, empirical work on the impact of promotional 
alliances on employees has not materialized.  Consequently, future research that 
embraced a diversified stakeholder perspective would advance the momentum of this 
discipline of study in addition to the questions raised in the areas of promotional alliance 
dimensions, structure, compliments, outcomes, and valuation.  Hopefully, the studies 
undertaken within this dissertation successfully evoke conversation and intrigue that lead 
to even more knowledge generation concerning these interorganizational alliances.   
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THE TABLES 
 
Table A.1. Overview of the research characterizing strategic alliances and commercial sponsorship.  
 
 
 
Strategic Alliance 
 
Commercial Sponsorship 
Aspects Description Source Description Source 
Definition Cooperative relationships 
driven by a logic of strategic 
resource needs and social 
resource opportunities. 
Eisenhardt & 
Schoonhoven, 1996, p. 
137 
The provision of assistance either 
financial or in kind to an activity 
by a commercial organization for 
the purpose of achieving 
commercial objectives. 
Meenaghan, 1983, p.9 
Alternate 
Definition 
Voluntary cooperative inter-
firm agreements aimed at 
achieving competitive 
advantage for the partners. 
Das & Tang, 2000, 
p.33 
An alliance between those who 
market sport and those who 
market through sport. 
Farrelly & Quester, 2005, p. 
238 
Purpose  Create optimum value from 
limited resources 
 Improve strategic position 
 Stimulate demand 
 Organizational learning 
 Differentiation 
 Cost risk reduction 
 Access new markets 
 Broaden product line 
 Exploit opportunities 
Barringer & Harrison, 
2000; Das et al., 1998; 
Das & Tang, 2000; 
Varadarajan & 
Cunningham, 1995 
 Achieve competitive advantage 
 Image/awareness enhancement 
 Differentiation 
 Sales 
 Relationship building 
 Community relations and 
support 
 Personal interest 
Amis et al., 1997; Copeland 
et al., 1996; Cornwell et al., 
2001; Crowley, 1991; Fahy et 
al., 2004; Meenaghan, 2005; 
O’Hagan & Harvey, 2000; 
Thjømøe et al., 2002  
Structure  Unilateral contract-based 
 Bilateral contract-based 
 Equity joint venture 
 Minority equity alliance 
Das & Teng, 2000 Exchange between sponsor and 
sponsee whereby the latter 
receives a fee and the former 
obtains the right to associate itself 
with the activity sponsored. 
Cornwell & Maignan, 1998 
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Success 
Factors 
 Commitment 
 Trust 
 Compatibility 
 Cultural fit 
 Expectation and conflict 
management 
 Information exchange 
 Interdependence 
 Balance of power 
 Mutual learning and 
adjustment 
 Shared decision making 
 Strategic similarity 
 Strong interpersonal 
relations 
 Reputation 
Bucklin & Sengupta, 
1993; Day, 1995; Doz, 
1996; Gulati, 1998; 
Hughes & Weiss, 
2007; Hutt et al., 2000; 
Saxton, 1997 
 Commitment 
 Trust 
 Collaborative communication 
 Fit/match-up: functional or 
image-based congruence 
 Involvement level 
 Leveraging activities 
 Market orientation 
 Sincerity 
 
Amis et al., 1999; Farrelly & 
Quester, 2003a; Farrelly & 
Quester, 2003b; Gladden & 
Wolfe, 2001; Gwinner & 
Eaton, 1999; McDaniel, 
1999; Musante et al., 1999; 
Speed & Thompson, 2000 
Evaluation 
Measures 
 Longevity 
 Profitability 
 Partner satisfaction 
 Perceived effectiveness 
 Survival 
 
Bucklin & Sengupta, 
1993; Das & Teng, 
2000; Gulati, 1998; 
Hutt et al., 2000; 
Saxton, 1997 
 Longevity 
 Goodwill 
 Image/awareness enhancement 
 Consumer attitude 
 Partner satisfaction 
 Perceived contribution to brand 
equity 
 Perceived differentiation 
 Purchase intention 
Cornwell et al., 2001; 
Farrelly & Quester, 2003b; 
Gwinner & Eaton, 1999; 
McDaniel, 1999; Meenaghan, 
2001; Meenaghan & Shipley, 
1999; Ruth & Simonin, 2003; 
Speed & Thompson, 2000 
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Table A.2. 2007 Formula One Team and Driver Nationalities 
Team (Constructor) Team 
Nationality 
Driver Driver 
Nationality 
Vodafone McLaren Mercedes British Fernando Alonso Spanish 
  Lewis Hamilton British 
ING Renault F1 French Giancarlo Fisichella Italian 
  Heikki Kovalainen Finnish 
Scuderia Ferrari Marlboro Italian Felipe Massa Brazilian 
  Kimi Räikkönen Finnish 
Honda Racing F1 Japanese Jenson Button British 
  Rubens Barrichello Brazilian 
BMW Sauber F1 German Nick Heidfeld German 
  Robert Kubica Polish 
  Sebastian Vettel German 
Panasonic Toyota Racing Japanese Ralf Schumacher German 
  Jarno Trulli Italian 
Red Bull Racing Swiss David Coulthard Scottish 
  Mark Webber Australian 
AT&T Williams British Nico Rosberg German 
  Alexander Wurz Swiss 
  Kazuki Nakajima Japanese 
Scuderia Toro Rosso Italian Vitantonio Liuzzi Italian 
  Scott Speed American 
  Sebastian Vettel German 
Etihad Alder Spyker F1 Dutch Adrian Sutil German 
  Christijan Albers Dutch 
  Markus Winkelhock  German 
  Sakon Yamamoto Japanese 
Super Aguri F1 Japanese Takuma Sato Japanese 
  Anthony Davidson British 
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Table A.3: Descriptive statistics for the variables of Study 1. 
 
Variable Hypothesis/ 
Control 
Expected 
sign* 
Measure Count (%)^ Min Max Mean (S.D.) 
Dissolution (annual) Dependent 
Variable 
 Binary 68 (12.1% of 
562 team yrs.) 
   
Sponsor firm context 
experience (yrs.) 
H1 (-) Continuous n = 5,054 
alliance yrs. 
0 41 5.02 (6.51) 
Performance resources H2 (-) Continuous 2,781 (55.0) 0 29 4.46 (5.48) 
Financial resources H3 (-) Continuous 1,318 (26.1) 0 21 2.14 (2.80) 
Operational resources H4 (-) Continuous 955 (18.9) 0 21 1.53 (2.79) 
Institutional dynamics  
(era: post-’95) 
H5 (-) Binary 
interaction 
3,352 (66.3)    
Embeddedness (Btwn) H6 (-) Continuous  0 0.513 0.096 (0.097) 
Team performance: 
recent (5 yr. avg. pts.) 
H7a (-) Continuous  0 198 25.74 (35.86) 
Team performance:  
historic (champ.) 
H7b (-) Continuous  0 15 1.905 (3.136) 
Team Sold Control unspecified Binary 22 (3.9% of 
team years) 
   
* Note that the expected sign is the relationship to the hazard of enterprise dissolution.  As a result, a negative relationship is 
hypothesized to reduce the probability of dissolution, or in other words, increase the probability of enterprise survival. 
^ Unless otherwise noted, percentage reported is based on the sample of 5,054 unique sponsor-team alliance years.  For instance, of all 
sponsor-team alliances in every year (5,054), 55 percent (2,781) involved the exchange of performance-based resources.
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Table A.4: Correlation matrix for variables in the event history model (Study 1). 
 
  SprExp SprPer SprFin TmExp SprOps Era1996 Btwn Av5yrPts CumDrv Sold Dissolved 
SprExp 1  .848 ** .627 ** .648 ** .661 ** .692 ** .547 ** .649 ** .569 ** .073  -.191 ** 
SprPer .848 ** 1  .719 ** .454 ** .766 ** .765 ** .655 ** .409 ** .326 ** .132 ** -.198 ** 
SprFin .627 ** .719 ** 1  .331 ** .738 ** .756 ** .513 ** .213 ** .125 ** .187 ** -.134 ** 
TmExp .648 ** .454 ** .331 ** 1  .317 ** .403 ** .348 ** .685 ** .860 ** .014  -.215 ** 
SprOps .661 ** .766 ** .738 ** .317 ** 1  .763 ** .526 ** .221 ** .135 ** .162 ** -.129 ** 
Era1996 .692 ** .765 ** .756 ** .403 ** .763 ** 1  .441 ** .286 ** .216 ** .159 ** -.152 ** 
Btwn .547 ** .655 ** .513 ** .348 ** .526 ** .441 ** 1  .329 ** .273 ** .051  -.219 ** 
Av5yrPts .649 ** .409 ** .213 ** .685 ** .221 ** .286 ** .329 ** 1  .812 ** -.093 * -.236 ** 
CumDrv .569 ** .326 ** .125 ** .860 ** .135 ** .216 ** .273 ** .812 ** 1  -.097 * -.197 ** 
Sold .073 .132 ** .187 ** .014  .162 ** .159 ** .051  -.093 * -.097 * 1  -.073 * 
Dissolved -.191 ** -.198 ** -.134 ** -.215 ** -.129 ** -.152 ** -0.219 ** -.236 ** -.197 ** -.073 * 1   
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A.5: Event history model analysis examining the influence on enterprise (F1 team) 
survival of promotional alliances offering various resources (Study 1). 
 
Variable Hyp. Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6^ 
SprExp 1 0.018  0.005  0.009  0.020  0.021  0.025  
              
SprPer 2 -0.541 ***     -0.635 *** -0.730 *** -0.650 *** 
   SprPer (binary)    -0.756 *         
   SprPer (share)      -26.527 ***       
   SprPer * SprPer          0.027 ***   
              
SprFin 3a -0.628 **     -0.420 ** -0.642 ** -0.551 ** 
   SprFin (binary)    -0.756 *         
   SprFin (share)      -11.949 **       
   SprFin * SprFin          0.083 *   
TmExp#  0.122  0.180 * 0.139  0.123  0.154  0.110  
SprPer * TmExp        0.021 **     
SprFin * TmExp 3b 0.038        -0.010  0.001  
   SprFinBinary * TmExp    0.008          
   SprFinShare * TmExp      0.493        
              
SprOps 4 0.324      0.062  0.179  -0.048  
   SprOps (binary)    0.116          
   SprOps (share)      -0.425        
   SprOps * SprOps          -0.028    
              
Era1996#  0.577  5.981    2.081      
SprFin * Era1996 5 1.023 **     0.384      
   SprFinBinary * Era1996    -5.446          
              
DegBtwn 6 0.711  -4.562  1.315    0.739  1.597  
              
Av5YrPts 7 -0.067 ** -0.067 ** -0.071 ** -0.062 *** -0.078 *** -0.0694 *** 
Av5YrPts * Era1996  -1.959 ** -0.544 *   -0.842 **     
CumDrv 7 -0.855 ** -0.992 ** -0.435  -0.704 * -0.610  -0.567  
              
Sold  -28.973  -15.351  -15.165    -25.869  -15.202  
              
Likelihood ratio test (χ2)  79.401 *** 65.750 *** 62.814 *** 78.621 *** 73.641 *** 58.921 *** 
- 2 Log likelihood  210.9  224.547  191.449  254.731  216.657  203.008  
df  13  13  10  11  13  10  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 
^ Includes only data prior to 1996. (n = 432 team years) 
#
 These terms are included in the model as lower order terms of hypothesized interaction effects. 
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Table A.6: Main hypothesized results of Study 1, where the dependent variable is the likelihood of team dissolution. 
 
Variable Hypothesis Operationalization Prediction Coefficient^ Result 
Experience (sponsor) H1 Sum of sponsor portfolio 
yrs. of experience in F1 
(-) 0.018 
 
not supported 
Performance resources H2 No. of performance-based 
sponsors 
(-) -0.541 ** supported 
Financial resources H3a No. of financial-based 
sponsors 
(-) -0.628 * supported 
Financial resource 
interaction w/ team exp. 
H3b Financial sponsors * Yrs. of 
team experience in F1 
(-) 0.038  not supported 
Operational resources H4 No. of operationally-based 
sponsors 
(-) 0.324  not supported 
Institutional dynamics  H5 Financial sponsors * Era 
(post ’95) 
(-) 1.023 * not supported 
(reverse) 
Embeddedness H6 Betweenness centrality in F1 
sponsorship network 
(-) 0.711  not supported 
Team performance: recent  H7a Rolling avg. sum of team 
points in past 5 yrs. 
(-) -0.067 * supported 
Team performance:  historic  H7b Cumulative drivers 
championships won by team 
(-) -0.855 * supported 
^ Coefficient for corresponding term in the primary model (Model 1 of Table A.5) 
** p < 0.01, * p < .05 
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Table A.7: Results and characteristics of selected marketing event studies. 
 
Author(s) Event Sample size Baseline 
period 
MAR (%) 
at t = 0 
Test 
statistic 
Event 
windowa 
(days) 
CMAR (%) of 
event window 
Test 
statistic 
Lane & 
Jacobson, 1995 
Brand 
extension 
89 extensions 
(34 firms) 
t – 320 to 
t – 60 
Not 
reported 
NA 0, +1 (2) 0.63 3.67*** 
Geyskens, 
Gielens, & 
Dekimpe, 2002 
Internet 
marketing 
channel 
additions 
98 channel 
additions  
(22 firms) 
t – 250 to 
t – 30 
0.35 2.89*** 0, +1 (2) 0.71 Not 
reported 
Agrawal & 
Kamakura, 
1995 
Celebrity 
endorsement 
110 
endorsements 
(35 firms) 
t – 244 to 
t – 6 
0.44 
 
2.39** -1, 0 (2) 0.54 2.04* 
Mathur, Mathur, 
& Rangan, 1997 
Michael 
Jordan’s 
return to NBA 
5 firms 
endorsed by 
Jordan 
t – 55 to  
t – 6 
0.82 1.83* -2, +2 
(5) 
1.99 (p<.05)^ 
Cornwell, 
Pruitt, & Clark, 
2005 
Official 
product sports 
sponsorship 
53 sponsorships 
(43 firms) 
t – 275 to 
t – 26 
0.28 1.11 -2, +2 
(5) 
1.11 2.32** 
Clark, 
Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
Stadium 
naming rights 
sponsorship 
49 sponsorships 
(48 firms) 
t – 175 to 
t – 26 
0.73 2.37** -1, +1 
(3) 
1.65 3.12*** 
Leeds, Leeds, & 
Pistolet, 2007 
Stadium 
naming rights 
sponsorship 
54 sponsorships t – 170 to 
t – 21 
0.18 5/54 sig. 
(.05) at 
firm level 
(3+, 2-)^ 
-20, +21 
(42) 
2/54 sig. (.05) 
at firm level, 
(both [-])^ 
Not 
reported 
Pruitt, 
Cornwell, & 
Clark, 2004 
NASCAR 
team primary 
sponsorship 
24 sponsorships t + 101 to 
t + 200 
Not 
reported 
NA -1, 0 (2) 1.29 2.08** 
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Author(s) Event Sample size Baseline 
period 
MAR (%) 
at t = 0 
Test 
statistic 
Event 
windowa 
(days) 
CMAR (%) of 
event window 
Test 
statistic 
Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
NASCAR race 
effect on team 
sponsors 
39 firms  
(34 races) 
2001 
calendar 
year 
0.19 1.9*** NA   
Cornwell, 
Pruitt, & Van 
Ness, 2001 
Indy 500 race 
winner effect 
on team 
sponsor 
28 sponsorships 
(17 firms) 
t – 170 to 
t – 21 
-0.24 -1.19 -2, +2 
(5) 
-0.26 Not 
reported 
Miyazaki & 
Morgan, 2001 
Olympic 
sponsorship 
27 firms t – 125 to 
t – 6 
0.12  
(t –1,0) 
0.20 -4, 0 (5) 1.24 2.10** 
Farrell & 
Frame, 1997 
Olympic 
sponsorship 
26 firms t – 250 to 
t – 10 
0.01 0.04 0, 2 (3) -0.43 -2.20** 
Mishra, 
Bobinski, & 
Bhabra, 1997 
Various event 
sponsorships 
76 sponsorships t – 147 to 
t – 22 
0.56 2.02** -1, 0 (2) 0.69 1.91* 
* p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
^ Column statistic (and SE) not reported. 
a
 The event window reported here is the window used for multiple regression analysis of CMAR. 
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Table A.8: Descriptive statistics for the variables of Study 2. 
 
Variable Hypothesis/ 
Control 
Expected 
sign 
Measure Count (%);  
[n = 73*] 
Min.; Max. Mean (S.D.) Median 
CAR (0,1), Event 
Indicator Model  
Dependent 
Variable 
unspecified Continuous/ 
Binary by 
Sig. 
10 negative; 
0 positive 
(p<.10) 
-0.1020; 
0.0380 
-0.00940 
(0.0240) 
-0.00628 
Resource 
Complementarity 
H1 + Binary 47 (64.4)    
Nationality 
Congruence 
H2 + Binary 22 (30.1)    
Level (Owner/Title) H3 most likely Categorical 10 (13.7)    
Level (Top) H3 less likely Categorical 40 (54.8)    
Level (Supplier) H3 least likely Categorical 23 (31.5)    
Leverage H4 + Binary 17 (23.3)    
Size (Employee #) Control - Continuous  422; 366,736 81,533 (92,361) 40,900 
Corporate name Control + Binary 15 (23.1)^    
Experience (yrs.) Control unspecified Continuous  0; 24 3.40 (5.10) 0 
Agency conflict Control - Continuous  -1,182; 4,256 260.63 (593.69) 152.22 
Partner performance: 
recent (% pts.) 
Control + Continuous  0; 50% 10.01% (10.0%) 8.68% 
Partner performance:  
historic (champ.) 
Control + Continuous  0; 14 4.53 (4.31) 3 
* Seventy-three alliances are specified by the abnormal returns of the sponsoring firm.  These 73 alliances are made up of 65 firms 
and 10 promoting teams. Percentages reported in this column represent the sample’s 73 unique alliances unless otherwise noted. 
^ The percentage reported is based on the sample’s inclusion of 65 unique firms.
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Table A.9: Alliance characteristic variables used in prediction of cumulative abnormal returns in corporate sponsorship event studies. 
  
Independent 
variable 
Operationalized Context β  Test statistic Author(s) 
Congruence Dummy for yes/no 
relationship to sport 
MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
11.47 3.51*** Cornwell, 
Pruitt, & Clark, 
2005 
Congruence Automotive-related 
firm dummy 
NASCAR team 
sponsorship 
0.028 2.33** Pruitt, 
Cornwell, & 
Clark, 2004 
Congruence Automotive-related 
firm dummy 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race 
winner 
0.0281 1.42^ Cornwell, 
Pruitt, & Van 
Ness, 2001 
Contract length Years of agreement Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
0.16 2.36** Clark, 
Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
Relative cost Yearly payment 
divided by corporate 
cash flow 
Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
4.2E-05 1.09 Clark, 
Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
Local firm Dummy Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
1.95 1.83* Clark, 
Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
^ p<.10 (one-tailed test); * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A.10: Sponsoring firm characteristic variables used in prediction of cumulative abnormal returns in corporate sponsorship event 
studies.  
 
Independent 
variable 
Operationalized Context β  Test statistic Author(s) 
Agency 
conflict 
Corporate cash flow 
divided by market 
value of equity 
MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
1.95 0.15 Cornwell, Pruitt, & 
Clark, 2005 
Agency 
conflict 
Corporate cash flow 
per share 
NASCAR team 
sponsorship 
-0.0037 -2.31** Pruitt, Cornwell, & 
Clark, 2004 
High tech firm Dummy MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
11.08 3.12** Cornwell, Pruitt, & 
Clark, 2005 
High tech firm Dummy Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
4.51 3.30*** Clark, Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
Market 
position 
Market share MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
-0.18 -2.03** Cornwell, Pruitt, & 
Clark, 2005 
Corporate size Market value of 
equity 
MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
-6.3E-05 -1.19 Cornwell, Pruitt, & 
Clark, 2005 
Corporate size Total corporate assets NASCAR team 
sponsorship 
4.93E-08 0.63 Pruitt, Cornwell, & 
Clark, 2004 
Corporate size Market value of 
equity 
Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
-3.8E-11 -1.98 Clark, Cornwell, & 
Pruitt, 2002 
Corporate size Market value of 
equity divided by 
total MVE for Dow 
Jones’ 30 firms 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race 
winner 
-0.153 -0.29 Cornwell, Pruitt, & 
Van Ness, 2001 
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Independent 
variable 
Operationalized Context β  Test statistic Author(s) 
Corporate size Market value of 
equity and total assets 
Various event 
sponsorships 
Not reported Not significant Mishra, Bobinski, 
& Bhabra, 1997 
Corporate 
name 
Dummy for corporate 
name as opposed to 
product/brand name 
NASCAR team 
sponsorship 
0.029 2.90*** Pruitt, Cornwell, & 
Clark, 2004 
Corporate 
return on assets 
Firm operating 
income to total assets 
Various event 
sponsorships 
0.055 2.41** Mishra, Bobinski, 
& Bhabra, 1997 
Corporate 
advertising 
expenditure 
Advertising 
expenditure as 
proportion of sales 
Various event 
sponsorships 
Not reported Not significant Mishra, Bobinski, 
& Bhabra, 1997 
^ p<.10 (one-tailed test); * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A.11: Promotional partner characteristic variables used in prediction of cumulative abnormal returns in corporate sponsorship 
event studies.  
Independent 
variable 
Operationalized Context β  Test statistic Author(s) 
League Dummies for NBA, 
NFL, NHL, PGA 
(MLB intercept) 
MLB, NBA, NFL, 
NHL, PGA 
sponsorship 
-7.91 
(intercept); 
9.35 (NBA); 
7.07 (NFL); 
12.76 (NHL); 
9.58 (PGA) 
-1.87* 
(intercept); 
1.97* (NBA); 
1.61 (NFL); 
2.72***(NHL); 
2.03**(PGA) 
Cornwell, Pruitt, 
& Clark, 2005 
League Dummies for NBA, 
NFL, NHL (MLB 
intercept) 
Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
-10.72 
(intercept); 
1.73 (NBA);  
1.96 (NFL);  
1.37 (NHL) 
-3.31*** 
(intercept);  
1.27 (NBA);  
1.16 (NFL);  
1.07 (NHL) 
Clark, Cornwell, 
& Pruitt, 2002 
Market 
Population 
Metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) 
Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
-2.2E-07 -0.81 Clark, Cornwell, 
& Pruitt, 2002 
Television Dummy for televised 
event 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race winner 
0.006 0.255 Cornwell, Pruitt, 
& Van Ness, 2001 
Team success Total race series 
points in previous 
season 
NASCAR team 
sponsorship 
1.14E-05 3.62*** Pruitt, Cornwell, 
& Clark, 2004 
Win 
percentage 
Win percentage of 
past 2 years of tenant 
teams 
Stadium naming 
rights sponsorship 
12.02 2.48** Clark, Cornwell, 
& Pruitt, 2002 
Points earned Points earned in race NASCAR race effect 
on team sponsors 
-1E-04 -5.0*** Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
Prize money Prize money earned 
in race 
NASCAR race effect 
on team sponsors 
3.3E-05 2.75*** Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
Race win Dummy for winning 
race 
NASCAR race effect 
on team sponsors 
-0.003 -0.6 Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
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Independent 
variable 
Operationalized Context β  Test statistic Author(s) 
Win margin Race winner margin 
of victory in seconds 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race winner 
-4.85E-05 -0.49 Cornwell, Pruitt, 
& Van Ness, 2001 
Qualifying 
speed 
Percent of race 
winner’s qualifying 
speed relative to 
fastest qualifying car 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race winner 
-1.16 -1.44^ Cornwell, Pruitt, 
& Van Ness, 2001 
New winner Dummy if victory is 
driver’s first Indy 500 
win 
Sponsorship of an 
Indy 500 race winner 
0.042 2.35** Cornwell, Pruitt, 
& Van Ness, 2001 
Laps led Laps led in race NASCAR race effect 
on team sponsors 
-1.9E-06 -0.08 Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
Race accidents Number of race 
accidents involving 
sponsored team 
NASCAR race effect 
on team sponsors 
-0.005 2.60*** Sullivan & 
Dussold, 2003 
^ p<.10 (one-tailed test); * p<.10; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 (two-tailed test) 
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Table A.12: Correlation matrix for terms in the primary event study model and the CAR values for event window (0,1) 
 RComp NatC Lvl Lvg Size CorpN FirmExp Agency TeamP DriverP CAR SigCAR 
Resource 
Complementarity 1   0.071   0.037   -0.116   -0.174   -0.247 ** 0.168   0.149   -0.004   -0.179   -0.016   0.130   
Nationality Congruence 0.071   1   0.140   0.086   0.126   -0.033   0.179   0.018   0.081   0.099   0.225 * -0.180   
Level 0.037   0.140   1   -0.109   -0.402 *** 0.222 * -0.166   -0.166   0.066   -0.065   -0.038   -0.009   
Leverage Advertising 
-0.116   0.086   -0.109   1   -0.038   -0.052   -0.164   0.165   0.217 * 0.212 * 0.070   -0.173   
Size (employees) 
-0.174   0.126   -0.402 *** -0.038   1   0.052   0.126   0.060   -0.129   0.116   0.129   -0.062   
Corporate Name 
-0.247 ** -0.033   0.222 * -0.052   0.052   1   -0.065   -0.051   0.112   0.239 ** 0.089   0.089   
Firm Experience in F1 0.168   0.179   -0.166   -0.164   0.126   -0.065   1   -0.049   0.040   0.180   0.163   0.026   
Agency Conflict 0.149   0.018   -0.166   0.165   0.060   -0.051   -0.049   1   0.325 *** 0.055   0.134   -0.002   
Team Perf. (recent) 
-0.004   0.081   0.066   0.217 * -0.129   0.112   0.040   0.325 *** 1   0.609 *** 0.005   0.055   
Driver Perf. (historic) 
-0.179   0.099   -0.065   0.212 * 0.116   0.239 ** 0.180   0.055   0.609 *** 1   0.182   0.000   
CAR (0,1) 
-0.016   0.225 * -0.038   0.070   0.129   0.089   0.163   0.134   0.005   0.182   1   -0.551 *** 
Significant CAR 0.130   -0.180   -0.009   -0.173   -0.062   0.089   0.026   -0.002   0.055   0.000   -0.551 *** 1   
* Correlation significant at 0.10 level (2-tailed).   
** Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
*** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
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Table A.13: Various event window durations surrounding the announcement date of F1 promotional alliances. 
  2-Step Market Model Full Indicator Model 
Event 
Window 
Mean 
CAR (%) t-statistic 
Evt. Wdw. 
Dummy β t-Statistic 
-5, +5 -0.6764 -0.81  -0.00077 -0.99 
  
-2, +2 -0.4572 -0.94  -0.00084 -0.74 
  
-1, +1 
-0.5338 -1.51  
-0.00172 -1.18 
  
-1, 0 0.2483 0.82  0.00155 0.87 
  
0 -0.1669 -0.97  -0.00110 -0.44 
  
0, +1 -0.9442 -3.30 *** -0.00468 -2.62 *** 
0, +10 -1.8135 -2.22 ** -0.00170 -2.19 ** 
0, +20 -0.2978 -0.24  -0.00008 -0.14 
  
** p < .05; *** p < .01 
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Table A.14: Comparison by Sponsoring Firm of Event Indicator and Market Models for Event Windows (0,1) and (0,10). 
 
      Cumulative Abnormal Return [CAR] (0,1)   CAR (0,10) 
Sponsor Team^ 
Announce 
Date 
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model   
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model 
3D systems Renault 12/4/00 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0034  -0.2152 -0.2327 -0.2329 * 
Acer Ferrari 1/20/06 -0.0184 -0.0198 -0.0197  -0.1315 ** -0.1346 ** -0.1354 * 
Alice Ferrari 1/16/06 -0.0338 ** -0.0340 ** -0.0339  -0.0508 * -0.0502 * -0.0503 
Allianz Williams 5/19/00 -0.0107 -0.0122 -0.0121  -0.1168 -0.1125 -0.1125 
AMD Ferrari 2/6/02 -0.0553 -0.0543 -0.0543  0.0012 0.0069 0.0074 
AT&T Williams 10/20/06 0.0205 0.0200 0.0200  -0.0109 -0.0115 -0.0115 
Barco Honda 5/16/01 -0.0534 -0.0583 ** -0.0583  -0.0469 -0.0587 -0.0587 
Battery Williams 1/26/06 -0.0098 -0.0085 -0.0085  -0.0380 -0.0308 -0.0307 
BMC Software Toyota 7/2/04 -0.0167 -0.0183 -0.0183  -0.1549 ** -0.1615 ** -0.1646 
BMW Group BMW 6/22/05 0.0112 0.0114 0.0114  0.0491 0.0482 0.0481 
Bridgestone Multiple 12/14/05 -0.0414 ** -0.0421 ** -0.0420 *  -0.0555 * -0.0614 ** -0.0610 
Charmilles Honda 2/26/07 0.0033 0.0082 0.0073  0.0516 0.0530 0.0525 
Credit Suisse BMW 1/17/01 -0.0055 -0.0040 -0.0039  0.0017 0.0088 0.0087 
Dell Computer BMW 5/6/06 -0.0132 -0.0128 -0.0128  0.0198 0.0275 0.0282 
Denso Toyota 1/16/04 0.0307 0.0313 * 0.0313  0.0261 0.0285 0.0283 
DeWalt Williams 2/6/06 -0.0071 -0.0066 -0.0066 *  0.0040 0.0023 0.0022 
EMC2 Toyota 2/26/01 -0.1020 * -0.0965 ** -0.0964  -0.2462 * -0.2694 ** -0.2718 
Esprit Toyota 1/9/07 -0.0389 * -0.0346 -0.0347  -0.0865 -0.0813 -0.0833 
Exact Spyker 1/17/07 -0.0172 -0.0157 -0.0157  -0.0469 -0.0361 -0.0361 
FedEx McLaren 1/16/07 0.0221 0.0219 0.0219  0.0047 0.0041 0.0044 
Gatorade Honda 2/26/07 -0.0127 -0.0146 -0.0156  -0.0094 -0.0091 -0.0113 
Hilton International McLaren 9/9/05 -0.0064 -0.0062 -0.0062  -0.0253 -0.0185 -0.0186 
Honda Honda 11/17/04# -0.0376 ** -0.0382 * -0.0382 *  -0.0690 * -0.0700 -0.0701 ** 
Honda Super Aguri 10/7/05 -0.0054 -0.0057 -0.0057  -0.0206 -0.0235 -0.0237 
Honda Honda 10/26/99# 0.0041 0.0044  0.0044  0.0605 0.0444 0.0444 
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      Cumulative Abnormal Return [CAR] (0,1)   CAR (0,10) 
Sponsor Team^ 
Announce 
Date 
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model   
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model 
IBM Honda 2/26/07 -0.0103 -0.0083 -0.0078  -0.0141 -0.0145 -0.0137 
Infineon Ferrari 3/5/03 -0.0120 -0.0081 -0.0081  0.0910 0.0814 0.0766 
ING Renault 10/16/06 -0.0041 -0.0055 -0.0055  -0.0246 -0.0291 -0.0292 
Intel BMW 12/15/05 -0.0033 -0.0048 -0.0048  -0.0390 -0.0448 -0.0450 ** 
Johnnie Walker McLaren 2/22/05 0.0117 0.0105 0.0105  -0.0215 -0.0205 -0.0206 
KDDI Toyota 3/3/03 -0.0298 -0.0326 -0.0326  -0.0192 -0.0213 -0.0208 
Kingfisher Airlines Toyota 1/12/07 -0.0580 -0.0567 -0.0564  -0.0667 -0.0380 -0.0385 
Koni McLaren 11/30/06 -0.0121 -0.0112 -0.0112  -0.0313 -0.0257 -0.0255 
Kyoto Tool Toyota 10/25/01 -0.0600 -0.0628 -0.0628  -0.1275 -0.1374 -0.1367 
Lenovo Williams 1/16/07 0.0019 0.0012 0.0012  -0.0788 -0.0847 -0.0847 
Mercedes Benz McLaren 10/26/94 0.0120 0.0122 0.0121  0.0011 -0.0003 0.0004 
Mobil 1 McLaren 10/28/94 0.0032 0.0042 0.0040  -0.0412 -0.0372 -0.0373 
Nescafe Xpress McLaren 10/21/04 -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0039  0.0189 0.0154 0.0157 
NetApp Renault 1/20/03 0.0380 0.0380 0.0380  0.0621 0.0657 0.0660 
NGK Honda 4/28/06 -0.0104 -0.0135 -0.0135  -0.0963 * -0.1052 * -0.1056 * 
Nippon Oil Eneos Honda 2/24/05 0.0034 0.0047 0.0047  -0.0029 0.0029 0.0025 
NTN Honda 1/16/05 -0.0102 -0.0107 -0.0107  -0.0133 -0.0156 -0.0155 
Oerlikon Red Bull 1/23/07 -0.0073 -0.0068 -0.0068  -0.0256 -0.0220 -0.0222 
Panasonic Toyota 7/1/01 -0.0171 -0.0168 -0.0168  0.0244 0.0242 0.0241 
Perkin Elmer Honda 2/26/07 -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0094  -0.0236 -0.0174 -0.0186 
Phantom Works Renault 6/17/04 -0.0055 -0.0037 -0.0037  -0.0063 0.0033 0.0031 
Philips Williams 12/6/05 -0.0063 -0.0059 -0.0060  0.0634 ** 0.0635 ** 0.0635 
Puma Ferrari 9/8/04 0.0095 0.0076 0.0076  0.0242 0.0135 0.0135 
Puma Renault 1/7/04 -0.0166 -0.0162 -0.0162  -0.0550 -0.0511 -0.0511 
Puma Williams 12/8/03 -0.0159 -0.0149 -0.0149  -0.0077 -0.0027 -0.0027 
Randstad Williams 1/20/06 -0.0100 -0.0078 -0.0077  0.0366 0.0500 0.0496 
Ray-Ban Honda 6/18/04 0.0145 0.0150  0.0151  0.0416 0.0423 0.0425 
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      Cumulative Abnormal Return [CAR] (0,1)   CAR (0,10) 
Sponsor Team^ 
Announce 
Date 
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model   
Full Dates 
Indicator 
Model 
Baseline 
Indicator 
Model 
2-Step 
Market 
Model 
RBS Williams 1/6/05 0.0023 0.0023 0.0023  -0.0113 -0.0097 -0.0097 
Renault Renault 3/17/00 0.0139 0.0050 0.0050  0.0754 0.0659 0.0670 
Reuters Williams 1/12/00 0.0071 0.0153 0.0153  0.1148 0.1480 * 0.1506 
Samsung Spyker 5/5/05 0.0066 0.0058 0.0058  0.0547 * 0.0531 * 0.0530 ** 
Santander McLaren 8/28/06 -0.0009 -0.0011 -0.0011  -0.0084 -0.0085 -0.0084 
Seiko Honda 1/16/05 -0.0167 -0.0171 -0.0171  0.0071 0.0041 0.0041 
Shell Ferrari 7/31/95 0.0047 0.0040 0.0040  -0.0114 -0.0144 -0.0144 
Showa Honda 6/7/04 0.0139 0.0194 0.0197  0.0877 0.0987 * 0.0986 
Snap On Honda 1/9/06 0.0114 0.0112 0.0112  0.0012 0.0001 0.0004 
Standox BMW 5/13/06 0.0118 0.0125 0.0125 ** -0.0240 -0.0202 -0.0205 
Symantec Renault 7/28/03 0.0252 0.0247 0.0188  -0.0195 -0.0207 -0.0385 
Tata Williams 1/27/06 -0.0041 -0.0005 -0.0005  0.0570 0.0692 0.0691 
Time Inc Toyota 12/17/01 -0.0422 -0.0452 -0.0452  -0.0791 -0.0909 -0.0910 
Toyota Williams 7/27/06 -0.0051 -0.0028 -0.0028  0.0216 0.0235 0.0236 
Toyota Motor Corp. Toyota 6/30/00 -0.0546 * -0.0561 -0.0561  -0.0178 -0.0274 -0.0274 
Universal Music Group Honda 2/26/07 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018  -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0075 
Vodafone McLaren 12/14/05 0.0081 0.0059 0.0058  -0.0043 -0.0123 -0.0127 
Xansa Renault 10/13/05 -0.0464 ** -0.0450 ** -0.0450 ** -0.0544  -0.0433  -0.0473  
 
 
 Event Window β 
CAR Mean 
(SD)  Event Window β  
CAR Mean 
(SD) 
Full Sample   -0.0047 -0.0047  
-0.0094 
(0.0239)  -0.0017  -0.0017  
-0.0181 
(0.0684) 
  t-stat -2.6150 ** -2.6477 ** -3.3017 ** -2.1950 ** -2.1708 ** -2.2162 ** 
    p-value 0.0089  0.0081   0.0015     0.0282   0.0300   0.0300   
* p < .10; **  p < .05 (two-tailed tests)               
^ Team names are circa 2007               
#
 Honda announced a title sponsorship in 1999 and announced an equity stake in 2004. 
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Table A.15: Logistic regression model analysis of sponsoring firms demonstrating significant negative returns (DV) for the alliance 
announcement window (0,1). 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  β 
Wald's 
/ χ2 df p 
e^β     
(odds ratio) β 
Wald's 
/ χ2 df p 
e^β     
(odds ratio) β 
Wald's 
/ χ2 df p 
e^β     
(odds ratio) 
Constant -2.948 5.002 1 0.025 0.052 -3.322 3.139 1 0.076 0.036 -3.135 27.032 1 0.000 0.043 
Resource 
Complementarity 
0.075 0.005 1 0.942 1.078 0.369 0.089 1 0.766 1.446 
         
Nationality Congruence 1.986 4.041 1 0.044 7.284 1.680 2.285 1 0.131 5.366 1.689 5.903 1 0.064 5.412 
Level (Owner/Title) 0.826 0.493 1 0.483 2.285 3.021 1.765 1 0.184 20.521 
          
Level (Top) 
-1.031 0.783 1 0.376 0.357 -0.080 0.004 1 0.952 0.923 
          
Level (Supplier) 
 2.455 2 0.293   2.484 2 0.289  
          
Leverage Advertising 
-0.541 0.188 1 0.665 0.582 -0.817 0.245 1 0.621 0.442 
          
Size (employees) 
          
0.000 0.382 1 0.536 1.000 
          
Corporate Name 
          
1.751 1.440 1 0.230 5.759 
          
Firm Experience in F1 
          
-0.066 0.192 1 0.661 0.936 
          
Agency Conflict 
          
-0.001 0.271 1 0.603 0.999 
          
Team Perf. (recent) 
          
3.049 0.196 1 0.658 21.088 
          
Driver Perf. (historic) 
          
-0.106 0.278 1 0.598 0.899 
          
 
          
     
          
Model 
  
6.443 5 0.266 
    
9.341 11 0.590  
  
3.693 1 0.017 
  
-2 Log likelihood 34.328         30.679     37.078         
Cox & Snell R-square 0.089         0.134     0.052         
Nagelkerke R-square 0.200         0.291     0.117         
Hosmer & Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-fit  
2.728 7 0.909     9.098 7 0.246     NA 
      
216
 
 217 
Table A.16: Logistic regression model analysis of the impact of investment magnitude and alliance nationality congruence on the 
likelihood of significant negative returns (DV) for sponsoring firms announcing an F1 alliance.  
  Model 1 Model 2 
  β 
Wald's 
/ χ2 df p 
e^β     
(odds ratio) β 
Wald's 
/ χ2 df p 
e^β     
(odds ratio) 
Constant -2.870 6.270 1 0.000 0.057 -4.100 2.484 1 0.000 0.017 
Firm Alliance 
Investment 0.011 3.745 1 0.015 1.011 0.013 2.285 1 0.012 1.013 
Nationality Congruence 
          
2.199 0.089 1 0.053 9.016 
 
                    
Model 
  
5.718 1 0.005 
    
10.415 2 0.005 
  
-2 Log likelihood 34.869         30.172     0.030^   
Cox & Snell R-square 0.081         0.142         
Nagelkerke R-square 0.179         0.316         
Hosmer & Lemeshow 
Goodness-of-fit 
  
15.165 7 0.034     7.809 8 0.452 
  
^ Chi-square test of difference in -2LL between models 1 & 2. 
 
217
 
 218 
Table A.17: Logistic regression model estimations of the probability of negative shareholder returns based on the magnitude of 
investment and nationality congruence between the sponsoring firm and a sponsored F1 racing team.  
    
p(Significantly Negative Returns) [%] 
Investment 
(millions US$) 
Sample 
designation 
Investment 
alone 
Nationally 
incongruent 
Nationally 
congruent 
0.05 minimum 
(incongruent) 
5.3679 1.6320 NA 
0.3 minimum 
(congruent) 
5.3816 1.6372 13.0488 
1  5.4201 1.6521 13.1533 
2.88 median 5.5248 1.6926 13.4375 
10  5.9389 1.8552 14.5614 
27.23 mean 7.0642 2.3148 17.6037 
50  8.8535 3.0955 22.3607 
100  14.2680 5.7979 35.6876 
260 maximum 
(congruent) 
48.2466 33.4184 81.9014 
350 maximum 
(incongruent) 
71.0753 62.0379 NA 
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